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The events of 1989 unleashed a number of significant changes in European develop-
ment, bringing in their wake consequences such as the dismantling of the Iron Curtain,
the transformation of communist regimes, German reunification, dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, an end to the Cold War syndrome and the arrival of
a host of new states. The consequences of these changes affect nation-states, the Euro-
pean Union (EU), and European security and stability. While Europe as a whole has
moved from enmity towards friendship and from conflict to co-operation in economic,
political and military fields, the internal stability and cohesion of many states has been
adversely affected. The result has been civil wars, fragmentation, migration and eco-
nomic and social hardship. Parallel to these developments are attempts by the Union for
a larger and more integrated entity.
How Europe is responding to these changes and developments and their conse-
quences is the focus of this series, appropriately entitled Europe in Change. Books in this
series take both a historical and interdisciplinary perspective in order to compare the
post-1989 situation with earlier periods in European history and benefit from the theo-
retical insights of different disciplines in analysing both events and developments.
Theory and reform in the European Union examines how the Union has changed
since the events of 1989 and whether available theoretical and conceptual tools enable us
to explain and predict future European integration. The authors highlight the uneven
development both within EU policy areas and between EU policies and institutional set-
tings, emphasising that, in spite of important breakthroughs in the form of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU) and the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, the political authority of
the Union has not significantly increased. Nor, according to the authors, has there been
a reliable integration theory as the basis for assessing the Union’s future. They suggest
that structural ways of understanding changing patterns of interaction, free from the
inherently fragmented boundaries of micro-analysis, are needed to establish a more reli-
able theory. This would involve studying how intrastate policy-making intermeshes with
that of large-scale polity formation, based on an interlocking structure of political
authority – a transnational polity which lacks a single locus of decision-making. For the
authors, such an entity would have to strike a balance between being the main locus of
collective, binding decision-making for the constituent governments, and the dominant
focus of popular identification.
By focusing on the Union as a joint-decision system and by incorporating the
sociopsychological conditions of popular political identification, the authors offer some
valuable insights into the European integration process. Their analysis enhances the
understanding of the forces that form and reform the regional system, the relevance of
Treaty development and the scope of EU policy expansion, as well as the context of the
EU institutional and constitutional setting. It is a book which will be an important guide




Theorising about the structural conditions and operational dynamics of European inte-
gration has produced a wide-ranging ‘laboratory’ of concepts and ideas about what the
European Union is, and towards what it is developing. Central to these analyses has been
the search for conceptually refined paradigms and interpretations either on specific
policy actors and processes, or on the dynamic institutional configuration of the larger
management system. But what most analysts have concluded in the past in a more or less
confident manner about the possible evolution of European governance has been
trapped in the unpredictability of changing circumstances at both national and interna-
tional level. Much to the surprise of the more supranationalist projections of European
integration in the mid-1980s, a period described as a ‘neofunctionalist comeback’, the
Union has managed to survive the tides of federalism and institutional centralisation.
True, new patterns of interaction have emerged between the collectivity and its compo-
nent parts. But considerable resistance became manifest on the part of national govern-
ing elites for substantive constitutional reforms to bring about a ‘constitutive’ European
polity, whose citizens – presently in the form of separate national demoi, rather than in
the shape of a transnational civic demos – are capable of directing their democratic
claims to, and via, the central institutions of governance.
Put another way, a European ‘civic space’ is yet to emerge, and with it a more trans-
parent, inclusive and participatory process of union. At the same time, however, ‘con-
ventional’ intergovernmentalism, primarily concerned with the role and influence of
national governmental actors, finds it equally difficult to provide an overall hermeneutic
pattern of EU polity development. In many important respects, the current debate about
the Union’s political and constitutional physiognomy transcends the traditional analyti-
cal tools for studying its defining – and distinctive – properties and functions. Although
a new ‘conceptual consensus’ (or even sufficiently convergent conceptual understand-
ings) is still far from evident among its students, the conceptual apparatus developed in
the 1990s, and particularly since the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty, raises
serious questions about the democracy, governance and polity of Europe. It also raises
important concerns regarding the emerging forms of co-operative decision-making –
themselves, product of a by now consolidated practice of political determination among
the segment elites – and, in general, the relationship between theory-building and
collective constitutional engineering.
How far, then, have the new conceptual lenses employed by contemporary scholar-
ship to assess the state of European integration in the 1990s and early 2000s moved from
the initial supranationalism–intergovernmentalism dichotomy? What is, or appears to
be, distinctively new about the way in which the new theoretical approaches attempt to
capture the dominant character of the relationship between national autonomy and
regional institutionalisation or, alternatively, between state sovereignty and EU polity-
building? Is it possible to discern an end state of the integration process – whether or not
federal in kind – after almost half a century of continuous theoretical and empirical
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engagement in studying the policy processes and decisional outcomes of the general
system? The answer to this last question remains as elusive as ever, albeit with an impor-
tant qualification to be made: we do not know exactly what the end situation of the inte-
gration process might look like, but at least we can conclude with a degree of certainty
what its final product will not come to resemble: a regional superstate subsuming the
participating units – in the form of states, subnational political authorities and citizens
– in its governance structures.
This is no easy conclusion, especially when looking at the political dynamics of the
single European currency, the development of a common European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP) in the framework of a fast-changing international system, or
even the federalist-inspired principles already embedded in the Union’s primary law –
i.e., dual citizenship, subsidiarity, proportionality and the like – and the reform package
agreed in Amsterdam and, more recently, in Nice. So why is it that we dismiss the possi-
bility of a regional superstate? First, because the Union is still composed of sovereign
nation-states, whose dominant governing elites are still capable of managing the process
of large-scale institution-building and – at least for the time being – treaty-making.
Second, because since the 1990s state and regional organisations have found themselves
bound in a mutually reinforcing relationship – what has been termed a ‘symbiotic
arrangement’ – thus dismissing any zero-sum conception of the interplay between the
collectivity and the constituent segments. Third, because the extension of the scope of
integration, that is, the new policy arenas that gradually form part of the Union’s policy
acquis, does not necessarily coincide with the less dramatic extension of its level, namely,
the actual way in which the new functional areas are managed – i.e., in a supranational
or state-centric manner. Finally, the whole question of a ‘democratic deficit’ in EU and
national political structures has revealed the growing democratic disjunction between
the wishes of West European political elites and their respective publics, resulting in an
acute legitimacy crisis.
All the above are issues with which this book deals. In particular, Chapter 1 provides
a general introduction to the ‘disorderly universe’ of EU theorising, touching upon some
methodological issues concerning the study of the regional process. In doing so it looks
at the different theoretical approaches to European integration developed in the forma-
tive years of the process and up to the late 1970s. Chapter 2 directs its analytical foci to
the examination of recent theoretical trends, as well as to the two treaty revisions which
took place in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, giving birth to the Single European Act
(SEA) and the TEU, respectively. Chapter 3 deals with the process of ‘revising Maas-
tricht’, by assessing the politics of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 1996/97 and
the extent to which the outcome of the revision process – i.e., the Treaty of Amsterdam
(AMT) – represents an advancement of the integration process or merely a consolida-
tion of state competences. In a similar manner, Chapter 4 examines the politics of the
IGC 2000 – a review process assigned the task of dealing with the so-called ‘Amsterdam
leftovers’ – leading to the signing of the hotly debated and controversial Treaty of Nice
(NIT), at least with reference to the way in which final agreement was reached and the
growing dissonance between smaller and larger EU states during the final stages of the
negotiations. Chapter 5 examines the extent to which change in the international system
has produced political outcomes related to post-Cold War European security and
defence. This analysis traces the definitional features of the ‘new order’ in Europe.
Common themes involve debates about stability and instability, continuity and change,
multipolarity and leadership, co-operation and discord, power capabilities and patterns
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of behaviour. It also incorporates an analysis of the post-11 September 2001 context, fol-
lowing the horrific terrorist attacks that shocked the international community. Chapter
6 directs analytical attention to the institutions which lie at the heart of the debate about
European security and examines their interrelationship. A large part of the discussion
deals with European integration from the perspective of foreign and security policy as
well as with the issue of the Union’s role in the post-Cold War world. Finally, Chapter 7
offers a critical summative account of the Amsterdam and Nice reforms and reflects on




Forty years of theorising European integration have produced a situation where
one might expect that little remains to be said. This is not an attempt to escape
the intellectual responsibility of developing a greater understanding of the
forces that constantly form and reform the regional system. It is only to state
that the theory of such a polysemous concept as ‘integration’ appears to have
reached a high plateau in its Western European context. Not that theorists of
European integration should start looking for new regional experiments of
comparable analytical potential. Rather, the idea is that the new challenges
facing the study of regional integration in Europe (concerning both its theoret-
ical boundaries and operational dynamics) do not take place in a theoretical
vacuum: they are an extension, if not a refinement, of older ones. The task
remains to discover a reliable integration theory as the basis for the future of 
he European Union (EU) and offer a convincing response to the challenges of
large-scale polity formation.
Legitimately, however, one wonders whether Puchala’s cynical prophecy
that integration theory will amount to ‘a rather long but not very prominent
footnote in the intellectual history of twentieth century social science’ will prove
as accurate as the author would have us believe.1 A first response might be that
theory matters, whether or not its conceptual findings and qualifications are to
be evenly appreciated by scholars and practitioners alike. For familiarity with
theory helps to test our analytical tools and appreciate their relevance in real-life
situations: According to Taylor: ‘Each theory . . . leads to unique insights which
are valid starting points for the purpose of comparison and evaluation.’2 Or, as
alternatively put by Keohane and Hoffmann: ‘Attempts to avoid theory . . . not
only miss interesting questions but rely on a framework for analysis that
remains unexamined precisely because it is implicit.’3 True, a great deal has still
1
The theoretical setting
to be accomplished. But as long as theory-building is at the top of the academic
agenda, there is good ground for thinking that important possibilities are
deemed to be explored.
But what might constitute such ‘possibilities’? How are they to be explored?
What is the appropriate methodological line to that end? To start with, substan-
tive progress in the field requires the transcendence of descriptive approaches
about, on the one hand, the form and functions of the integrative process and,
on the other, the resolution of fundamental conceptual problems confronting a
discipline which has become subject to diverse interpretation. This requires, in
Church’s words, ‘structured ways of understanding changing patterns of inter-
action’,4 free from the inherently fragmented boundaries of micro-analysis: to
project a macroscopic view of the Union based on systematic conceptual expla-
nation. To that end, ‘We need to be aware of the conceptions we use since they
determine our perception of things’.5 This methodological pathway to the study
of European integration allows higher access to reality or, alternatively, offers the
infrastructure from which ‘a hierarchy of realities’ might emerge.6
The analytical validity of these presuppositions is further justified when
trying to establish a link between continuity and change within a system of multi-
national shared rule; when attempting to identify the common values of distinct
polities and the prospects for the emergence of new ones; when aiming at throw-
ing some additional light on the dialectical and increasingly symbiotic union
between a highly interactive society of independent nations and new sources of
political authority; or even when engaging in a process of investigating the
allegedly ‘part-formed’ and/or sui generis physiognomy of a composite ‘union’
comprising distinct culturally defined and politically organised units, where the
dynamics of intrastate policy-making intermesh with those of large-scale polity-
formation with enormous complexity, producing a new type of collective entity
characterised by interlocking structures of political authority: a transnational
polity, which lacks a single locus of authoritative decision-making.
But even more difficult is to evaluate critically an ever-expanding corpus of
literature dealing with such a rich kaleidoscope of relations. And all this, while
trying to make sense of a hidden political agenda concerning the future of the
European state system itself and the viability of democratic arrangements
within and across pre-established borders. Whatever the lessons stemming from
the process of bringing together a number of democratic governments under
the organisational logic of a larger management system, the work at hand will
have made a contribution if it offers an opportunity to communicate the major
concerns underlying the evolutionary nature of European governance and its
functionally structured subsystems. Such a task represents, above all, a prag-
matic challenge, confronting, on the one hand, the transformation of interna-
tional behaviour and, on the other, the assertion of a new core set of values and
principles of what might best be described as ‘political co-determination’: the
forging of new co-operative arrangements for jointly managing the internal and
external affairs of the nascent European polity. The perennial question to ask
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here is whether such a composite polity will strike a balance between its becom-
ing the main locus of collective, binding decision-making for the constituent
governments and the dominant focus of popular political identification.
To start with, there is a case to be made why existing theories of integration,
even when taken in a complementary manner, fall short of capturing the dom-
inant character of the relationship between the region (Union) and the subunits
(states/substate system/citizens). A first attempt to answer this question is that
Mitrany’s functionalism, Haas’ revised version of it (what was conveniently
labelled as ‘neofunctionalism’) and the various federalist-inspired approaches
to European integration, ranging from the American model of ‘dual federalism’
to the ‘co-operative federalism’ of the German political system, find it equally
difficult to reconcile two apparently mutually exclusive principles: the preserva-
tion of high levels of segmental autonomy within a nascent, yet politically and
constitutionally uncrystallised, system of mutual governance. That is, to capture
the dynamics of two complementary objectives: strengthening the political via-
bility of separate constitutional orders through the institutionalisation of joint
sovereignty and with it the practice of political co-determination. The intellec-
tual problem associated with such an endeavour is rooted in the different treat-
ments and perceptions of ‘general concepts’ such as sovereignty, autonomy and
interdependence, to mention only a few. Both normative and narrative inter-
pretations of the integrative project, purporting to identify the logic of a distinct
form of regionalism and its implications for the participating state and societies,
often tend to overemphasise either the importance of the central institutions or,
conversely, the role of national governments in setting the integrative agenda
and then acting authoritatively upon it. This ‘battle of theories’ has produced
zero-sum notions of transnational bargaining, coupled with unjustified confi-
dence in how the system actually works and towards what it is developing. The
‘elephant’, however, to recall Puchala’s colourful description, is not easy to
manipulate in theoretical terms: it often turns into a ‘chameleon’, adjusting itself
to the actual requirements of the day.7
Defining the Union
The conceptual problems mentioned above are further compounded by the fact
that, on the basis of existing typologies, the Union still remains, almost by defi-
nition, an unsolved puzzle: a ‘half-way house’ between the worlds of ‘federal
state’ and ‘federal union of states’.8 Although the Union is often taken to imply
something more than the mere aggregate of its constituent parts, political
authority has not yet moved towards a new regional centre. In this view, the
Union is neither an international organisation as conventionally understood,
nor is it becoming an ordinary state possessing a monopoly of law-making and
law-enforcing powers. But equally puzzling remains the nature of its legal struc-
ture. For some, the Union rests upon a series of international treaty-based rules,
while others prefer to speak of an incipient constitutional system driven by aspi-
rations akin to those involved in traditional state-building. From an integration
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theory perspective, although the larger polity exceeds the Deutschian notion of
a ‘pluralistic security-community’, it has failed to meet either the sociopsycho-
logical conditions of the older functionalist school or those related to the forma-
tion of a neofunctionalist-inspired European ‘political community’.
Profoundly uncrystallised in its political superstructure, the Union remains
an integrative venture whose final destination is yet to become discernible.
Attributes such as ‘partial polity’ and ‘part-formed political system’ clearly
demonstrate the lack of confident scholarly assertion,9 while rendering the
whole enterprise ‘a challenge to the continuing separation of international rela-
tions from political science’.10 But even without taking into account the series of
neologisms invented over time to capture the distinctive properties that make
up its governance structures, the intermeshing of federal principles, confederal
structures and consociational processes (see Chapter 2) renders its institutional
setting far from comprehensible. Simply to argue, however, that the Union is a
polity sui generis and should thus be examined in terms of new conceptual par-
adigms or ad hoc theoretical interpretations, or even a combination of both,
runs the danger of complying with undisciplined and often ill-founded formu-
lations, while perpetuating its present stance in the grey, ‘in-between’ area of
‘normal interstate’ and ‘normal intrastate relations’: the two extreme poles of an
analytical continuum on which political systems are conventionally located.11
Herein lies perhaps the greatest intellectual challenge facing the contemporary
student of European integration: to fill the existing gap between state-centric
theory and federalist-driven approaches and develop a more profound under-
standing of what the Union actually is.12
To give a brief account of the complexity surrounding the issue of defining
the regional system: Wallace notes that what has now been created by the con-
stituent governments is ‘a constitutional system which has some state attributes,
but which most – or all – of its constituent governments do not wish to develop
into a state, even while expecting it to deliver outcomes which are hard to envis-
age outside the framework of an entity which we would recognise as a (federal)
state’.13 He adds: ‘The retreat from a federal objective for the European Commu-
nity, while retaining a constitutional agenda which implied the need for a federal
state-framework, has left a shadowy area at the center of EC construction.’14 In this
context, Sbragia asserts that it is perhaps more useful to think of the Community
as ‘an ongoing experiment in fashioning a new structure of governance, one that
accepts a great deal of cultural diversity as well as incorporating politics based on
the state-society model and politics based on relations between governments’.15
Behind this statement lies the concept of symbiosis between the collectivity and
the segments, adding credence to those employing co-operative federalism as a
model for explaining current integrative arrangements, as well as to Taylor’s
understanding of the constitutional implications of the symbiotic process for the
changing conditions of sovereign statehood in contemporary Europe.16
In attempting to explain the origins of political unions, McKay has put
the issue thus: ‘What we have witnessed in Europe . . . is a movement towards
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federation which has indigenous rather than external roots, over which there is
near unanimity among elites and which has already produced real results in
terms of the delineation of power between national and supra-national (or fed-
eral) authorities.’17 Moravcsik, on his part, by developing a theory of ‘liberal inter-
governmentalism’ (see Chapter 2), describes the Union as a regime that makes
interstate bargaining more efficient, while enhancing the autonomy of national
leaders;18 a definition close to Puchala’s understanding of the larger polity as a
multilevel ‘system of managed interdependence’.19 But while Wallace accepts that
the Union is ‘more than an international regime but less than a fully-developed
political system’, questioning whether it can be seen as ‘a political “community”
in the widest sense’,20 Webb takes it to be ‘a partially-integrated policy-making
system at the regional level’,21 thus making Cameron’s ‘institutionalised inter-
governmentalism’ sound like a relatively specific analogy.22
Writing on the inappropriateness of classical statist, purely intergovern-
mental, and traditional federal forms of political organisation, Keohane and
Hoffmann have captured the evolving European reality as ‘an elaborate set of
networks, closely linked in some ways, partially decomposed in others, whose
results depend on the political style in the ascendant at the moment’.23 But per-
haps one of the most ‘progressive’ classifications has been Scharpf ’s conception
of the then European Community (EC) as a ‘joint-decision system’, where the
pathology of public policy-making is conditioned by a ‘systemic tendency
towards sub-optimal substantive solutions’, exemplifying the notion of a ‘joint-
decision trap’ or politikverflechtungfalle.24 Embracing Wallace’s dictum that the
Community system is ‘stuck between sovereignty and integration’, while recog-
nising that the effectiveness and implementation of common policies are greatly
influenced by what Taylor had earlier called the ‘interdependence trap’, Scharpf
argues that Europe ‘seems to have become just that “middle ground between
co-operation among nations and the breaking of a new one” which Stanley
Hoffmann thought impossible’.25 Although this statement contradicts the view
that progress towards the formation of a European demos – conceived in civic
rather than ethnocultural terms – should not be seen as a prelude to the emer-
gence of a larger ‘political nation’, it adds something to the current debate. Other
terms to be found in the acquis académique as means of conceptualising the
larger entity include ‘proto-federation’, ‘confederance’, ‘concordance system’,
‘quasi-state’, ‘Staatenverbund’, ‘consortio’, ‘condominio’, ‘regulatory state’,
‘regional regime’, ‘mixed commonwealth’, ‘managed Gesellschaft’, ‘quasi-state’,
‘sympolity’, ‘federated republic’, ‘market polity’, ‘international state’, ‘confederal
consociation’, ‘multilevel governance’ and so on. If anything, the above defini-
tional accounts suggest that the question of what the Union ‘actually’ is has yet
to be sorted out.
Given the various conceptual and analytical difficulties in reaching an
authoritative statement on the political physiognomy of the present-day Union,
we suggest that, instead of placing undue emphasis on the peculiarities of its
constitutive properties, it is perhaps more profitable to examine those aspects of
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its internal political organisation which can be paralleled, with a greater or lesser
degree of accuracy, with already familiar forms of polity and/or models of gov-
ernance. The underlying premise here is that a new theoretical thesis will not
only have to take into account pre-existing classifications, but will also have to
use them constructively so as to substantiate its findings both theoretically and
empirically. As Groom has observed: ‘There must be acknowledgment of the old
Europe, but also a realisation that in building a new one, there are many origi-
nal aspects that do not fit easily into the customary conceptual frameworks of
integration theory.’26
The general thesis put forward in this book is that we are currently witness-
ing the reversal of the Mitranian logic of international integration: instead of
‘form follows function’,27 it is increasingly the case that the structural properties
of the larger management system dictate the pace and range of joint integrative
schemes. Thus an additional concern has become manifest: the extension of the
‘scope’ (range) and ‘level’ (depth) of European integration do not necessarily
coincide. Since the coming into force of the SEA in February 1987 and the TEU
in November 1993, there is evidence to suggest that both the functional scope
(new policy arenas) and territorial scale (new members) of the integrative
process may well be extended, if not at the expense of the level of integration
(ways of management), without either altering the locus of sovereignty or
having any significant impact on the way in which the central institutions exer-
cise political authority. The extension of QMV by these treaty revisions, as well
as by the AMT in May 1999 and the more recent Treaty of Nice (signed in Feb-
ruary 2001), on largely non-conflict-prone areas, helps to illustrate this point.
But let us now turn to the way in which this ever-demanding exercise of EU
theory-building has evolved over time.
Theorising integration
As already suggested, there are various ways of examining an inherently inter-
disciplinary object of study; arguably, as many as the constitutive bodies of
theory which allegedly compose it. The process of European integration, revolv-
ing around the three-pillar structure of the Union – a structure which managed
to survive any ambition to communitarise in any substantive terms its two inter-
governmental components at the June 1997 and December 2000 Amsterdam
and Nice Summits, respectively – is a good case in point. For since the early days
of the process, students of European integration have applied a variety of meth-
ods and approaches in order to develop a more profound understanding of what
the European ‘body politic’ looked like at the many different stages of its politi-
cal and, in the wider sense of the term, constitutional, evolution. And yet,
despite the many promising theoretical departures over the years, arguably only
a few concrete theoretical arrivals have been achieved.
Different traditions of international relations theory, ranging from pluralist
paradigms of interstate behaviour to (neo)realist interpretations of state-centric
preferences and power, coupled with a plethora of approaches flowing from the
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domain of comparative politics ‘proper’ – in turn, seeking to link the domestic
and international arenas of European governance – seem to have exhausted the
analytical spectrum within which the study of European integration can bear
fruits. More recently, however, a preference has emerged for the latter analytical
pathway (the term ‘comparativists’ capturing this scholarly trend), although
intergovernmentalism, or even modified schemes of co-operative interstate
behaviour (at both treaty-formation and daily policy-making levels), have by
and large survived the tides of supranationalism and institutional centralisation.
Doubtless, the initial supranationalist schemes were of considerable inte-
grative potential, dominating the domestic policy arena of the Community
during the formative years of the regional process. This was a period when Hall-
stein’s Presidency of the newly founded Commission aimed at projecting a new
structure of managing the affairs of the Community’s nascent regime. Later,
however, it was followed by a more balanced relationship between the Commu-
nity’s supranational/expansionist ambitions and intergovernmental realities.
This was the beginning of what has been termed, after the 1966 Luxembourg
Accords, the ‘Second Europe’: a transition stage leading to the 1969 Hague
Summit, in turn hailed as the first significant relance of integration. The third
integrative stage came about only a few years later, with the formal institution-
alisation of the European Council at the 1974 Paris Summit. This top political
institution was expected to provide the leadership needed to move the Com-
munity towards higher levels of integration, acting at the same time as a protec-
tive mechanism for sensitive (and often non-negotiable) national interests. Such
a development signalled the inception of what was later to be termed as the
‘Third Europe’: a qualitatively different phase from the pre-1974 one, this time
characterised by a more favourable version of intergovernmentalism as a
method of promoting integration. The end result of this stage – itself a largely
‘compromised structure’ of the previous two – projected a symbiotic arrange-
ment between national and European political (and even polity) dynamics.
The many different phases of European integration and the subsequent the-
oretical approaches devoted to their explanation point to the assumption that
the formation of a European polity, as distinct from the making of a new regional
superstate (a superordinate form of government beyond the nation-state), or for
that matter from the construction of a purely confederal structure (a loosely
institutionalised society of sovereign states), resembles an asymmetrical and
often analytically incongruent synthesis of academic (sub)disciplines. Yet the
rationale of studying the integrative phenomenon from the perspective of vari-
ous, and often contending, schools of thought seems to be as relevant today as
it was during the formative debate between functionalists and federalists
(although this was a far less complicated one). But how are we to appreciate the
enormous diversity embedded in the various theoretical approaches to the study
of European integration in general, and its multifarious arenas of collective
policy- and decision-making in particular? A first answer is to look at each par-
ticular theory of integration separately, placing at the same time its conceptual
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findings and analytical insights in a wider comparative context. Here, undoubt-
edly, functionalism emerges as an appropriate point of departure.
Core theories of integration
Functionalism
In general terms, functionalism purports to explain why collective action in spe-
cific, functionally linked areas of co-operation is a more attractive option than
unilateral state action: group involvement in peaceful problem-solving schemes,
supported by the necessary technical expertise, emanates as a real option.
Nationalism and international anarchy are treated as the sources of the frag-
mentation of the world community into rival groups, obstructing the creation
of a ‘working peace system’. International community-building is the function-
alist remedy to these problems, centred on the resolution of basic welfare needs
which transcend territorial considerations. Mitrany’s understanding of ‘the
integrative dynamic’, Taylor notes, ‘is the learning process of citizens who are
gradually drawn into the co-operative ethos created by functionally specific
international institutions devoted to the satisfaction of real welfare needs’.28
This organic process is furthered by what may be described as ‘management
committee government’, reflecting Mitrany’s distrust of traditional assembly
controls over complex policy-making. Guided by the quest to watch closely for
the ‘relation of things’, Mitrany argued the case for replacing old-style, non-spe-
cialist assemblies with new forms of representation and ways of obtaining public
control, such as ‘functional’ assemblies composed of experts whose technical
knowledge would guarantee greater and better efficiency in supervising govern-
mental actions. In The Functional Theory of Politics, he reiterates that ‘no one
would share in power who did not share in responsibility’ and that ‘the func-
tional structure could be made a union of peoples . . . directly concerned in any
specific function, by giving them functional representation’.29 Mitrany’s under-
lying rationale was that ‘in acquiring formal representative status, [pressure
groups] also assume a corresponding democratic responsibility’.30 No doubt,
however, this form of democracy, labelled by Mitrany himself as ‘working
democracy’ (as opposed to ‘voting democracy’) is seen by those who perceive
the institution of Parliament as the focal point of accountability as a hindrance
to established notions of representative and responsible government.
The functionalist conception of ‘union’ is part of an evolutionary process of
achieving functionally specific objectives, and not of a deterministic situation
leading, immediately or necessarily, towards a federal state or even a state-like
entity. Like other gradualist theories, the end product of the integration process
is left deliberately vague (although some form of larger constitutional frame-
work is not dismissed outright). One reason for this is that, according to
Mitrany, ‘form follows function’ in that the actual needs of the integrative
system will determine its structural properties. Although it would be false to
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assume that functionalist theory perceives federalism as an uncontrolled
homogenising force eroding national diversity and/or identity, it maintains that
it is in the interests of the integration process itself to proceed in an incremen-
tal, piecemeal fashion. Hence the idea of a modest ‘step-by-step’ approach as
opposed to a federalist-inspired ‘head-on’ approach to European unity for fear
that a federal surrender of sovereignty would be too big a sacrifice for national
governments on the altar of their unification.
The key concept of the functionalist method is identified in the perception
of a common interest among the various actors involved in the integration
process, as well as a propensity to non-coercive means of problem-solving. This
was judged to be vitally important for the European region to develop the nec-
essary institutional machinery to produce common policies and decisions, not
least due to its recent turbulent history. Thus the pursuit of common tasks
was linked from the outset to the creation of common institutions possessing
a responsibility of their own, albeit limited in scope. As Kitzinger has pointed
out, the main difference between functionalists and federalists was that, whereas
the former were preoccupied with defining the ‘general interest’ first, and then
finding common answers to common problems, the latter sought joint action as
a means for obtaining more efficient central institutions.31 As a result, the func-
tionalists sought ‘to set up only that minimum of political institutions that
was indispensable in order to direct the common action that was most urgently
required’.32 Supranationalism, as applied in a specific regional context produc-
ing a larger-scale territorial authority, is perceived as a potential source of repli-
cating nationalist sentiments at a level beyond the nation-state.
Being confined to technical and economic areas, functional integration does
not postulate the creation of a new sovereign power at a higher level. Instead, by
trying to eschew politics, in terms of depoliticising communal issues rather than
being inherently apolitical itself, it presents no immediate challenge to the sov-
ereignty of states, which continue to survive as identifiable entities.33 As Taylor
states: ‘the functionalist approach, indeed, allows the view that there is no point
at which the state would necessarily lose its sovereignty, in the sense that power
would now need to be finally transferred, or that the state would lose its legal
right to act, if it so wished, against the wishes of the functional agency’.34 In par-
ticular, the ‘functional imperative’, as the basic law governing the evolution of
the integration process, rejected the inevitability of constitutional requirements
and fixed divisions of political authority, instead focusing on problems which,
although they cannot really be ignored, cannot be solved separately by each
government acting alone. This has been termed as the ‘unitary trap’.35
There seems to be a globalising, cumulative effect in the functionalist line of
argument: once problems are recognised as common (or at least not essentially
differentiated by the relevant community of actors), and solutions to these
problems may arise from collective rational thinking, then there is a tendency to
expand such co-operative behaviour to other relevant spheres of action. Does
Mitrany’s logic, however, necessarily avoid being trapped in the domain of
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conventional politics, where interests and preferences are shaped by traditional
party political discourse and electoral considerations? The answer is that,
despite certain elements of ‘technical self-determination’ embedded in the func-
tionalist method, it does not always evade parameters of this kind. But there is
another crucial point to be made about the political aspects of the functionalist
logic, namely that functionalism is about the application of carefully examined,
but not necessarily politically structured, strategies for transcending (national)
territorial boundaries in tackling issues of a technical nature. Institution-build-
ing, in this regard, becomes conditional upon the (functionally determined)
needs of the integrative system itself, rather than the preferred lines of action to
be taken by national governments according to territorial interests.
However, it is not always easy to distinguish between ‘non-territorial’ and
‘territorial’ politics in the context of the Union’s governance system, especially
when a variety of actors pursues different, albeit not necessarily antithetical,
interests and are motivated by different cultural traditions. In principle, how-
ever, not ‘apolitical’, but ‘aterritorial’, is a more appropriate term to describe
the internal logic of functional arrangements. Functionalism in the Mitranian
tradition is above all a theory of international society based on the principle of
technical self-determination, reliance upon non-coercive means of interna-
tional community-building, and an inherent mistrust of constitutional pre-
scriptions of power-sharing. Mitrany’s main concern was how to replace
territorially defined structures of decision-making with international functional
agencies, leading towards a ‘working international system’.
Federalism
Federalism as an integration theory is much more relevant to the study of Euro-
pean integration than is often admitted. This is mainly owing to its increased
concern about the dialectics of power-sharing in a compound political setting;
its emphasis on in-built democratic arrangements linking different levels of
governmental authority; its often flexible interpretation of the sovereignty
principle; its focus on constitutional issues touching upon sensitive areas of
individual and collective liberties, legislative representation and the allocation
of competences; and its deeper concern about how to organise in a mutually
reinforcing way the concurrent demands for ‘unity in diversity’. Federalism,
however, does not emanate from a single corpus of theory – a grand design, that
is, which can be transplanted from one federal system to another without losing
its internal (or systemic) relevance and cohesion. Rather, there can be different
sets of principles and structures composing a federal polity. These, however,
need to be seen in a wider symbiotic perspective: a creative co-existence of dis-
tinct but ‘constitutive’ units. Once one recognises these analytical constraints,
it is possible to turn to the application of the various federalist designs to Euro-
pean integration and appreciate the diversity of their logic.
In general terms, federalism aims to reconcile the parallel demands for
greater political union (but not necessarily unity) of the whole and adequate
10 Theory and reform in the European Union
constitutional guarantees for the parts; namely, ‘unity without uniformity and
diversity without anarchy’.36 Thus the appropriateness of federal arrangements
‘would appear to lie in those instances where the existence and vigour of the
forces that press both for wider unity and for autonomous regional diversity are
relatively balanced’.37 The striking of such a delicate balance emerges as the
strongest catalyst for achieving overall ‘federal cohesion’ – itself a precondition
for federations to survive the test of time. In Forsyth’s words: ‘[Federal struc-
tures] establish a union but they simultaneously guarantee autonomy, and they
fix or settle ratio or balance between the two.’38 Or, alternatively: ‘[Federalism] is
based on the existence of regional differences and recognises the claims of the
component areas to perpetuate their individual characters.’39 Here, democratic
representation becomes a crucial factor for the political viability of federal units,
highlighting the importance of accommodating territorial and non-territorial
claims in nascent federal structures based on systems of common management
such as the polity that is currently emerging in Europe.
Moreover, the representation of the people, either as a whole (when taken
as a single entity) or as parts (when taken as a plurality of entities) becomes the
prior object of the federation.40 ‘What is distinctive about federations’, King
notes, ‘is not that “the people” are viewed as sovereign, but that the expression
of this sovereignty is tied to the existence and entrenchment of regional, territo-
rial entities’.41 In fact, ‘one of the characteristics of federalism that flows from its
popular base is the reduction of the question of political sovereignty to an inci-
dental one’, with the federal principle representing ‘an alternative to (and a rad-
ical attack upon) the modern idea of sovereignty’.42 Consequently, there are two
possible, but not antithetical, ways of perceiving ‘the people’: as united and as
diverse, a duality which ‘for the life of the federation, is implicitly inexpungi-
ble’.43 In both equations, however, it is the federal demos as a whole, rather than
primarily the dominant political elites representing the interests of each con-
stituent unit, which is to be served by the central arrangements.
Although federations encompass a considerable range of purposes, identities,
cultural traditions, organisational characteristics and power-sharing arrange-
ments, as well as different means of protecting the constitution,44 democratic
representation of all participating communities emerges as a common defining
property. The issue here is not so much about creating direct links between dif-
ferent levels of government but rather about establishing concrete and accessible
avenues of communication between the demos and the central institutions. In
speaking of such ‘levels’, one might assume that they are sharply separated from
each other, ‘like boxes piled on top of one another’.45 In reality, however, these
different levels are never thus sharply divided. But if one considers that in most
federal systems the central authorities are free to exercise considerable power over
the federal demos, it is easy to explain why these direct links are central to the
democratic legitimacy of the federal polity.
Unlike a unitary state model, the degree of democratic participation in a
federal system is linked to the extent to which legislative autonomy in the form
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of ‘reserved powers’ (powers not delegated to the federal level) has been con-
ferred on each participating collectivity by the Constitution. Thus public par-
ticipation in the affairs of the federation is intrinsically woven into the degree of
autonomous action granted to each level of government in which the demos
exercises its sovereign rights. Further, the extent to which democratic diversity,
or ‘a co-ordinated expression of it’,46 can be maintained without endangering the
political cohesion of the federation is conditioned by the ability of the central
arrangements to produce viable constitutional equilibria. Indeed, the intersec-
tion between federalism and democracy passes through the capacity of the com-
pound polity to generate a common commitment to federal unity, while
preserving the integrity of the constituent units. This implies that the idea of
federation emerges as a living, pluralist and organic political order which ‘builds
itself from the ground upwards’.47 Hence federalism as a multilevel political
arrangement is based on a constitutional system of delegated, reserved and/or
shared powers between relatively autonomous, yet interrelated, structures of
government whose multiple interactions aim to serve the sovereign will of the
federal demos.48
With the postwar circumstances in Western Europe corresponding, in
Bowie’s words, ‘to those which often in the past have led nations to undertake
the initial steps towards federation’, the federal solution emerged as an inspir-
ing remedy for Europe’s multiple organisational problems.49 At the same time,
the interposition of a central authority beyond pre-existing boundaries
acquired, mainly thanks to Italian federalist thinking, the status of a desirable
political ideology. Although the ideal of a united Europe predated the specific
postwar attempts, what makes them unique is that ‘the unity concept moved
into the foreground of popular thinking with both an emotional and practical
appeal’.50 In a continent that was deeply shocked with the suicidal effects of
nationalism, the federal impulse to postwar European unity rose as an attrac-
tive alternative to a challenge that, in Bowie’s words, ‘went to the very founda-
tions of social existence’.51
Far from conceiving the nation-state as an a priori fact of existence, the
federalists regarded it as a ‘historic accident’ and proposed its transcendence by
a process of ‘rational federal development’.52 As a Draft Declaration by the Euro-
pean Resistance Movement in July 1944 put it: ‘Federal Union alone can ensure
the principles of liberty and democracy in the continent of Europe.’53 Following
this somewhat teleological line of thinking, any federal surrender of sovereignty
seemed better than allowing the European state system to consolidate itself once
more, especially after its ‘great moral and material bankruptcy’.54 Reflecting
upon the 1944 Ventotene Manifesto, Bosco has observed: ‘The real cause of
international anarchy was seen as “the absolute sovereignty of national States”,
which is the source of power-politics in the international sphere and of totali-
tarianism in the national one.’55 Similarly, Spinelli has argued that the nation-
state had become ‘a compass which had ceased to give any bearings’.56 These
statements provided the moral justification of early federalist designs. The
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choice of European nations was one between federalism and anarchy, rather
than between the former and some measure of interstate co-operation.
The federalists also argued their case by stressing the inability of states to
provide new means of popular participation, and that an unprecedented ‘legit-
imacy crisis’ had shaken their once powerful structures: a deep-rooted struc-
tural crisis which prompted them to look above the nation-state itself as a means
of resolving its acute legitimation problems. Underlying these criticisms is a
belief that ‘new loyalties will arise in direct conflict with the nation-state’,57 open-
ing up much wider horizons than those afforded by the latter. This is exactly
what European federalists had in mind: that these multiple pressures on the
nation-state would lead to the recognition that new democratic arrangements
would have to be devised so as to meet the challenges of the post-1945 era.
Spinelli, for instance, had strongly opposed the idea proposed by national gov-
ernments of a ‘partial’ European union without first creating a democratic
infrastructure upon which common institutions would be based. In this sense,
federalism provided the means not only to overcome the structural crisis of the
nation-state itself, or even ‘to transform the very essence of national statehood
into a larger loyalty going beyond its territorial affinities’,58 but also a powerful
stimulus to the extension of the democratic process.
Whatever the title ascribed to the envisaged polity, it was widely recognised
that it would have to strike a balance between interdependence and autonomy,
democracy and efficiency and, above all, unity and diversity. To convince the
European peoples of the merits of federalism as a means of safeguarding their
cultural and political traditions, the federalists stressed the representative char-
acter of the central institutions. It was maintained that the latter should be left
free to exercise the political authority conferred on them by a written constitu-
tion in direct relation to the European public without having to rely upon the
convergence of short-term national interests for the formulation of common
policies. Herein lies federalism’s greatest contribution to the cause of European
unity: in the ‘inclusive’ political community, power and responsibility should be
seen as being mutually supportive, rather than as a competitive tussle for polit-
ical authority between the collectivity and the segments.
Writing on the strategic aims of the Federalist Movement, Levi refers to ‘the
objective of changing the character of exclusive communities which nation-
states have and unifying them in a federal community thus transforming them
into member states of the European Federation, in such a way that they can
coexist peacefully though maintaining their autonomy’.59 It was believed that
federalism would encourage democratic diversity by establishing a system of co-
ordinate but independent spheres of authority based on a division of power
among state and federal agents. According to this scheme, the component legis-
latures would hold their executives accountable to their respective publics, while
a European legislature would act as a potential barrier against the danger of cen-
tral executive dominance. Resting upon a ‘firm constitutional structure’, the
main powers of the federation were to lie in the sphere of defence, foreign affairs,
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commerce across state lines, international exchange, communication and, in
Pinder’s words, ‘enough tax to sustain the necessary expenditure’.60 On the
whole, the envisaged pattern of federal–state relations was closer to the dualis-
tic model of classical federalism, requiring a constitutional separation of powers
between state and central authorities, rather than to a system of ‘shared rule’
based on concurrent competences, which were seen at the time as a potential
source of internal disputes.
It soon became evident, however, that if the federal project was to be
crowned with success it would have to overcome national governmental resis-
tance to an immediate relinquishing of state sovereignty to a federal polity. The
solution to this problem came from Spinelli, proposing a strategy based on a
campaign of public persuasion for the drafting of a federal constitution. This
task was to be carried out by a directly elected European Constituent Assembly.61
The justification of Spinelli’s ‘constituent method’ lay in the belief that such an
assembly was the only acceptable body to transform the possibility of popular
participation in the affairs of the federation into political reality. The constitu-
tion was to be based on a declaration of fundamental rights, democratic insti-
tutions and the separation of powers: it was believed that a balanced structure
of national and federal competences based on the principle of dual federalism
would preserve national identity and diversity in a way compatible with the
democratic ethos. Thus it was agreed that the federation should have limited but
real powers, with the remaining spheres of competence resting on state jurisdic-
tion. In short, the gist of the federalist thesis was that ‘federalism is the only
international democratic bond which can create a reign of law among nations’,
as well as the only possible means for enlarging ‘the sphere of democratic gov-
ernment from the ambit of the state to that of a group of states’.62 As most fed-
eralists have acknowledged, however, the difficulty of the task lay not so much
in convincing the European peoples of the need for a federation, but in con-
vincing them that they, rather than their national governments, must create it.
This brings us to the very limitations of European constitution-making, to
which we now turn.
The first real test for the idea of creating a federal Europe came with the
1948 Hague Congress. Yet its end product, in the form of the Council of Europe,
did not live up to federalist expectations. Rather, it represented ‘a triumph of
the unionists’.63 As the Federal Movement was losing whatever popular appeal it
initially displayed, an alternative method of institutional development started
to consolidate its strength: Monnet’s ‘functional federalism’. Being functional-
ist in conception but federalist in prospect, this approach represented a new,
albeit modest, integration philosophy. Convinced that European unification
was not interested in ‘end situations’ as in evolutionary processes, the func-
tionalists criticised the federal alternative for being totally impractical and ide-
alistic, ‘offering’, in Harrison’s words, ‘merely the prospect of the unattainable’.64
Instead, by recognising that integration had nothing to do with formal consti-
tutional engineering, the functionalists stressed the point that Europe could not
14 Theory and reform in the European Union
be unified ‘by a stroke of the constitutional lawyer’s pen’.65 They criticised the
federalists as advocates of an immediate objective which was largely overtaken
by a naive sentimentalism, deceiving themselves with the illusion of radical
political change. Likewise, Spinelli’s pathway to unification was viewed as over-
ambitious and legalistic, resting on the fallacious assumption that the termina-
tion of the war had also signalled the ‘withering away of the nation state’. In
general, the federal projects were believed to be consciously undermining the
necessary gradualness of integration in order to achieve a rigid constitutional
settlement, thus losing sight of the dynamics of ‘functional incrementalism’ as
its major characteristic.
The early school of European federalism, by relying heavily on the Ameri-
can federal experience, seemed to have undermined the sui generis character of
postwar European integration. In their unrestrained passion for a united
Europe, Beloff asserts, federalists were misguided in looking to the US pattern
for a promising analogy.66 In Albertini’s words, ‘as a new form of the modern
state, federalism is an American product. But the United States of America had
not to overcome historically constituted nations to constitute itself.’67 In con-
trast, the federal conception of Europe failed to recognise that such a vision was
not the primary goal for a sufficient number of Europeans. Likewise, its consti-
tutive principles did not acquire sufficient persuasive power to win the confi-
dence of national governments. But it would be unjust not to reiterate the
commitment of European federalists towards a democratic process of union,
and their opposition to an essentially utilitarian form of interest convergence as
a precondition for any substantive public loyalty transfers. For they unequivo-
cally maintained that parliamentary democracy was too closely related to
Europe’s political culture to be denied beyond the state level. Finally, it was they
who first stressed the importance of linking the idea of a European Constitution
with the legitimation of the larger polity based on a parliamentary (bicameral)
system of government.
Confederalism
Just as a federal state differs essentially from a unitary one, so does a confedera-
tion from a federation. Whereas the latter is based on a constitutive act which
creates a higher, superordinate legal order, a confederation is based on a foedus
or treaty among sovereign states. It thus represents a ‘contractual union of
states’ in which the participants voluntarily decide to band together by way of
‘mutual agreement’ in order to transform their existing patterns of relations into
something akin, yet not identical, to the internal relations of one state.68
Sharma and Choudhry have described the distinction between these
models thus: ‘a confederation is a loose union over confederating independent
states, whereas a federation is a union deriving its authority from the citizens
of the union’; ‘a confederation is the outcome of an agreement or treaty made
generally for a specific period . . . whereas a federation is the result of a true
constitution supreme over all other instruments from which both [levels of]
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government[s] . . . derive their respective powers’; ‘in a confederation, the
powers of the common body or authority are narrow and extremely limited,
whereas in a federation the powers of the general government are wider, largely
exclusive, and capable of being exercised through its own agencies’; ‘in a con-
federation, the units are free to dissociate themselves from the union, whereas in
a federation the units are united with the general government on a co-operative
basis’; ‘in a confederation the units retain their sovereignty, whereas in a feder-
ation the authority of government is shared by them with the general govern-
ment’; and ‘in a confederation the general government is subordinate to the
regional governments, whereas in a federation the general government co-exists
with the regional governments and is independent from them.’69
From a different perspective, in the case of the confederation, a plurality of
previously independent states gives way to a ‘treaty-constituted political body’70
in which ‘the condition of “the last say”’71 rests with the partners to it, rather
than with an independent authoritative entity having a monopoly of legislative
and coercive powers. Hence Forsyth views confederation as being ‘far more
directly a contractual creature than the normal state’, manifesting itself not as
‘the constituted unity of one people or nation, but a unity constituted by states’.72
He explains: ‘the constitution of a confederation is not, by definition, the uni-
lateral act of one people . . . considered as a homogeneous entity . . . a confeder-
ation is formed precisely because a nation or people in this sense is not deemed
to exist, because the sense of identity and thus of trust between the citizens of
each member state does not run to that depth.’73
In practice, a confederation takes the form of a ‘half-way house’ between
‘normal interstate’ and ‘normal intrastate relations’, with the constituent units
reserving the right of self-determination: ‘it is a union that falls short of a com-
plete fusion or incorporation in which one or all the members lose their iden-
tity as states.’74 Or, as defined by Elazar: ‘Several pre-existing polities joined
together to form a common government for strictly limited purposes . . . that
remains dependent upon its constituent polities in critical ways and must work
through them.’75 This type of union, similarly to a ‘mutual pact’ among self-
determining bodies politic, signifies a ‘joint agreement to be independent’.76
Forsyth explains: ‘The contract which lies at its base is not a contract to abide by
the will of the majority regarding the government to which all shall be subordi-
nate, but simply a contract between equals to act henceforth as one.’77 This is not
to imply that a confederation possesses merely a ‘legal’ personality of the type of
‘conventional’ international organisations. Rather, it is capable of developing a
‘real’ personality of its own: ‘an original capacity to act akin to that possessed by
the states themselves.’78 The underlying characteristic of a confederation as ‘a
system of governments’ is that it provides the component parts with a variety of
opportunities to achieve mutually advantageous co-operation without resign-
ing their individual sovereignty, by focusing on intergovernmental relationships
between a number of legally and politically equal centres of authority, rather
than between them and a single federal government.
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According to the German political theorist, von Treitschke: ‘A Confedera-
tion of States . . . is recognised by international law as an association of sover-
eign States, who have bound themselves together, without resigning their
independence, to further certain common goals . . . Consequently the members
of a Confederation exercise their natural liberum veto.’79 In other words,
although confederations may have a considerable freedom in determining their
internal organisational structures, ‘they cannot as organisations make general
rules or measures which are directly binding upon the states that create them’.80
Forsyth makes the point well: ‘Thus the individual states must give their express
assent, or at the very least withhold their express dissent during a fixed period,
before a convention, treaty, or any kind of general resolution made within or by
an interstate organisation becomes binding upon them.’81 All in all, confedera-
tions do not fundamentally challenge, at least in constitutional terms, the legal
capacity of the constituent units to determine the fate of their own polities. In
this context, the idea of a ‘condominium of powers’ in which the management
of certain policy areas is voluntarily put into a limited but joint pool of sover-
eignty does not conflict with the above description.82
Moreover, Forsyth argues that ‘the permanence accorded to a confederation
is more than merely the standing “disposability” of the institutions of the typical
international organisation’.83 Instead, ‘it is a profound locking together of states
themselves as regards the joint exercise of fundamental powers’, driven by a
common determination to prevent hegemony and, hence, a monopoly of
power.84 Accordingly, confederation can also be seen as a process by which a group
of separate states commit themselves by a treaty of union to mutually beneficial
interaction which may well extend beyond the traditional patterns of interna-
tional co-operation. And since it aims to reconcile the concurrent demands for
preserving the sovereignty of the parts, and with it the integrity of their popula-
tions, and for maintaining high levels of co-ordination among them, this model
is indeed capable of embracing a wide range of institutional possibilities. Thus it
can be conceived, in line with Friedrich’s dynamic model, as a ‘federation-to-be’,85
or even taken to denote, according to Forsyth’s theory, a ‘genuine federal body’,
albeit of a looser kind, insofar as the constituent units become parts of a new
whole.86 In short, irrespective of whether the analytical dichotomy between the
two forms of polity springs, as Friedrich believes, from ‘the quintessence of
the static and formalistic approach’,87 what seems to be certain is that the concept
of confederation ‘remains a useful part of the federal vocabulary’.88
The literature on confederation has impressed upon a number of scholars
over the years in their attempt to classify the defining properties of the Union.
The confederal character of the system has been pointed out by a number of
scholars, summarised by Keohane and Hoffmann thus: ‘If any traditional model
were to be applied, it would be that of a confederation . . . since the central insti-
tutions are (a) largely intergovernmental, (b) more concerned with establishing
a common framework than with networks of detailed regulations, and (c)
apparently willing to tolerate a vast amount of national diversity.’89 Similar
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descriptions of the Community are to be found, inter alia, in the subtitle of an
article written by Brewin – ‘A Union of States without Unity of Government’; in
Church’s prototypal term ‘confederence’ as a means of capturing its intrinsic
confederal properties; and in Elazar’s characterisation of the Community as a
‘new-style confederation of old states’.90
The justification of the confederal approach to the study of European inte-
gration is that the evolution of the Community system has been shaped by ardu-
ous intergovernmental bargains among sovereign states, as well as by an attempt
to accommodate their varying preferences in a mutually acceptable way, that is,
without threatening what they have often perceived as their vital national inter-
ests. In this context, the idea that the larger entity is based on an international
treaty, rather than a European Constitution, is also supportive of its essentially
confederal character. What this view often fails to take into account, however, is
the legal dynamics of integration and the political activism of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) in the process of ‘constitutionalising’ the treaties. Yet it is
doubtful whether subsequent amendments to the founding treaties have
brought about a higher constitutional order, at least when measured against the
constitutional properties of the member nation-states. Rather, it seems that the
larger political unit rests upon the separate constitutional orders of its compo-
nent parts which, by virtue of their sovereign nature, continue to act as ‘Masters
of the Treaties’ (Herren der Verträge). The mere fact that formal treaty change
requires the unanimous consent of the member state governments underlines
this point.
At the decision-making level, there is a case to be made against the confed-
eral approach in so far as majority rule applies in the Council of Ministers. Yet,
clear as it may be that states may well be outvoted in a number of policy areas,
there is a tendency to treat the dissenting states with extreme caution when
national interests are at stake. Hence the contention that more often than not it
is the threat of invoking the right to veto, in accordance with the provisions of
the Luxembourg Accords, that has a crucial impact in the negotiating process,
resulting in most cases in ‘package deals’ of an accommodative nature. Another
point which prima facie seems to contradict the confederal approach is that the
European Parliament (EP) is the only directly elected international Parliament,
possessing limited but effective co-legislative powers. Again, true as it may be
that the EP acts as a source of the Union’s democratic legitimacy, it remains far
from being regarded as a Parliament in the conventional sense, since it still lacks
the power to initiate legislation, to have a prominent role in setting the Union’s
legislative agenda, to hold collectively into account the Union’s main legislative
body (the Council) for its actions or inaction, to elect a single European Gov-
ernment, to hold its elections under a uniform electoral procedure, and so on.
More importantly, there is evidence to suggest that the Union is characterised
by a fragmented citizen body rather than a politically self-conscious European
demos, capable of directing its democratic claims to, and via, the central insti-
tutions. This is a point that needs to be made in relation to the democratic
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properties of federal polities where a composite demos exists and forms the
‘constitutive power’ of the federation.
Transactionalism
The approach developed by Deutsch in his examination of the North Atlantic
Area represented a shift in emphasis from the early theoretical endeavours of
functionalists and federalists to a more empirically oriented framework of
analysis. This was a systematic attempt to capture the relationship between
international integration (largely seen as a process of community-formation)
and social communication (changes in patterns of transactions), by focusing on
the conditions which may bring about a large-scale ‘sociopsychological com-
munity’. Deutsch defined integration as ‘the attainment of a “sense of commu-
nity” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to
assure, for a “long time”, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among
its population’.91 That could be achieved through processes of mutual transac-
tions, cultural flows and social learning. Prominent in his argument was the idea
of peaceful problem-solving through the intensification of avenues of commu-
nication among nations. This he called a ‘security community’: a framework of
social interactions where war would eventually become in the relevant region
both unthinkable and impractical. Deutsch’s notion of ‘security community’
could be either ‘pluralistic’ or ‘amalgamated’, although he never really implied
that there was an automatic forward linkage between these two different types
of organisation.
Deutsch was not particularly concerned with the institutional configura-
tion that the integration process would bring about. Nor was he especially inter-
ested in the allocation of authoritative power among different levels of
decision-making. His research focused on the sociopsychological aspects of
community-formation, which was seen as a result of increased and ‘mutually
responsive’ transactions among its constituent parts. But it would be unfair to
the logic of his approach to present the developments in transactions solely as
an indicator of community-building. Taylor explains: ‘It is also important to
point out that it is the range and quality of changes in transactions that consti-
tutes an indicator of community: too frequently Deutsch’s ideas are criticised on
the mistaken assumption that he sees particular transactions as equivalent to
developing community.’92 The end product of integration would take the form
of an identifiable community of citizens – that is, a people – through a process
of social learning. Although such an outcome would take a long time to materi-
alise, in fact several generations as Deutsch suggested, what is important is that
the ‘uniting parts’ would start to develop ‘a sense of community’ based on the
power of common identities, shared values and belief systems, and a common
perception of their destiny, and that certain norms and habits of societal inter-
action would emerge from the range and intensity of informal contacts. Com-
munity feelings, therefore, were seen as the result, rather than the cause, of
closer links among the participating units.
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The distinction made by Deutsch between a ‘pluralistic’ and ‘amalgamated’
security community warrants closer attention. The former was expected to pro-
duce a ‘sense of security’ among the relevant populations, whereby the resolu-
tion of conflicts through violent means would be replaced by mutually
acceptable methods for their peaceful settlement. It was the particular attitudes
of the actors involved that would create a certain culture of co-operation which,
through the forging of further and closer communicative links among them,
would make resort to war highly unlikely. On the other hand, Deutsch’s idea of
an ‘amalgamated’ security community was a more advanced form of political
community, closer to the type of Gemeinschaft (or community) depicted by
Tönnies in the late nineteenth century.93
In this type of association, as opposed to the more ‘instrumental’ notion of
Gesellschaft (or society), one may perceive the embryo of a genuinely ‘constitu-
tive’ community: ‘a community that would constitute the very identity of the
individuals.’94 Gemeinschaft is more suitable for the prospering of mutually
responsive relations since the individuals forming it have developed to a suffi-
cient degree a ‘sense of community’, also known as ‘community spirit’ or ‘com-
munity of attachment’, strong enough to overcome, and even transcend, any
potentially divisive issues which may arise as integration proceeds. Equally,
where the ‘community spirit’ is less profound, integration will find it more dif-
ficult to cope with internal disputes. In this sense, the ‘Gemeinschaft factor’
appears as one of integration’s indispensable ‘common spheres’.
Although no actual society or institution will ever conform completely to
Tönnies’ theoretical selections,95 since they are conceptual entities representing
two ideal types of social organisation, Deutsch was aware of the fact that a
sociopsychological community would have to be based on ‘a sense among the
individuals forming it of belonging together, of having common loyalties and
values, of kinship’, so that the tasks performed within its structures would stem
from ‘a feeling of contributing something worthwhile to the good of the
whole’.96 Thus a Gemeinschaft is something qualitatively distinct and higher
than the numerical sum of the private well-being of its members. In this type of
community, people associate themselves together because they think of their
relationship as valuable in the dual sense of being important both as ends in and
of themselves. It is perceived as an internal, living and organic ‘collective entity’
– organic in terms of being considered and conceived of in relation to its parts97
– whose ‘norms of order’ are based upon ‘concord’, as opposed to a Gesellschaft
which rests on a contractual arrangement or ‘convention’.
Resting upon relationships of mutual affirmation of a federative kind, the
members of a Gemeinschaft gradually develop strong feelings of ‘togetherness’,
‘we-ness’ or even ‘oneness’, to the eventual framing of a collective consciousness.
Accordingly, these individuals are bound together in symbiotic – that is, mutu-
ally reinforcing – relationships, thinking of their collective existence as domi-
nating their respective individualism, while perceiving their close association as
a means of improving their domestic conditions of living. In short, an entity
20 Theory and reform in the European Union
which is formed through this positive type of relationship points to ‘a lasting
and genuine form of living together’, as opposed to its counterpart form of
‘human Gesellschaft’, which is considered as a mere co-existence of people inde-
pendently of each other.98 Therefore, whereas the ‘common sphere’ of a
Gesellschaft rests on the concept of contract, with its ‘secret’ lying in ‘a rational
coming together of ends that remain individual’,99 that of a Gemeinschaft rests on
the concept of ‘one people’, with its ‘secret’ lying in an ‘internally oriented rela-
tionship’ developed among its members, rather than in a mechanical or artifi-
cial fusion of separate, private wills. Also, in Gemeinschaft-like relationships the
ensemble of individual wills mutually direct each other towards an ‘equilibrium
of forces’, with authority not being viewed as an all-powerful decision-making
centre, but rather as a dialectical process of structuring civic relations.100
According to Taylor, Deutsch’s sociological approach ‘concentrated more on
description and was more cautious about predicting the dynamic links between
the various stages of the integration process’.101 This distinguishes him from the
analysis of neofunctionalism and the premium it placed on forward linkages.
Being interested in the early stages of community-formation and the relationship
between different conditions of the integrative process, Deutsch’s analysis is
also easy to distinguish from the early federalist school of thought and its empha-
sis on the constitutional prerequisites of European unification. In fact, Taylor
notes, ‘Deutsch’s pluralistic security community contains no common decision-
making centres . . . but in some ways it is highly integrated’.102 Institution-
building, therefore, is not treated in mainstream Deutschian analysis as an end in
itself or as a primary indication that integration has indeed taken place. Rather,
the emphasis lies at a different level of analysis: the development of a sense of
community at the popular level. In this, Deutsch shares a common belief with the
older functionalists: the higher the level of sociopsychological community and,
hence, of consensus in society, the greater the progress towards the integration of
the segments into a larger purposive whole – i.e., ‘a community of attitudes and
values’ – and the less controversial the process of transferring substantive powers
to a new regional centre.
Neofunctionalism
Next comes neofunctionalism, which is often but mistakenly associated with
Monnet’s ‘functional federalism’. The latter term has been employed as an ana-
lytical tool to explain the composite character of Monnet’s gradualist approach
to integration, amounting to a rather eclectic synthesis of elements of function-
alism and neofunctionalism, without however being fully in accord with either.
Neofunctionalism, therefore, should not be hastily classified as being – concep-
tually or otherwise – in limbo between functionalism and federalism. Although
it shares some important elements of both schools (from functionalism the cen-
trality of transnational actors and from federalism that of the central institu-
tions) it has developed its own integrative logic, subscribing to certain principles
and values of transnational interaction, dynamics of institution-building and
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styles of collective decision-making. In fact, the contribution of neofunctional-
ism, an American-bred school of thought led initially by Haas,103 has been
unique in the study of European integration.
Most notably, neofunctionalist thinking inserted the element of conflict in
the analysis of the regional process, as well as that of forward linkages among
different, yet interrelated, policy arenas. Procedural mechanisms were seen as
decisive, whereas the idea of a sociopsychological consensus at the popular level,
a variable indirectly linked to Mitrany’s philosophy of international integration,
was not taken as a prerequisite for the transfer of authoritative decision-making
power to a new regional centre. Rather, such a consensus, which in a way corre-
sponds to the idea of a less polarised form of society, emerges as a latent prop-
erty and/or a consequence of successful elite socialisation: the process by which
influential factors of policy and decision-making from different national set-
tings learn to work with each other under the institutional umbrella of a larger
management system. In this context, a process of bureaucratic interpenetration
or engrenage, emerged as the dominant modus operandi of the regional system.
The idea is that different actors decide to shift their focus on collaborative action
to the point that competences – functional and jurisdictional – become blurred,
identities overlap and loyalties co-exist. Mutual reinforcement is a key to under-
standing the logic of neofunctionalist ‘spillovers’ in functionally and/or politi-
cally relevant policy arenas. Progressively, there will be a convergence of
demands on the parts of governments and a propensity for further integrative
action, facilitated by the new central authorities. The spillover effect may take
three different forms: functional (technical pressures leading towards further
integration), political (as a result of intensive levels of elite socialisation) and
cultivated (through the role of the central bureaucracy).
An essential part of the neofunctionalist strategy was the identification of
the Community Method as the new modus operandi of the integrative system.
Such a ‘method’ consisted, inter alia, of high levels of elite socialisation, joint
lobbying activities of organised interests, the Commission’s right of legislative
initiative, the involvement of national governments in complex negotiations at
the European level, and a certain culture on the part of the Commission for
upgrading the Community interest. It was not accidental, therefore, that in the
early stages of the Community’s development, neofunctionalism acquired
the status of an ideology in Brussels. As Milward and Sørensen put it: ‘the
theory’s technocratic elitism appealed strongly to European Community offi-
cials who naturally saw the extensive theorizing about the workings of the Com-
munity as a confirmation of their historical role as guardians of European
integration processes.’104 This line of argument chimes well with Monnet’s phi-
losophy of integration. According to Mutimer, ‘neofunctionalism . . . provides
relative rigorous formulation of the means of political integration developed
ad hoc by Jean Monnet and his colleagues in the 1950s’.105 Likewise, Monnet’s
pragmatic method was in line with Haas’ dictum that ‘functional integration
requires pluralism’.
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Taken as a dynamic process rather than a condition, the end product of inte-
gration remained an open-ended one. Even Haas’ definition of ‘political com-
munity’,106 as a possible end situation where loyalties are transferred towards a
new centre, leaves much to be desired from an organisational point of view. The
reason for this ‘reluctance’ to identify a terminal state of integration can be
traced in the logic of neofunctionalism itself: having stressed the idea for an
inner compulsion towards integration, ‘in that the creation of common institu-
tions would set in motion a process for the accumulation of wider functions’, it
would be too risky an endeavour to reach any authoritative conclusion on the
political properties of the envisaged European polity. Neofunctionalists would
often go as far as to state that the very incompleteness of the project would create
the need for new central arrangements and, in time, for a directly elected EP to
ensure democratic control over the larger, and by then federated, European
‘community’. From the outset, however, direct democratic legitimacy was not
viewed as a prerequisite for entrusting the new institutions with the political
management of the larger entity. Attributes like ‘political community’, ‘supra-
national authority’ and ‘federal union’ add little to the precise institutional form
the end product is expected to take. Perhaps the only relatively discernible out-
come of integration in neofunctionalist terms is the creation of what Harrison
called a ‘self-regulating pluralist society’.107
Moreover, the neofunctionalists, by abandoning the central integrative role
of attitudinal change while exhibiting a strong normative commitment to elite-
driven integration, placed the emphasis on a ‘procedural consensus’ about the
institutional rules of the game: they stressed ‘the psychology of elites in an inte-
gration process ideally culminating in the emergence of a new political system’.108
Further, they conceptualised integration as resulting from what Haas called an
‘institutionalised pattern’ of interest politics.109 Such concentration on institu-
tional developments had important implications for their conception of sover-
eignty. Taylor writes: ‘[neofunctionalists] implicitly accepted the view that
sovereignty is strengthened by an expanding legal competence.’110 Further, it was
crucial for the common system to operate under conditions of economic and
political pluralism, driven by what has been described as ‘the expansive logic of
integration’. The latter, once in train, was expected to transcend, and for the
more optimistic even replace, existing nation-state structures. Implicitly, the
neofunctionalists envisaged the development of a new regional government
composed of a highly interactive community of actors.
But the important element remained firmly confined in the process of inte-
gration itself: successive spillovers would bring together previously uncon-
nected policy arenas and demand a change in both the behavioural and
operational attitudes of the ‘relevant elites’. In this respect also, the Commission,
in its function as a collegiate body, was to occupy the major role for European-
wide policy change. It was assigned the task of acting as the motor of integra-
tion, the source of integrative initiatives and the centre of technical expertise for
launching joint projects of a supranational character. The point to make here is
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that the Commission, in contradistinction to its predecessor (High Authority),
was given a wide range of policy competences to influence, along with the Coun-
cil, the common legislative process, and to be significantly involved in the
process of setting the integrative agenda. This was especially true until the estab-
lishment of the European Council in the mid-1970s and the changing role and
dynamism of the Presidency arrangements thereafter.
Although neofunctionalism stressed the importance of ‘conflict’ in the inte-
grative process, it failed, initially at least, to distinguish between the ‘scope’ and
‘level’ of integration. The former refers to the range of the central arrangements
in the form of policy arenas that become part of the region’s integrative corpus
– specific functions, that is, that are commonly managed at the larger level. On
the other hand, the ‘level’ of integration refers to the ways in which such func-
tional areas are managed, the involvement of supranational institutions in the
shaping of common policies, and hence the extent to which the central institu-
tions are capable of exercising political authority independently of national
political institutions. Neofunctionalist thinking, certainly before Schmitter
introduced the notion of ‘spillaround’, assumed that the scope and level of inte-
gration are mutual reinforcements: the more you bring into the common frame-
work of interests and power new policy areas, the greater the involvement and,
subsequently, the influence, of supranational institutions.
Consequent amendments to the original treaties, however, point in the
opposite direction. For example, in the case of the SEA, although there existed a
feeling of accomplishment among European leaders for overcoming some of the
obstacles towards further market integration (in the sphere of negative integra-
tion), greater majority rule-making in the Council and more attention to issues
of economic and social cohesion, the level of integration was not fundamentally
altered to take the system closer to a federal polity. However, the scope of inte-
gration was significantly advanced to include new areas of transnational co-
operation. A similar view may be adopted for the TEU, the AMT and the NIT
which, taken together, do not alter the locus of sovereignty from national to
supranational institutions of governance. These revisions add to the political
dynamics of integration, but not to the formation of a European polity whose
constitutional properties would present a direct threat to sovereign statehood.
Neofunctionalist theory has also been criticised on the following grounds:
projecting a supranationally biased image of Community arrangements and
dynamics; overestimating the role of the Commission as a policy initiator; over-
stressing the role and influence of organised interests at the larger level; offering
an ‘elite-driven’ explanation of the Community’s internal workings; not taking
into account ‘the logic of diversity’ in the regional system; being overtaken by
events, especially after the first major constitutional crisis of the Community in
the mid-1960s; underestimating the viability of national polities; failing to dis-
tinguish between ‘low politics’ (spheres of technical co-operation) and ‘high
politics’ (foreign policy and defence); ignoring the high levels of interdepen-
dence in the global arena, and so on. In the end, it was Haas himself who, in the
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mid-1970s, critically refined some of his earlier formulations, most notably the
automaticity of the spillover effect.111 As Church has rightly summarised the
debate: ‘[neofunctionalist] predictions proved empirically wrong . . . the states
of western Europe did not lie down and let supranationality walk over them.’112
Yet he is equally right to point out that neofunctionalist theory ‘was the first
really deep and complex explanation of the Communities’.113
Theorising in the 1970s
International regimes
As neofunctionalism was gradually denounced in the late 1970s, a sense of
renewed theoretical excitement was set in train by other, equally sophisticated,
approaches, regime theory and interdependence theory being among the most
prominent. The former brought into the debate the question of whether insti-
tutions really mattered in processes of internationalised governance – in the case
of the Community, capable of producing publicly binding decisions – whereas
the latter portrayed a dynamic system of increased interconnectedness, func-
tional and structural, which set the pace and, to a certain extent, the depth of the
regional management arrangements.
International regimes justify the separateness of states as constitutionally
distinct entities. As Taylor put it: ‘states do not cease to be states because they are
members of a regime.’114 At the same time, regimes allow states to ‘socialise’ with
each other in a complex web of norms of behaviour, rules and procedures of
decision-making that are commonly, if not ex ante, agreed upon by the partici-
pating actors. The emphasis is on informal routes of co-operative behaviour,
patterned as much by specific political interests – although it has been argued
that regimes imply ‘a form of co-operation that is more than the following of
short-run interests’115 – as by a common tendency to pursue (but not necessar-
ily explicitly set as such) reciprocal objectives. Regimes project a certain under-
standing of regional international co-operation: an ‘inclusive’ framework of
multiple and, more often than not, complex interactions which reflect a given
political reality. In the case of the Community, it could be argued that regime-
creation, as in the case of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, was
directed at setting the limits of acceptable behaviour within a structure of
collective, yet flexibly arranged, governance.
Although the influence of American-led international relations literature
became immediately manifest in the discussion of the Community as an inter-
national regime (or as a system with significant regime characteristics), the
latter concept remained conveniently vague as to embrace a multiplicity of dif-
ferent manifestations concerning the management of complex interdependen-
cies, to the extent that almost every aspect of transgovernmental co-operation,
whether stemming from a treaty-based mandate or from ‘extra-treaty’ arrange-
ments, was classified as one type of regime or other. Cox’s definition of regimes
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illustrates this point, ‘[Regimes] are . . . recognised patterns of practice that
define the rules of the game’,116 as does Krasner, describing them as ‘sets of
implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international rela-
tions’.117 A somewhat different account is offered by Young, who defines regimes
as ‘social institutions governing the actions of those involved in specifiable activ-
ities or set of activities’.118 The emphasis here is on rules that are translated into
‘well-defined guides to action’ and on compliance mechanisms with the rules
governing the regime. There is a certain procedural bias in this view, in terms of
the actors’ expected actions ‘under appropriate circumstances’.119
Different interpretations of these elusive constructs come from authors
who focus on the norms that regularise the behaviour of actors and guide their
choices. Norms constitute ‘standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and
obligations’.120 The question here is: can norms transcend possible sources of
tension among regime actors stemming from what Scharpf calls ‘the self-inter-
estedness of governments’?121 If ‘yes’, then through which accommodationist
mechanisms do actors reconsider their choices and decide to comply with a cer-
tain pattern of behaviour which is acceptable to their partners? This is no onto-
logical issue; it is about the flexibility of the regime in question, the way in which
it is valued by the participants, and the means by which norms can facilitate the
reaching of agreements on the basis of mutualism and reciprocity. In a word,
what are the limits of consciousness-raising that a regime can generate? These
questions have serious theoretical implications when examining the major
crises in the history of the Community, from de Gaulle’s ‘empty chair policy’ in
the summer of 1965, to the budgetary crisis of the early 1980s, to the negative
Danish vote on the TEU in June 1992.122 A common thread in these episodes was
that the dissenting state did not seriously contemplate the possibility of with-
drawing from the common regional system – an indication that regime analysis
remains an important part of EU theorising.123
What regime theory found difficult to transcend, however, was the role of
national establishments in dealing with issues relating to the level of integration,
rather than merely its functional scope. Although the concept was capable of
explaining why international co-operation does not necessarily take place
within an anarchical environment, or even why it creates conditions conducive
to structured interactions, regime analysis fell short of explaining the intensity
of relations resulting from the regional process and the extent to which the
structural properties of the system – that is, the treaty-based nature of the Com-
munity and the reality of mutual vetoes in the Council – could determine the
level of integrative arrangements at certain points in time. True, regimes may
account for the institutionalisation of multilateral relations in specific fields, but
they do not offer any structured analysis of the nature of power-politics and
interest differentiation among the participating actors. The conceptual lenses
used by regime theory are often part of a largely normative interpretation of
internationalised co-operation: namely, that states will play by the rules of the
26 Theory and reform in the European Union
game, as of course set by themselves. Purely political considerations may then be
subordinate to a functionalist explanation of collective action, overemphasising
the actors’ initial commitments.
In particular, where the degree of commitment exhibited by the constituent
parts varies according to the stakes involved in the process, or in fields of
co-operation where governmental activity rests primarily within the domestic
arena, regime theory faces a difficult challenge: it has to take account of the more
formalistic networks of relations developed by the Community (legal) system,
where the influence of non-territorial institutions such as the Commission
and the ECJ is of significance. Thus, like interdependence theory, regime analy-
sis is often trapped in a rather dispersed or loose framework of exchanges
among policy actors, undermining the impact of the Community’s legal order
(or its legal authority, for that matter) on shaping national patterns of behaviour
and limiting their preferred options – that is, compliance with detailed Com-
munity regulations.
Another area of concern is that the Community is too fragmented a system
of policy interactions to be treated as a single international regime: it needs to
be differentiated according to the specific conditions of co-operation in its var-
ious policy sectors. Under this line of argument, the Community system could
be seen as a multilayered structure of partial regimes, encompassing a multi-
plicity of different norms of behaviour and rules of the game (especially when
different legislative procedures apply which determine the degree of involve-
ment and strategy of the relevant actors). As Wallace put it with reference to the
EC budget, ‘the difficulties which the Community so far faced in agreeing on the
objectives which the budget should serve . . . and the policies and priorities it
should support, offer sobering evidence of the incompleteness and incoherence
of the partially integrated policy-making system which it represents’.124 Further,
a partial conceptualisation of the Community’s ‘policy regimes’ is not particu-
larly helpful when assessing its cross-sectional, essentially political properties –
that is, what defines it as a political system.
The proliferation of extra-treaty arrangements in the late 1970s stemmed
from a deeper concern on the part of the national executives to reassert a con-
siderable degree of national autonomy in the handling of their internal affairs
within a sensibly arranged framework of complex interactions. In this respect,
regime theory failed to take into account the relationship between the politici-
sation of issues that regional integration produced and the strategy employed by
particular state actors to exercise managerial control over the integration
process. These deeper concerns have as much to do with implied benefits from
collective action (or regime maintenance) as with questions of an ideological
nature about what kind of integration is allowed, or indeed prohibited. In fact,
viewing the Community through the relatively modest lenses of international
regime theory risks missing important points about the dynamics of formal
interinstitutional linkages at the regional level and the importance of domestic
politics in shaping transnational affairs. Perhaps this is the strongest critique of
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regime analysis as applied to the European integration process: politicisation
and grassroots democratic concerns often determine the limits of regime for-
mation at the larger level – they provide a clearly defined set of conditions about
the legitimation of systems of common management.
Interdependence theory
‘Interdependence’ was put forward by students of the Community as a more
analytically profitable term than ‘integration’, partly as a result of the unfulfilled
objectives of political union in the mid-to-late 1960s, and partly due to the
dominant role that national governments continued to enjoy in the manage-
ment of Community affairs throughout the 1970s. In fact, one of the conse-
quences of the Luxembourg Accords was not only the preservation of a
decision-making culture in the Council of Ministers in favour of consensual
outcomes, but also the gradual marginalisation of the Commission’s influence
over the domestic political orders of states. After the deterioration of the inter-
national economic environment in the early and late 1970s, a common thread
emerged among the member state executives for the maintenance of a consider-
able degree of autonomy over their internal affairs against any potentially ambi-
tious integrationist design, either in the field of institutionalised monetary
co-operation or in those associated with the harmonisation (although the pre-
ferred term at the time was ‘co-ordination’) of the separate foreign policies of
the segments.
The core set of relations determining the management, political or other-
wise, of Community business was captured by the concept of interdependence:
‘a condition (of intensive economic exchange) which may influence political
relationships but does not necessarily elicit an integrative response from those
most affected.’125 Unlike ‘conventional’ neofunctionalist analysis, interdepen-
dence theory encapsulates the process of European integration in erratic rather
than linear terms, emphasising ‘the loss of control and sense of hopelessness
which complex economic interactions can trigger, especially in governments
whose fate turns on their ability to safeguard the welfare of their electorates’.126
In a way, it sets the limits of a federalist-inspired political union since it shifts the
focus from questions of institution-building and constitutional engineering to
those associated with the management of pressing realities as a response to the
changing conditions of market forces and the economy.
The application of interdependence theory to integration studies in the
1970s produced less concern about the conceptualisation of the Community as
a political system, or for that matter as a form of polity with clearly defined
boundaries of institutional development. This, in turn, diverted attention from
the oft-raised question of whether the Community should follow an intergov-
ernmental or federalist path to institution-building, to questions dealing more
directly with the implications of policy co-ordination for the efficiency of the
system as a whole. Policy outputs, in other words, were seen as much more inter-
esting clusters of analysis – at both micro and macro levels – as compared with
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abstract models of collective governance based on ideologically defined rules
and procedures of large-scale political organisation. Institutionalisation thus
became of secondary importance to the student of interdependence theory in
the Community: governments may well achieve a considerable degree of policy
co-ordination and cohesion without being represented in a highly institution-
alised framework of interactions. In this sense, perhaps, by diminishing any
deterministic projections of the larger configuration, interdependence theory
deviates from neofunctionalist-driven analysis, let alone federal macro-
political aspirations. In Webb’s words: ‘Interdependence seems to be the answer
for scholars and politicians who wish to keep their options open on the evolu-
tion of the EC.’127
On the other hand, there is a common denominator where interdependence
analysts converge when referring to the internal dynamics of the Community
system – that is, the practice of mutualism in the management of complex rela-
tions that results in a policy ‘mix’: a variety of costs and benefits to the partici-
pating (interdependent) units. In this view, interdependence theory may be able
to explain some, albeit certainly not all, aspects of the various negotiating games
being played at the European level between national governments, transnational
actors and non-territorial central institutions. The emphasis here is on a per-
ceived diffusion of decision-making power among the major actors, as well as on
expected utilitarian outcomes of intense interrelationships on essentially non-
conflict-prone areas. Areas, that is, where state and non-state (transnational)
actors pursue their strategic choices in view of pressing socioeconomic problems
stemming from functional, and to a lesser extent structural, interdependence.
Hence ‘transnational coalitions’ take shape within the Community’s multi-
layered setting, impinging with considerable rigour on its policy processes.
Moreover, by transcending the ‘end product dilemma’ of mainstream
regional integration analysis – that is, federal state, confederation, union, and so
on – interdependence theory claims to offer a pragmatic, ideologically free alter-
native to the study of both the structural conditions and policy outcomes of
intensive interactions – something that supranationalism, the argument has it,
by its nature cannot offer. To quote again from Webb: ‘[Interdependence]
encourages the analyst to focus on the policy issues first and foremost rather
than be diverted by the particular and frequently parochial institutional prob-
lems which infiltrate and obscure the policy debate in Brussels.’128
A fair amount of criticism directed against the interdependence school cen-
tres around the basic, and, it needs saying, hard-won, political properties of the
Community system: the role and influence of its supranational institutions par
excellence; the dynamics of institutional ‘spillovers’ or forward linkages leading
to further institutionalisation; and the impact of ‘extra-treaty’ arrangements on
the conditions of joint decision-making, especially when sensitive issues are at
stake for a particular state or group of states. The list could well be extended to
cover interinstitutional relations, bargaining practices promoting national
interests, issues of large-scale jurisdictional competence, the constitutional
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implications of Community law for the domestic legal orders of states, and so
on. These issues, often due to their controversial nature, are dealt with more
explicitly by political theories of regional international integration.
But more importantly, perhaps, interdependence should be seen as only
one side of the coin. The other is the principle and practice of autonomy on the
part of national political authorities. The interplay between the two has pro-
duced, as many theorists rightly expected, a ‘flexible equilibrium’, or even ‘mul-
tiple flexible equilibria’, where structural (mainly systemic) properties were in a
position to determine the quality of functions performed by state agents (ways
of management), be they bureaucrats, administrators or government represen-
tatives. In a way, and this is not an attempt to simplify an inevitably complex
reality based on open-ended processes (also capable of producing unintended
consequences), the problem confronting the interdependence approach is that
it relies primarily on horizontal interactions whose decisional outcomes, how-
ever – that is, the process of regulating a policy arena where co-operative action
applies – are based on a set of authoritative rules reached by joint decisions but
applied vertically to the domestic orders of the participating collectivities. A
functionalist understanding of sovereignty, therefore, as part of the interdepen-
dence vocabulary, is in need of further clarification.
Ideally, in a system of highly interdependent relations, territorially demar-
cated boundaries become of secondary importance to the expected fruits (or
non-costs) of concerted action. Yet it is often the case that the management and,
more accurately, the exercise of managing these relations, rests closely with
‘executive-centred elites’ which are often willing to compromise the wider inter-
est – as resulting from the dictates of interdependence itself – to avoid the danger
of intersegmental confrontation. Here, consensual politics prevail, whether or
not specific treaty provisions may require a different course of procedural (deci-
sional) action. Interdependence, in other words, does not guarantee that ratio-
nal decisions prevail between actors who find themselves in the middle of a
difficult dilemma: to strengthen the co-operative ethos of the regional arrange-
ments or to resort to autonomous action under ideological or party political
pressures (in fact the latter may be part of a single political package, as has often
been the case in the history of interstate bargaining within the Community).
What interdependence theory cannot properly address, then, is the ques-
tion of explicitly political choices on the part of dominant governing elites about
the nature and extent of their involvement in joint co-operative schemes. This is
something with which, much to the detriment of supranationalist-driven aspi-
rations about the Community’s political future, state-centric approaches are
better equipped to deal. In conclusion, interdependence theory places Commu-
nity politics in a wider pluralist perspective of post-industrial relations, diverg-
ing attention from a structured analysis of hierarchical conceptions of the
regional process to a much more diffused system of policy co-ordination,
transnational coalition-formation and economic management.
30 Theory and reform in the European Union
Concordance systems
More than thirty years have elapsed since Puchala’s celebrated linking of the
Community with the story of the elephant and the blind men. Although falling
within the wider analytical framework of the interdependence school, Puchala’s
‘new thinking’ about contemporary international integration is worth exploring
in its own right, offering at the same time a thorough critical evaluation of
conventional integration models. Indeed, in an attempt to break away from the
classical theses of federalism and intergovernmentalism, Puchala discussed the
integration phenomenon in terms of ‘what it really is and is actually leading
to’.129 His main concern was that the pre-existing accounts of the relevant field,
especially as applied in the case of Western Europe, had been characterised by
conceptual confusion, stressing either the indispensability of national polities
or that of the central institutions. As a result, normative theoretical preferences
had exhausted the intellectual efforts of scholars, depriving the integration
process of a descriptive model capable of conceptualising its distinctive proper-
ties and dynamics.
Puchala argued his case against the analytical validity of conventional
approaches to the study of international integration such as federalism, func-
tionalism, nationalism and what he called ‘old-fashioned power-politics’. His
criticism reflected the state of theorising integration in the early 1970s, a period
when the Community’s workings were characterised by a more favourable ver-
sion of intergovernmentalism, but where no clear model of integration, or for
that matter a wider conceptual consensus, had emerged among its students.
Puchala was critical of the limited, predominantly economic, nature of the
Community at that time, as well as of the autonomy of the Commission in rep-
resenting the wider European interest being detached from the separate inter-
ests of the member states. His understanding of the Western European system
also challenged the mainstream federalist approach, in that progress towards
further integration was being equated with movement towards a central Euro-
pean government and the extent to which national political authorities had
relinquished their sovereignty to an emerging federal state. The question he
asked was ‘to what extent does participation in an international integration
arrangement actually enhance rather than undermine national sovereignty?’130
This was something which effectively remained largely unspoken within the
federalist camp.
However, Puchala was also critical of the view that equates international
integration with nation-building processes. The point he made here was that
Western European integration does not even closely approximate a model of
political evolution where the measurement of its ‘progress’ or ‘success’ is condi-
tioned by the extent to which the component parts that are being integrated
move towards ‘the social and cultural assimilation of [their] nationalities’.131 In
this respect, Puchala was particularly sceptical of the applicability of the ‘nation-
alism model’ in the study of international integration. His main argument was
that such an approach lacked evidence of progress towards the envisaged process
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of assimilation among diverse peoples. Again, students applying the ‘national-
ism model’ were asking, according to Puchala, the wrong questions: ‘about
people-to-people interactions and transactions, about similarities and differ-
ences in people’s life styles, value systems and cultural norms, and especially
about their attitudes toward one or another and attendant perceptions of “we-
ness”.’132 In his view, the rather more interesting question to pose was about the
relationship between peoples and their national governments, as well as
between the former and international organisations and processes.
In his equally critical approach to Mitrany’s functionalism, Puchala ques-
tioned the extent to which his sectoral approach, for all its validity in locating the
sources of international co-operation and the role of transnational (non-
governmental) actors, had actually worked in the way in which the functionalist
model originally intended. The point he made here was that in internationally
integrating systems, ‘[l]eadership, initiative and prerogative have by and large
remained with national governments’,133 rather than with newly formed techno-
cratic agencies, large-scale bureaucratic entities and non-governmental actors.
Moreover, functionalist theorising failed to predict the importance attached by
national governments to pursuing ‘welfare’ objectives, rather than merely
‘power’ relations at the regional level. Equally, Puchala dismissed the function-
alist claim about non-political aspects of international co-operation, arguing
that no such issues really exist in interstate relations. He also pointed to another
deficiency of the functionalist design in that, instead of being primarily preoc-
cupied with sector-to-sector task expansion, ‘there is possible expansion in the
political system brought into being when functional sectors are integrated inter-
nationally’.134 Finally, he was concerned with the normative/hypothetical aspects
of the functionalist analysis in that the end product of international integration
would resemble a ‘functional federation’ or some sort of ‘multi-sector merger’.
In brief, functionalism in the Mitranian tradition failed, in Puchala’s view, to ask
‘how international co-operation is in fact achieved during international integra-
tion in the very course of international politics’.135 It has been ‘partially strait-
jacketed’ by its own integrative assumptions.
Last in his ‘critical list’ comes the realist school of thought, perceiving inter-
national integration as ‘power politics’. This traditional international relations
approach fails to understand what the phenomenon is all about, not least
because it views international integration as ‘a process of mutual exploitation
wherein governments attempt to mobilise and accumulate the resources of
neighbouring states in the interests of enhancing their own power’.136 Such an
account emphasises the self-interestedness of national governing elites which
perceive international integration as an instrument towards the accumulation
of greater power as ‘international marriages of convenience, comfortable for all
partners as long as self-interests are satisfied’.137 The point that realist thinking is
making is that international integration never really gets ‘beyond the nation-
state’. It stays confined within the dictates of international diplomacy, leading
eventually towards disintegration: the participating actors are ‘destined for
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divorce the moment any partner’s interests are seriously frustrated’.138 In
general terms, Puchala noted, political realists are so convinced that interna-
tional integration is played by traditional international relations rules – also set
by traditional actors – that they never ask ‘whether actors committed to inter-
national integration may be pursuing any other than the traditional inventory
of international goals – autonomy, military security, influence and prestige’.139
In brief, ‘by assuming that international politics remains the same “old game”
and that international integration is but a part of it’,140 the advocates of the real-
ist analysis fail to take into account the possibility, if not reality, that interna-
tional integration arrangements may in the end define the self-interests of states
themselves, rather than vice versa.
So, with what did Puchala propose to replace the existing deficiencies in
international integration analysis? His answer was that ‘contemporary inter-
national integration can best be thought of as a set of processes that produce
and sustain a Concordance System at the international level’.141 Such a system
of ‘co-operatively interacting states’ is based on the harmonisation of the
actors’ interests and on mutually beneficial interactions. The role of the
nation-state remains central in the integration process but at the same time the
institutions of the larger system possess their own organisational and opera-
tional logic. A Concordance System may include actors from different organi-
sational levels or governmental arenas without producing a system of
hierarchical authority structures. Rather, ‘each of the actors remain[s] semi-
autonomous . . . all are interdependent, and all interact in pursuit of consen-
sus that yields mutual rewards’.142 It is a complex international pluralist system
with high levels of institutionalisation and various organisational networks,
where international interactions are mainly channelled through bureaucratic,
rather than diplomatic, means: ‘a system of relations among sovereign states
and separate peoples.’143
In the Concordance System, problem-solving and conflict regulation are
facilitated via ‘institutionalised, constitutional, precedential or otherwise stan-
dardised, patterned procedures which all actors commit themselves to use and
respect’.144 But it is not a state, national or transnational in kind. Rather, it takes
the form of numerous functionally specific bodies, without having to rely upon
federalist-inspired processes of institutional centralisation. More importantly,
political conflict arises from different approaches to international co-operation,
mainly in terms of the necessary procedural avenues to be pursued, rather than
from ‘fundamental incompatibilities in the interests of the various actors’.145
Hence conflict may well be one of the system’s functional aspects and not, as
is often the case in various realist predictions, a move towards disintegration
(or de-federation). Another important dimension of a Concordance System is
the bargaining techniques used by the relevant actors to reach mutually rein-
forcing outcomes in international negotiations: coercion and confrontation
should be excluded from the acceptable patterns of international (intrasys-
temic) behaviour. On the contrary, the rules of the system are determined by
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what Puchala calls a ‘full information’ game, where secrecy and deception are
altogether unknown.
International interdependence – often seen as a result of ‘national inade-
quacy’ – emerges as a defining property of Concordance Systems. This does not
amount, however, to a negation of the nation-state. Rather, ‘nation-states can be
preserved as distinct entities only through the international pooling of resources
to confront problems that challenge their separate existence’.146 Likewise,
Puchala explicitly states that ‘mass populations within the Concordance System
need not be assimilated into a supranationality’.147 However, they do confer legit-
imacy upon the system, comply with its authoritative decisional outcomes and,
in general, support the integrative process.
In summary, the theoretical lenses employed by the Concordance Systems
approach capture aspects of the structural, attitudinal and procedural condi-
tions of international integration, while freeing the analyst from normative,
hypothetical and ideologically defined interpretations of the integrative phe-
nomenon. Thus it is a pragmatic approach aiming to reveal the underlying
structure of relations between highly interdependent units and the way in which
large-scale co-ordination projects, patterned on routinised procedures and stan-
dardised codes of conduct, transcend the ill-effects of adversarial politics in mul-
tiple policy arenas. It is these regime aspects of the Concordance System which
are mainly responsible for the elimination of competitive tussles for political
authority among the participants and the prevalence of positive-sum outcomes
in multilateral negotiations. In conclusion, Puchala’s approach to international
integration attempted a fresh start by exploring the possibilities of consensus-
formation, pragmatic politics, patterned procedures, institutionalised compro-
mise, mutual responsiveness and co-operative behaviour. It is our contention
that his analysis remains a valuable contribution in the field.
A final note
Having examined the core theories of integration both during the formative
years of the regional process and throughout the 1970s, we can now turn to the
relationship between the major constitutional revisions of the original treaties
and the theoretical implications stemming from them, especially in the light of
new approaches to the study of European integration in the 1990s, especially
from the perspective of EU polity-building. Such an analysis will help us link
the theoretical findings of Chapter 2 with the more detailed examination of
recent treaty reforms, as epitomised in the Amsterdam and Nice outcomes,
respectively (Chapters 3 and 4). It will also provide the analytical frame-
work and normative basis from which we may develop a more penetrating
understanding of the evolutionary nature of the integration process in general,
and the qualitative transformation of the regional system from a policy-
oriented enterprise to a transnational polity: a system of governance capable of
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producing authoritative political decisions, allocating values in European
society, and transforming the traditional patterns of interaction among the
component state/citizen parts.
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Treaty reform in perspective
The SEA and beyond
In the mid-1980s, the whole scene became dominated by claims of a ‘neofunc-
tionalist comeback’ – modified in nature, yet easily discernible in scope.1
Processes of negative integration primarily at the market level were linked with
the development of a wide range of policies covering almost all spheres of
regional co-operation. Neofunctionalist ‘spillovers’ were envisaged for the
transformation of a ‘Business Europe’ to a ‘People’s Europe’: the functions of the
larger management system seemed to have produced not only new expectations
but also new pressures for further integration. But the institutional evolution of
the Community was lagging behind its (re)emerging neofunctionalist ambi-
tions. The SEA did not represent a qualitative leap towards a ‘self-regulating
pluralist society’ at the regional level, or even towards high levels of political
autonomy on the part of supranational institutions.
Although it needs to be pointed out that the Delors Commission did try to
develop an independent strategy for managing the ‘1992 process’ and to exploit
its enormous publicity – a project supported at the time by even the most
‘reluctant’ Europeans including British Prime Minister Thatcher – the states
once again found ways of resisting any substantive movement towards a
profound transformation of the Community system: supranationalism cham-
pioned in areas where the states wanted to see progress, such as the implemen-
tation of the single market programme (and even here there was to be a target
date rather than a legally binding date for its completion). In those areas where
national interests were, or appeared to be, at stake, such as European Political
Co-operation (EPC) that was merely codified in a legal text, intergovernmen-
talism effectively prevailed as the dominant mode of decision-taking. More-
over, no subsequent alteration of the locus of sovereignty emerged as a result of
2
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the coming into force of the SEA in July 1987, although it did pave the way for
higher levels of power-sharing in the Community system. An equally impor-
tant line of criticism directed against resurgent neofunctionalist aspirations
came from a number of scholars who stressed the fact that the theory did not
take into account the wider international environment within which Commu-
nity change was to flourish.2
So why did neofunctionalism, which had been obsolescent for some twenty
years, emerge once again as the leading theory of European integration? A pos-
sible answer is that the SEA was hailed by many observers at the time as opening
up new horizons for positive integration. Neofunctionalism was in fact the only
theory that could place, if not justify, these claims in a dynamic, macropolitical
perspective. After all, the analytical validity of the theory had been linked from
the outset with the development of the Community political system and now
there was a widespread sense of a renewed dynamism in the integration process.
In particular, there was a feeling that the single market plan would not allow
for any critical drawbacks. Instead, it was seen as constituting the ‘motor’ of
integration, the long-needed integrative project that would accelerate the pace of
the regional process by mobilising political elites, trade unions and the wider
business community towards a commonly shared – and, crucially, feasible –
objective. At the same time, there were mounting expectations that the dynam-
ics of economic integration would soon spill over into the institutional sphere.
Although new sources of possible pressure became manifest in a wide range of
policy domains, neofunctionalist analysis concentrated on the stimulus rather
than the outcome of the envisaged spillovers; that is, on the integrative dynamic
rather than on the consequence of the newly generated impetus.
For instance, it was expected that increased trade and, albeit to a lesser
extent, financial interdependencies would lead, in a somewhat deterministic
fashion, towards a full-blown monetary union on the grounds that positive
movement at one level of integration would set up problems that could only be
resolved at another level. But there was no immediate link, nor was there any
automatic mechanism to that end. On the contrary, much had to rely upon the
convergence of interests among the dominant governing elites, which also had
to take into account what such a move would entail for the sovereignty of their
respective polities. The crucial question missed by ‘new neofunctionalism’ was
how far can Community competences be extended beyond the traditional state
level without raising the sensitive issue of national sovereignty? Even in the case
of the SEA, for all the new dynamism and innovative strategy shown by the
Delors Presidency, despite the existing political consensus among the national
governing elites, and despite even the positive mobilisation of non-governmen-
tal actors around the ‘1992 project’, the level of European integration cannot be
said to have been significantly advanced.
However, it is equally difficult to assume that the member state governments
decided to refocus, as Haas might have it, their loyalties, activities and political
expectations on a new regional centre, for no such ‘centre’ ever came into being
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with the SEA. Moreover, neither the inherent technical characteristics of the
vision of a ‘Europe without frontiers’, nor the utilitarian calculus of ‘the cost of
non-Europe’, nor even the introduction of QMV in the Council (which was
mainly aimed at speeding up European legislation in areas related to the com-
pletion of the single market) and of a new co-operation procedure upgrading
(under certain conditions) the legislative role of the EP, can be said to correspond
to what neofunctionalists originally had in mind: the regional centralisation of
authoritative decision-making driven by the expansive logic of integration and,
eventually, the emergence of a new European ‘political community’.
Reflections on the TEU
This section considers the state of theorising European integration in the 1990s
in relation to the political and constitutional physiognomy of the Maastricht
Treaty. Such an inquiry is of particular theoretical interest as none of the previ-
ously dominant paradigms of regional integration in Europe provide an overall
hermeneutic pattern. Rather, different theoretical accounts intermesh with
enormous complexity as to the outcome of the twin Intergovernmental Confer-
ences of 1990/91. A possible explanation is that from a phase of integration in
the mid-1980s, when expected ‘spillovers’ monopolised the interest of the acad-
emic community, we moved into a situation where a process of ‘overspill’
became manifest:3 the scope of integration – that is, the range of things that states
decide to do together – had by then seriously expanded, whereas its level had
become all the more difficult to dissociate from the control of state executives.
Indeed, the component states were equally anxious to preserve the integrity of
their respective polities, and hence to continue their existence as distinct sover-
eign entities and even reinforce their own autonomy, rather than be drawn into
a system of uncontrolled institutional centralisation followed by advanced
schemes of federalism and, as some may have it, regional state-building.
Art. A TEU states that ‘The Union shall be founded on the European Com-
munities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established in
this Treaty’. Accordingly, the Union provides for a general umbrella under which
the pre-established Communities continue to exist as separate legal entities. The
EC is the more advanced component of a three-pillar structure complemented
by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Co-operation in Jus-
tice and Home Affairs (JHA). The latter pillars, by establishing two additional
‘pluralist’ arenas, reveal the limits of majority voting in still sensitive policy areas.
The locus decidendi of the new competencies ‘pooled’ to the central institutions
in these sectors rests firmly in the hands of the Council, the limited consultative
role of the Commission and the EP notwithstanding. As Taylor put it: ‘The
whole was to be consolidated into a single package of activities linked in systems
of common management.’4 Owing to the cautiously designated stages of joint
decision-making, the procedures operating in these pillars resemble an exercise
in transnational regime formation: a co-operative venture based upon a com-
monly agreed set of principles, norms, rules and procedures, elaborate enough
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to promote a relatively high degree of horizontal interaction among the states,
and elastic enough to be wholly consistent with the pursuit of a wide range of
segmental interests in EU affairs.5 As Bulmer and Scott put it: ‘the two new
pillars of the Union constitute an extension of the terrain of inter-state co-
operation . . . a strengthening of the kind of intergovernmental arrangements
which exacerbate the democratic deficit.’6 This point is further supported by
the perpetuation of a complex ‘comitology’ system which evades proper parlia-
mentary control, national or European; the issue of extending the EP’s co-
responsibility over the Community’s compulsory expenditure (agriculture); the
question of a uniform procedure for European elections; and a wide range of
issues relating to the openness, clarity and transparency of EU decision-making.
According to Art. E TEU, the four main institutions of the Union shall exer-
cise their powers ‘under the conditions and for the purposes provided for’ by the
provisions of the Treaty, while Art. N TEU renders all parts of the Treaty subject
to the same revision rules. And since the TEU rests on two different sets of legal
mechanisms – the Community Method and intergovernmental co-operation –
the extent to which it has provided for a ‘single institutional framework’ is far
from self-evident. However, Demaret recognises that ‘the dividing line between
the two types of mechanisms and between their respective fields of application
is, in several instances, less than clear-cut’.7 But even despite these reservations,
the legal maze of the TEU has raised more questions than it originally sought to
address, proving to be ‘a source of controversy’.8 As Wallace put it: ‘the terms of
Maastricht . . . can be interpreted as easily as making efforts to set a ceiling on,
even a roll back of, the forces of supranationalism as they can be seen as crossing
a new threshold on the route towards a European transnational polity.’9 It is thus
conceivable that the Union does not possess a legal personality of its own.
Rather, ‘it must be considered a new international organization sui generis and
thus as a subject of international law’.10 If by the term ‘international organisation’
we mean ‘a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between
members . . . from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the
common, interests of membership’,11 then challenging this view is no easy task.
Suffice it to stress that the confusion surrounding the ‘constitutionality’ of the
TEU is supportive of the fact that for many scholars the question whether the
Union has moved closer to a federal type of polity remains largely unanswered.
What is also remarkable in the central arrangements brought about by the
TEU is the insistence of sovereignty-conscious states to protect their own cul-
tural, political and constitutional features; a point clearly made in Art. F(1)
TEU: ‘The Union shall respect the national identities of the Member States,
whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy.’ This
is indicative of the need to sustain a pluralistic form of society at the regional
level, implying that any challenge to constituent identities would be legally and
practically unacceptable. The search for unity through an ‘uneasy compromise’
between federalism and confederalism implies a series of interstate concessions
to meet the challenges of joint decision-making, without losing sight of the
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growing quest for national autonomous action. Both points seem to substanti-
ate the view that, owing to the premium it places on preserving (territorial) seg-
mental autonomy within a sensibly arranged ‘union’, the TEU is characterised
by a unique blend of consensual mechanisms for accommodating segmental
diversity within a nascent, yet fragile, political unity. Joining together diverse
entities in a regional union that respects their individual integrity, the constitu-
tional structure of the Union challenges the organic theory of the polity, with-
out relying entirely on the properties of ‘segmented differentiation’. From this
stems its greatest merit as a system of mutual governance, but also its strongest
concern: to provide equality of status to its members while allowing for a less
rigid understanding of sovereign statehood. In fact, the TEU offers an advanced
conception of the practice of political co-determination. This has been achieved
so far by applying a mixed system of consensus and majority government, con-
sistent with what Forsyth had earlier defined as ‘unanimity at the base, majority
voting in the superstructure’.12
The political fragility of the new arrangements was clearly manifested not
only during the negotiations leading up to the signing of the TEU in February
1992, but also during its arduous course of ratification and the subsequent ‘opt-
outs’ secured by the more sceptical members as a quid pro quo for consenting to
the Union project. Against the background of an ever more cynical electorate,
any residual touch of optimism from the mid-1980s seemed to have evaporated
by the conclusion of the ratification process in October 1993. Although the TEU
finally managed to survive the new tides of Euroscepticism, a new ‘democratic
disjunction’ became manifest between the wishes of national leaders and popu-
lar political sentiments.13 As in past treaty revisions, the TEU reflected in a most
tenacious way the ongoing tussle between those defending the rights of states (as
sovereign units) and those projecting an independent legitimacy for the Union
(as an composite polity). In Neunreither’s words: ‘It is a text for insiders, not
only in being difficult to read and to digest, but even more because of its pater-
nalistic approach – everything is done for the people, not very much by the
people.’14 Thus the lesson to be learned from the Maastricht process is that unless
there is a sufficient area of consensus at the elite level, no viable outcome(s) can
exist. This accords with what most students of integration had implicitly
assumed: over the 1990s, the weight of the evidence is that the extension of the
scope and level of European integration has exploited a crucial property of con-
sensual politics: the capacity to reconcile the challenges of institutional innova-
tion with the need for systemic continuity. The conclusion to be drawn is that
‘the burden of proof ’ lies more on federalism than on intergovernmentalism as
a method of organising both the internal and external affairs of the general
system. This view is further supported by the rather moderate, and certainly
unimaginative, reform packages agreed in Amsterdam and Nice in June 1997
and December 2000, respectively, which will be examined later in this study.
Having examined some crucial aspects of the TEU, it is time to consider in
greater detail some of the stimulating theoretical attempts to (re)conceptualise,
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largely from a political systemic perspective, the emerging properties and
functions of the regional system. Of particular interest here are liberal inter-
governmentalism, the fusion thesis, new institutionalism, multilevel gover-
nance, the international state thesis, the concepts of condominio and consortio,
the examination of the Union’s state-like properties in comparison with other
forms of state, the confederal consociation thesis, as well as new normative per-
spectives on EU theorising, such as neo-republicanism and constructivism.
New theoretical approaches
Liberal intergovernmentalism
The approach developed by Moravcsik in the early 1990s aimed at widening the
spectrum of scholarly debate about the evolution of the EU system, its internal
decision-making procedures and, more importantly, the relationship between
domestic politics and international co-operation – the latter is achieved mainly
by using Putnam’s analogy of the two-level games.15 Liberal intergovernmental-
ism, in attempting to restore the superiority of state-centric approaches to the
study of regional integration, purports to explain, on the one hand, the interac-
tion between states and international organisations and, on the other, the rela-
tionship between national preference-formation, coalitional behaviour and
interstate bargaining. What is distinctive in this approach is that it offers a range
of intellectual opportunities for moving beyond ‘unicausal theorising’, by inte-
grating three important subdisciplines of general international relations theory:
regime analysis, negotiation theory and intergovernmentalism. The wider the-
oretical concern revolves around an understanding of the dynamic interplay
between a liberal interpretation of national preference-formation, the rational-
ity of actors pursuing their interests at the central level and the distinct nature
of intergovernmental bargaining within the Community system.
The welcoming aspect of this analysis is that it links the domestic political
orders and economic agendas of states to joint decision-making, as well as to
coalition-formation in the Council. Moravcsik argues that Community institu-
tions, which are generally taken as highly reactive agents operating within a ‘pas-
sive structure’, strengthen the power of national governments in two important
respects: ‘they increase the efficiency of interstate bargaining’, often by acting as
‘facilitators of positive-sum governing’, and they ‘strengthen the autonomy of
national political leaders vis-à-vis particularistic societal groups within their
domestic polity’.16 The point being made in the latter case is that state executives
mediate between domestic interests and Community action: integration out-
comes are shaped by the relative bargaining power of national governments and
by the distribution of preferences among them. The Community’s transaction
cost-reducing function, its highly institutionalised policy co-ordination envi-
ronment and the institutional delegation (pooling of sovereignty) that take
place at the larger level (mainly through the application of majority rule)
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are important factors towards a viable negotiating order: ‘a successful inter-
governmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through
negotiated policy co-ordination.’17 In brief, despite its many critics (who are par-
ticularly sceptical of the theory’s working assumptions on state rationality and
its tendency to downplay the impact of decision rules and institutional prefer-
ences), Moravcsik’s ‘new intergovernmentalism’ represents a attempt to bridge
the gap between neofunctionalist pre-theorising and ‘substantive’ theorising,
by proposing a challenging research agenda, which places the emphasis on the
primacy of interstate bargaining in determining the pace and range of the
regional arrangements.
The fusion thesis
Wessels’ analysis on the subject projects a dynamic macropolitical view of the
integrative process.18 The argument he puts forward is that European integration
is characterised by an ‘ever closer fusion’ of ‘public instruments from several
levels linked with the respective Europeanisation of national actors and institu-
tions’.19 Wessels stresses the development and importance of institutionalised
patterns of joint problem-solving between national and European governance
structures for the fulfilment of public needs. This makes the larger system part
of the evolution of West European statehood itself. In Wessels’ words: ‘it is a cru-
cial factor and dynamic engine of the fundamental changes in the statehood of
western Europe’; thus attributing to the Union a much more complex role than
that of merely ‘rescuing the nation state’ in the Milwardian sense.20 Conceptually,
the term ‘fusion’ is taken to mean something more than merely a ‘horizontal
pooling of sovereignties’ as understood by mainstream realist state-centric
analyses. Rather, it bears a strong resemblance to the functioning of the German
political system of ‘interlocking’ federalism or Politikverflechtung, which in turn
refers to a continuous process of negotiation between state and federal agents in
the determination of national policy. In fact, this particular form of interlocking
authority structures becomes part of Wessels’ explanatory variables for the
patterns of political systemic growth and differentiation in the Union.
Applied to the Union’s composite polity, ‘fusion’ refers, according to Wes-
sels, to the ‘merger’ of public resources located at several levels of governance,
including substate structures. This, however, has as a result the blurring of
responsibilities among the actors involved and, by extension, an increased diffi-
culty in tracing the accountability of diffused policies. This kind of ‘messy fed-
eralism’, to borrow a phrase, is also reminiscent of the way in which politics
operates in the German system, where an apparent ‘accountability deficit’ stems
from the complexity and composite nature of national policy-making in deter-
mining which particular actor or set of actors is responsible for which deci-
sion(s). In general terms, the Union is treated as ‘the logical product of
fundamental choices by member governments’, operating through ‘package
deals’, without however undermining the role of central institutional actors,
which remain important ‘in shaping the perceptions of national actors’.21 In
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short, the fusion thesis purports to explain the new challenges confronting the
evolution of West European states and the way in which they, as the basic units
constituting a larger polity, ‘try to achieve an increased effectiveness in applying
public instruments by using efficient procedures on the one hand, while main-
taining a major say through broad and intensive participation on the other’.22
New institutionalism
Leaving aside the apparent methodological sophistication of new institutional-
ism, many of its explanations rely upon a rather uncomplicated (and until
recently largely unqualified) assumption that institutions make a difference in
the process of organising public life: whether formal or informal in kind, insti-
tutions are not merely epiphenomena: they form a constitutive part of a fuller
and for that matter more profound understanding of complex social reality.
Indeed, the revival of institutional analysis as an indispensable element in con-
ducting political science research is partly to do with an attempt to tackle new
challenging questions about the changing conditions of the liberal constitu-
tional polity and of novel processes of socioeconomic governance, and partly to
do with the equally demanding task of providing better explanations about the
causal impact different institutions have on specific policy outcomes, by means
of influencing – i.e., systematising, structuring, constraining, etc. – the forma-
tion of actors’ preferences and the pursuit of their interests. New institutionalist
accounts also assert that institutions, conceived as non-neutral arenas of human
governance, facilitate the exchange of information among actors, offer the pos-
sibility of informal contacts, assist the internalisation of norms, enhance the
quality of communicative action, promote patterns of co-operative behaviour
(often by means of shaping the behaviour of those working within their struc-
tures), and map the expectations of actors on issues of social and political
change. In particular, institutions are capable not only of promoting change, but
also of constraining it, as well as touching upon sensitive issues of actors’ iden-
tity, rather than merely acting as neutral or passive instruments for aggregating
societal interests and claims.
The arguments mounted in support of new institutionalism in the discus-
sion of the EU political system can be summarised as follows: supranational
institutions have an impact on the behaviour of national governing elites and
domestic policy actors, while becoming important venues for conflict resolu-
tion; the present-day Union offers the most advanced form of regional institu-
tionalisation based on both formal and informal mechanisms of rule-making
and norm-setting; post-SEA, there is a notable re-embrace of institutional analy-
sis, treating institutions as meaningful, autonomous actors in the European
policy setting, often by means of imposing constraints on rule-based state
behaviour; systemic growth in the Union has often led to a series of ‘unintended
consequences’ regarding the influence and competence acquisition of suprana-
tional institutions at the expense of state executives which can no longer act as
gatekeepers; explaining and understanding the evolution of the integrative
48 Theory and reform in the European Union
system can no longer rely on an analysis of ‘grand episodes’ and ‘history-making’
decisions through formal interstate negotiations; supranational institutions
limit the capacity of states to exercise effective and/or ultimate political control
in either setting the integrative agenda or in determining integration outcomes;
the emergence of new policy norms and regulatory practices influencing EU
policy-making.
Focusing on the impact of the central institutions on integration processes,
Bulmer analyses the transformation of European governance from a compara-
tive public policy perspective,23 offering a new institutionalist account that goes
beyond both purely descriptive empiricism and reductionist political analysis.
In doing so, his illuminating analysis has placed EU institutions ‘in a context
which allows differentiation between formal political institutions, informal
conventions and the norms and beliefs embedded within those institutions’.24
The underlying assumption here is that institutions matter: ‘that political
struggles are mediated by prevailing institutional arrangements.’25 New institu-
tionalism treats institutions as instruments capable of shaping ‘the pattern of
political behaviour’, going ‘beyond the formal organs of government’ to
include ‘standard operating procedures, so-called soft-law, norms and conven-
tions of behaviour’.26 Both the SEA and the TEU, Bulmer notes, can be under-
stood from a historical institutionalist perspective, for they created and
extended the competences of the Community and have generated changes in
the conventions and norms embedded in the central institutions.27 Bulmer’s
analysis does not point either to a holistic or a unifocal approach, but rather
complements other theoretical endeavours in their examination of EU politics
and governance in the 1990s.
In general, the new institutionalist political science raises challenging
research questions about the institutional dynamics of macropolitical order-
building; the consequences of institutional reform (through formal or informal
means and procedures); the impact on constitutive norms on actual policy per-
formance; the ways in which institutions structure the interaction between dif-
ferent actors, shape their choices and influence their behaviour; the relationship
between continuity and change in a system of institutionalised rule; the inter-
play between institutional affirmation and transformation; the intrinsic and
extrinsic importance of institutional settings, and so on. Having said this, how-
ever, it is still imperative to qualify further the central institutionalist tenet,
namely that institutions matter. Here, a promising research agenda drawn from
the domain of comparative politics has recently emerged, examining not only
the question of whether or not institutions are important, but also for what,
while touching upon issues of regime or system-wide performance and institu-
tional causality. It is almost a certainty, at least for the foreseeable future, as
well as a very welcoming aspect in EU theory-building, that institutional
approaches to the study of European integration will grow stronger and that
its students will be better equipped to deal in a more insightful and systematic
manner with such intricate issues as the impact of less formalised arenas of
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governance on integration outcomes, the role of institutional values in everyday
policy-making and, crucially, the normative context within which the constitu-
tive actors and governance arrangements of the European polity operate as
norm-setting forces.
Multilevel governance
In stark contrast to state-centric approaches to European integration like liberal
intergovernmentalism (which generally perceive the EU system as a means of
enhancing state sovereignty or autonomy), the ‘multilevel governance’ school
aims to inform our understanding of an emerging European polity that is
increasingly characterised by overlapping competences and structures of politi-
cal authority. In this context, Marks, Hooghe and Blank have directed their foci
to the study of the Union as a system of ‘multilevel governance’.28 Being critical
of (realist) state-centrism, this group of scholars looks at the ‘polity-creating
process’ that is currently emerging in Europe, leading to a situation whereby
‘authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of gov-
ernment’, and where national governments ‘have lost some of their former
authoritative control over individuals in their respective territories’.29 The point
the authors make is that ‘the locus of political control has changed’ – state exec-
utives do not monopolise decision-making competencies any longer – and that
‘[i]ndividual state sovereignty is diluted in the Union by collective decision-
making among national governments’ and by ‘the increased autonomy and
independent influence that EU institutions have come to enjoy’.30
There are indeed limits to both individual and collective state executive con-
trol: increased majoritarianism in the Council and the regression of its (once
dominant) ‘veto culture’; the mistrust among state executives; the role of interest
group organisations and transnational actors in the actual policy process; the
intensified interconnection of different political arenas, the increased complexi-
ties and specialisation of collective public policy-making (requiring detailed reg-
ulation); the co-legislative rights of the EP; the agenda-setting role of the
Commission along with its substantive informational capacity and policy imple-
mentation influence; the political dynamics of the ECJ’s legal activism; domestic
party political competition; subnational mobilisation, national constitutional
constraints on formal treaty change, and so on, are only a few factors to mention.
From this school of thought, EU policy-making ‘is characterised by mutual
dependence, complementary functions and overlapping competencies’.31 The
Union is thus taken as a ‘multilevel polity’ composed of interlocked arenas for
political contest, where direct links are established among actors in diverse polit-
ical arenas, where political control is diffuse – often leading to ‘second-best’
policy outcomes, in turn resulting from Scharpf ’s notion of a ‘joint-decision trap’
or Politikverflechtungsfalle – and where ‘states no longer serve as the exclusive
nexus between domestic politics and international relations [or intergovern-
mental bargaining]’.32 Although it is not claimed that supranational institutions
will eventually supersede the member state executives, multilevel governance
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theorists argue that no single locus of accumulated political authority exists, or
for that matter is likely to come into being, owing to the largely ‘post-sovereign’
character of the Union, in that authority cuts across traditional state boundaries
and domains of policy action. A major difference between liberal intergovern-
mentalism and the multilevel governance approach is that, according to the
former, governments bargain the interests of domestic actors in state-dominated
arenas, while the latter acknowledges the mobilisation of domestic actors directly
in the transnational arena through their involvement in multilevel policy
networks, where they represent one out of many competing actors.
Multilevel governance carries at least two important meanings in relation to
national sovereignty. First, there is a notion of a single, albeit pluralistic and
asymmetrical, regional polity, within which sovereignty is dispersed among
competing political actors which chose to bypass their central national author-
ities in their dealings with Brussels. The European polity thus transcends the
traditional bond between territory, function and, increasingly, identity, and
becomes a new venue for conflict resolution, interest articulation and the repre-
sentation of claims stemming from ‘smaller’, diverse, but politically organised
units. This perspective, which in large measure leads to a postmodern approxi-
mation of EU reality, stresses the limits of state sovereignty in advanced
processes of union and the penetration of diverse social and political settings. A
second meaning to national sovereignty denotes a new type of collective action
that recognises the constitutional foundations of sovereignty as resting on the
member state polities, but challenges the capacity and, hence, the functional
autonomy of states to respond effectively to pressing socioeconomic realities. In
this sense, subnational mobilisation becomes an additional vehicle for the re-
allocation of authoritative problem-solving capacity to constitutive entities
within a polity that remains dependent in critical ways on its subsystems, but
which also allows for new structures of political opportunity to emerge. This
implies a dynamic understanding of governance, not so much as the political
capacity to steer, but as a practical means for domestic actors to influence large-
scale policy-making by hitting several access points directly. To summarise the
two conceptions of sovereignty: in the first case, contrary to the hierarchical
order of the Westphalian sovereignty regime, there is an explicit acknowledge-
ment of the structural transformation of the nation-state, which now becomes
an integral part of a new multilevel polity of diffused public authority and gov-
ernance functions. In the second case, the state retains de jure sovereignty but
loses its autonomy – its capacity rather than authority to control events – in per-
forming its tasks as the principal actor for the articulation of domestic interests,
as well as in projecting its political domination of collective problem-solving.
International state
In an illuminating analysis about the ‘post-ontological’ stage of contemporary
EU studies (the emphasis being on explanation rather than categorisation),
Caporaso sheds light on the character of the European polity and the possible
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ways of conceptualising its evolving institutional structure from the theoretical
perspective of different ‘forms of state’.33 His insightful research encourages the
analyst to develop a deeper and, comparatively speaking, historically informed
understanding of the Union as a ‘regional international state’: ‘an international
structure of governance based on the extrusion of certain political activities of
its constituent units.’34 Caporaso is also critical of the view that equates the emer-
gence of EU authority structures, however novel or difficult to conceptualise in
traditional political systemic terms, with a direct loss of national autonomy.
Instead, he urges the analyst to focus on ‘the ongoing structure of political
authority and governance’, that is, the complex interaction of economic and
political relations among the member states, which are mediated by supra-
national institutions.35
Drawing on three stylised ‘forms of state’ as ‘conceptually possible expres-
sions of political authority organised at the national and transnational levels’36 –
the Westphalian state, the regulatory state and the postmodern state – Caporaso
makes the point that each of these distinct governance structures captures a sig-
nificant part of the evolving EU reality. After clarifying, however, that his analy-
sis represents a ‘comparative exploration of three metaphors rather than a test
of three theories’, he argues that the first ideal state form helps us to perceive
regional integration as ‘a re-enactment of the traditional processes of state-
building from the seventeenth through to the twentieth centuries’; the second
encourages us to think of the present-day European polity as ‘a supranational
state specialising in the control and management of international externalities’;
and the third directs us to an understanding of the general system as a ‘poly-
morphic structure’, which is characterised by the absence of a strong institu-
tional core, is increasingly fragmented, has no clear public sphere as compared
to its domestic counterparts and where ‘process and activity become more
important than structure and fixed institutions’.37
In general terms, Caporaso’s understanding of the Union as an ‘interna-
tional state’ is closer to the regulatory and postnational forms of polity than to
the traditional Westphalian state model. Such an understanding of the EU
system, while remaining historically informed, marks a shift away from verti-
cally defined end products such as ‘political community’, ‘federal state’, ‘consti-
tutional union’ and the like which, to borrow from Haas, ‘foreclose real-life
developmental possibilities’. Instead, Caporaso’s preferred lines of investigation
and resulting conceptual understanding are able to incorporate different visions
and ideal-type (normative) orientations of European political order. Notwith-
standing the view that statist analogies to the study of the European polity are
only partly justified, and that hypothetical integration outcomes are, at best,
‘mere provisional points in the future’, Caporaso’s international state thesis
encourages contemporary integration theorists to focus more closely on ‘the
ongoing structure of political authority and governance’, that is, the complex
interaction of economic and political relations among the subunits that are
mediated by the central institutions. In short, his examination contributes to a
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‘post-ontological’ account of the emerging European polity informed by a novel
instance of social formations, interests and interactions that are embedded in an
international structure of governance.
Consortio and condominio
Schmitter’s examination of ‘some alternative futures for the European polity’
through the projection of novel forms of political organisation constitutes a
welcome contribution to the debate about the evolution of the Union.38 Arguing
that the latter already represents ‘the most complex polity that human agency
has ever devised’, Schmitter rejects the idea that the end state of integration will
be ‘a “re-run” of the processes and policies that earlier made the nation state the
predominant political institution of Europe’; instead, he claims that the Union,
presently lacking a locus of clearly defined authority, a central hierarchy of
public offices, a distinct sphere of competence, a fixed territory, an exclusive
recognition by other polities, an overarching identity, a monopoly over legiti-
mate coercion and a unique capacity to impose its decisions, ‘is well on its way
[to] becoming something new’.39
What might this ‘new’ entity be? Two possible suggestions from Schmitter,
presented as ideal-types, warrant our attention. The first refers to the notion
of a ‘consortio’, defined as ‘a form of collective action . . . where national author-
ities of fixed number and identity agree to co-operate in the performance of
functional tasks that are variable, dispersed and overlapping’.40 In it, the seg-
ments retain their respective territorial identities and ‘accept positions within a
common hierarchy of authority, but pool their capacities to act autonomously
in domains they can no longer control at their own level of aggregation’.41
Another possible, albeit less imaginative, integration outcome is the emergence
of what Schmitter calls ‘condominio’, referring to a complex regional arrange-
ment based on ‘a variation in both the territorial and the functional constituen-
cies’.42 He explains: ‘Instead of a Eurocracy accumulating organisationally
distinct but politically co-ordinated tasks around a single centre, there would be
multiple regional institutions acting autonomously to solve common problems
and produce different public goods . . . Moreover, their dispersed and overlap-
ping domains . . . could result in competitive, even conflictual, situations and
would certainly seem inefficient when compared with the clear demarcations of
competence and hierarchy of authority that (supposedly) characterise existing
nation states.’43
At present, Schmitter concludes, the idea of a condominio-type outcome,
somewhat reminiscent of Haas’ multivariate integration scheme termed ‘asym-
metrical authority overlap’, emanates as the most probable trajectory of the
European polity. Schmitter’s analysis is not a-historical. For all the novelty of his
alternative integration scenaria for the future of Europe, he offers a general con-
ceptual justification for applying the terminology of pre-existing forms of polity
to the study of contemporary Europe. In particular, he embraces the view that,
in the interests of conceptual refinement and historically informed comparisons,
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one has to turn to the past to recapture a more diverse language about political
units. Revisiting European history, especially its early modern phase, where the
continent witnessed the emergence of ‘composite states’ characterised by a
system of shared sovereignty, overlapping political arenas and multiple points
of contention, offers scholars the opportunity to draw valuable insights and
categories of analysis in order to get their bearings in a present that is in flux.
Rethinking the present Union in light of past experiences of polity-building is a
productive way of sparking scholarly imagination in studying processes that
have also evolved through different phases, and which are reminiscent of those
currently under way. More importantly, such lines of inquiry provide the cogni-
tive resources necessary not only for the framing of intriguing hypotheses, but
also for functional analogies of recent developments to be tested. At the same
time, Schmitter’s analysis helps integration scholarship to become familiar with
an otherwise nebulous image of EU polity-building, by allowing for the transfer
of assumptions and ideas from novel political formations, which can in turn
offer a useful conceptual laboratory for insightful comparative investigations
to be drawn.
Confederal consociation
The concept of ‘confederal consociation’ was first introduced in the mid-1990s,
drawing on Taylor’s earlier work, as a means of capturing the dialectic between
fragmentation and stability in the EU polity. The point made was that the TEU
gave birth to an advanced form of regional organisation, which can best be
defined as a compound polity whose distinct culturally defined and politically
organised units are bound together in a consensually prearranged form of
‘union’ for specific purposes, without losing their sense of forming collective
national identities or resigning their individual sovereignty to a higher central
authority.44 Confederal consociation emanates as a promising analogy in filling
the existing gap between state-centric and federalist-inspired approaches to
European integration, suggesting that the constituent governments have dis-
covered new ways of strengthening their positions both regionally and interna-
tionally. Indeed, the three-pillar structure created by the TEU, similar to an
ancient Greek temple, and the moderate reforms brought about by its recent
revisions, help to maximise the states’ influence in deciding upon matters of
common concern, while allowing them to enjoy what Lijphart described earlier
as ‘a high degree of secure autonomy in organising their own affairs’.45
Segmental autonomy, therefore, supported by an accommodative mutual
veto, a proportional representation of all states to the central institutions, and
an increased propensity of national leaders to rely on what Taylor called ‘gov-
ernment by alliance’46 via reversible dissensus practices in joint decision-making,
highlights the determination of states to exercise managerial control over inte-
gration, even if this implies the striking of less ambitious settlements among
them. Confederal consociation has an interesting analogue with a system of hor-
izontal Kooperative Staaten, in that the collective power of component parts is
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well preserved by making progress towards further formal integration depen-
dent on the convergence of national preferences, as in the workings of the Euro-
pean Council which represents the Union’s ‘grand coalition’ forum for striking
interstate compromises. This polycentric and multilogical pattern of federalism
co-exists with a more favourable version of intergovernmentalism as a method
of promoting unification, and is based on the premise that the defence of each
separate interest coincides with the need to strike a deal in the context of an
intersegmental positive-sum game. It may best be defined as a case of ‘inverse
federalism’: a situation in which political authority tends to be diffused as much
as possible to the segments and away from the central institutions of gover-
nance.47 This mode of interaction may be seen as a discernible integrative stage,
where the dynamics of elite-led governance shape the forms that EU federalism
is allowed or indeed prohibited from taking. In brief, territorial politics is
becoming stronger in the larger system as the scope of joint decisions is being
extended, thus bringing the locus decidendi of the central political system closer
to the domain of state agents.
The last property of confederal consociation, that of ‘controlled pluralism’,
highlights the elite-dominated character of EU decision-making, in that the
members of the elite cartel are induced to adopting the working principles of
‘joint consensual rule’. This co-operative dynamic conflicts with the ‘winner-
takes-all’ ethos which subsists in majoritarian systems, deviating also from nor-
mative democratic theory and its insistence on ‘rule by the many’. But it accords
with the development of consensus politics at the leadership level, supported by
a transnational political culture among the national governing elites. By dis-
missing an ‘either/or’ conception of EU politics, confederal consociation makes
the point that the extension of central competences is compatible not only with
the very idea of statehood itself, but also with further national state-building,
subnational community-strengthening and multiple identity-holding. It also
contains a suggestion both of the non-conflictual character of EU power-shar-
ing and of the means through which the separateness of the segments, in the
form of well consolidated democracies, is compatible with processes of ‘institu-
tionalised compromise’. Hence, the preservation of ‘pluralism-within-unity’ is
conditioned by an overarching concern at the elite level for meeting the condi-
tions of stable governance.
Finally, by emphasising elite-driven, as opposed to demos-led, integration,
the model suggests that the dialectical co-existence of a plurality of forces press-
ing simultaneously for a more centralised or decentralised, loose or coherent,
technocratic or democratic Union, passes through the capacity of states to retain
ultimate control over both European constitutional choice and change. This
system of consensus elite government, in which high levels of interconnected-
ness co-exist with segmental autonomy, approximates the type of community
detected by Taylor as ‘managed Gesellschaft’: ‘a decentralised though coordi-
nated system of political interaction in which the segments . . . are characterised
by high levels of interdependence with each other, but nevertheless preserve and
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even augment their autonomy.’48 What is striking in this unique interplay
between co-ordinated interdependencies and diffuse political authority is that
the interests of the ‘territorial state’ co-exist with those of the central institutions
insofar as they are products of consensual inter-elite negotiations.49 This last
observation, which has important and, one might argue adverse, implications
for the emergence and consolidation of a European civic demos ab intra,50 brings
us to the final part of our theoretical inquiry, asking an oft-raised question:
where do we go from here?
Constructivism
This strand in EU theorising, heavily drawing from constructivist approaches to
international relations theory, has arguably come closer to instituting a system-
atic ‘second-order discourse’ in the study of the European polity. In 1999, a spe-
cial issue of the Journal of European Public Policy was devoted to the ‘Social
Construction of Europe’, recognising the value of a normatively informed,
metatheoretical research context to EU polity-building, by investigating, inter
alia, the impact of constitutive norms and rules; the role of ideas and commu-
nicative action; the uses of language and deliberative processes; the interplay of
routinised practices, socialisation, symbolism and institutional interaction; and
the interplay between agent identity and interests. The whole exercise was meant
to herald a ‘constructivist turn’ in EU studies, aiming ‘to go beyond explaining
variation [in politics and policy] within a fixed setting’ and to stress ‘the impact
of “intersubjectivity” and “social context” on the continuing process of Euro-
pean integration . . . [in brief, to call attention to] the constructive force of the
process itself ’.51
The starting point of this emergent research trend is an aspect of change, in
that integration has ‘a transformative impact on the European state system and
its constituent units’, as well as a firm belief in taking the logic and methods of
social science inquiry seriously and incorporate into the process of understand-
ing social reality ‘human consciousness’ and ‘ideational factors’ with a norma-
tive as well as instrumental dimension.52 The gist of the argument is that there
exists ‘a socially constructed reality’ as an expression of what Ruggie calls ‘col-
lective intentionality’.53 Keeping in mind that there is both a realist and an ideal-
ist component in constructivist thought, constructivism represents a social
theory with a strong interdisciplinary reach, straddling the lines between the
various subfields of social science research. This interdisciplinary trend is exem-
plified in the writings of Shaw and Wiener, whose aim is ‘to track norms from
“the social” to “the legal” . . . [and] trace the empirically observable process of
norm construction and change . . . with a view to examining aspects of “Euro-
pean” constitutionalism [and citizenship practice]’.54 Their core set of conclu-
sions is that EU constitutional politics as ‘day-to-day practices in the legal and
political realm as well as the high dramas of IGCs and new Treaties’ is about
‘fundamental ordering principles which have a validity outwith the formal set-
ting of the nation state’, that ‘norms may achieve strong structuring power . . .
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[and] are created through interaction’, and that ‘[t]he processes of norm
construction and rule-following are mutually constitutive’.55
The general question posed by constructivist theorists in EU studies is ‘to
what extent, and in which ways, a new polity is being constructed in Europe’.56
The principal aim is to problematise the changing social ontologies of European
polity-formation. It is on this premise that middle-range constructivist theoris-
ing becomes well suited to the study of the European polity, directing its
research foci to ‘the juridification and institutionalization of politics through
rules and norms; the formation of identities and the construction of political
communities; the role of language and discourse’.57 Although it would be rather
difficult, as it would be unfair, to reach an authoritative conclusion on the over-
all contribution of constructivism to the field, for it is both a recent and an
ongoing attempt ‘to enlarge the theoretical toolbox of EU studies’,58 a multitude
of useful analytic and epistemological insights can be drawn from an inter-
disciplinary constructivist research programme that places metatheoretical
thinking at the centre of understanding the social ontology of the European
polity, thus creating ‘an arena in which ontological shifts and meta-theoretical
moves can be debated’.59
Particularly with reference to issues of polity and democracy, construc-
tivism represents a critical normative turn in integration studies, in that the
means and ends of the Union’s social legitimation are increasingly becoming the
object of analysis. In this context, the emphasis has not been exhausted, as in
other approaches, on the question which body of theory can best explain the
constitutive norms and rules of European governance per se, but rather which
type of theorising offers a deeper understanding of the European polity in rela-
tion to the sociopsychological conditions of European identity-building.
Whether this metatheoretical approach will contribute to the emergence of a
conceptual consensus about the construction of a democratic theory of Euro-
pean integration – a task requiring the refinement of integration theory and the
development of ‘transcendent perspectives’ on a range of conventional disposi-
tions that existing theories and approaches hold – is difficult to foresee. Yet, the
point is clearly made in constructivist discourses that familiarity with metathe-
ory is a two-way process: it helps to develop ‘overarching theoretical perspec-
tives’ and appreciate their relevance to ‘first-order theorising’.
(Neo)republicanism
In its basic conception, a res publica aims at fulfilling three fundamental ends:
justice through the rule of law; the common good/public interest through a
mixed and balanced constitution; and liberty (or civic freedom) through active
citizenship. Overall, Omnia reliquit servare rempublicam captures the republican
imagination of a virtue-centred life, defined in civic terms. It is worth noting
that, even 2510 years since the founding of the Roman republic, an anniversary
that passed largely unnoticed by present-day Europeans, the above features con-
stituting the raison d’être of the res publica continue to mark their impact in the
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interminable search – scholarly and otherwise – for ‘the good polity’. Recently,
republican thought managed to infiltrate the disorderly universe of EU theoris-
ing, by yielding some valuable new insights into an already voluminous aquis
académique on how best to conceptualise the evolving Union. Such approaches,
however, have become more than simply ‘trendy’: new republican perspectives
on the Union sought not only to revive, but also to nurture a paradigm of social
and political organisation founded on a new ‘civic partnership’ among distinct
historically constituted demoi. Indeed, republican conceptions of Europe are
part of a demanding intellectual current: the search for a reliable as well as
democratic theory of integration able to capture the dialectic between strength-
ening the viability of the component public spheres through the institutionali-
sation of a mixed sovereignty regime. The point being made here is that, absent
a formal (or material) European constitution, and given the inchoateness – at
best – of a European civic demos (and corresponding lack of an input-oriented
European legitimacy), there is urgent need for a substantive restructuring of the
Union’s civic arenas with a view to engaging its citizens in its governance struc-
tures. This philosophy accords fully with a civic conception of the European
polity that aims to assess the relationship between the Union and ‘the civic’. Such
normative explorations have been recently brought into focus, often by employ-
ing the language of ‘second-order discourse’, especially in the sphere of collec-
tive norm-orientation and political constitutionalism. Their distinctive
contribution to the field is that they have given rise to a ‘normative turn’ in con-
temporary EU studies, signalling at the same time a paradigm shift from ‘policy
to polity’, or from ‘diplomacy to democracy’ – or, more accurately, ‘from
democracies to democracy’.
Pace the view that, for all the richness of recent normative investigations,
the Union will continue to be, at least for the foreseeable future, ‘an ongoing
social scientific puzzle’, Bellamy and Castiglione have attempted to capture the
Union’s complexity, pluralism and hybridity – in that its political system dis-
plays a ‘baffling mixture’ of federal and intergovernmental properties – through
a theory of ‘democratic liberalism’ based on ‘a pre-liberal conception of consti-
tutionalism that identified the constitution with the social composition and
form of government of the polity’.60 This amounts to a political system capable
of dispersing power within civil society, while encouraging dialogue between the
component parts of the polity. ‘Instead of the constitution being a precondition
for politics’, Bellamy and Castiglione note, ‘political debate becomes the
medium through which a polity constitutes itself ’.61 Being highly critical of any
territorial and/or hierarchical distribution of power, democratic liberalism
brings the constituent groups of the polity into an equilibrium with one
another, aiming at dispersing power so as ‘to encourage a process of controlled
political conflict and deliberation [as a way of filtering and channelling prefer-
ences] . . . moving them thereby to construct and pursue the public good rather
than narrow sectional interests’.62 The theory goes that, within this pluralist
polity characterised by a differentiated social context, there can be different
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forms of representation employed for different purposes. Differentiation is cru-
cial to the kind of political constitutionalism advocated by democratic liberals,
as it links together justice, the rule of law and the democratic dispersal and divi-
sion of power, while providing a balanced mix of social forces and levels of
authoritative decision-making.
From a similar prism, by reviving the usage of an eighteenth-century term,
MacCormick suggests that the European polity can be best defined as a ‘mixed
commonwealth’, within which the subjects of the ‘constitution’ are not homo-
geneous, but rather represent a mixture of political agents that share in the sov-
ereignty of the larger political entity.63 Bellamy and Castiglione explain this
point well: ‘The polycentric polity that is therefore emerging is a definite depar-
ture from the nation state, mainly because it implies a dissociation of the tradi-
tional elements that come with state sovereignty: a unified system of authority
and representation controlling all functions of governance over a given terri-
tory.’64 MacCormick’s notion of a lawfully constituted European commonwealth
of post-sovereign states, whose normative validity stems largely from the exis-
tence of a well-established legal order (supported by foundational norms, basic
doctrines, and general principles), allows the regional polity to conduct itself as
a Rechtsgemeinschaft but not as a Rechtsstaat. Within it, and absent ‘a single
power-structure with a single normative frame’,65 or, to borrow from Lindberg
and Scheingold,66 in the context of an ‘ambiguous pluralist system’, political
authority is neither proportionately nor symmetrically vested in an overarching
centre, but is rather distributed through overlapping arrangements, with the
polity being characterised by various degrees of decentralisation and ‘infinitely
tiered multiple loyalties’.67 Informed by an associative understanding of gover-
nance, this pluralist depiction of the European polity as an essentially heterar-
chical order within which sovereignty is dispersed across and between a variety
of actors and public domains, and where a ‘balanced constitution’ emerges as
the ultimate protective mechanism against the danger of domination – political,
judicial, constitutional or otherwise – is fully in line with Tarrow’s insightful and
historically informed definition of the Union as a ‘composite polity’: ‘a system
of shared sovereignty, partial and uncertain policy autonomy between levels of
governance, and patterns of contention combining territorial with substantive
issues’.68 Tarrow’s conceptualisation largely draws from the work of historian
Wayne te Brake on the formation of ‘composite states’ in early modern Europe,
where people ‘acted in the context of overlapping, intersecting, and changing
political spaces’.69
Republican theory embodies a strong normative commitment to democra-
tic deliberation for the promotion of the public interest, as opposed to factional
demands, and to the setting up of a particular kind of constitutional ordering
based on the idea of ‘balanced government’. Such ordering, in the form of a con-
stitutional state, is dedicated to offering citizens ‘undominanted’ (or quality)
choice. But it is not the latter that causes liberty. Rather, liberty is constituted
by the legal institutions of the republican state. In this context, democratic
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participation is not taken as an end in itself, but rather a means of ensuring a
dispensation of non-domination or non-arbitrary rule. Another republican
variation on the theme of vita activa takes civic participation ‘as a process of
constructing politics, not merely one means among others to secure something
else’. In brief, the rule of law, opposition of arbitrariness and the republican con-
stitution are constitutive of liberty, conceived in republican terms as civic free-
dom. With reference now to the idea of ‘balanced government’, Craig argues that
it was forged in two related ways: negatively, by associating the constitution of ‘a
proper institutional balance’ with the aim of preventing tyranny; and positively,
by ensuring a deliberative form of democracy, ‘within which the different “con-
stituencies” which made up civil society would be encouraged to treat their pref-
erences not simply as givens, but rather as choices which were open to debate
and alteration’.70 More than that, liberty was expected to be best preserved under
‘a mixed form of republican governance’ through certain constitutional prac-
tices or provisions, whereby no single component part of government would be
privileged over the others; such normative issues, claims Craig, are of relevance
when considering the actual distribution of authority within the Union.71 Here,
republicanism claims to strike a balance between participation in the European
legislative process and the attainment of the general public good, by allowing
for ‘a stable form of political ordering for a society within which there are dif-
ferent interests or constituencies’.72 In institutional terms, the idea of a ‘balanced
constitution’ in the Union is reflected in the Commission’s exclusive right to ini-
tiate legislation and its interaction with civil society, the EP’s co-decision rights
in fostering more deliberative outcomes and the relationship between the Coun-
cil’s indirect democratic mandate and the fact that the Union rests on a system
of treaty-based rules.
But there also exist other facets of republican thinking relevant to a civic
conception of Europe. Lavdas, for instance, draws on Pettit’s seminal study on
freedom as non-domination – as opposed to a negative conception of liberty as
non-interference, or to a positive conception of it as self-mastery – to argue that
the larger polity may develop in the future the democratic functions of institu-
tionalised public deliberation (and a corresponding concern with active or par-
ticipatory citizenship), which are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for a
more ‘democentric’ process of union.73 Given the absence of an engaging Euro-
pean demos, a republican mode of governance emanates as an appropriate
means of disentangling ‘the issue of participation in an emerging polity from the
cultural and emotional dimensions of citizenship as pre-existing affinity and a
confirmation of belonging’.74 The point here is that ‘some elements of the real and
symbolic res publica, may sustain a degree of political motivation vis-à-vis the
Union and its relevance for peoples’ lives while also allowing for other and more
intense forms of motivation and involvement at other levels of participation’.75
But given the apparent lack of organic unity among Europe’s constituent demoi,
the republican challenge is one of institutionalising respect for difference and
group rights (in line with the dictates of multiculturalism), while sustaining a
60 Theory and reform in the European Union
shared sense of the public good. This is more likely to be achieved through Pettit’s
third concept of freedom (as non-domination), in that it ‘enables a view which
aims to combine the recognition of the significance of the pluralism of cultural
possibilities for meaningful choice and a framework based on a minimal set of
shared political values’.76 From these neo-republican expositions, one could
imagine a European res publica, within which a multitude of commitments may
generate higher levels of civic engagement, while enhancing the possibilities of
meaningful choices on the part of the composite demos through the institution-
alisation of a deliberative, rather than aggregative, model of governance.
Concluding note
Every theoretical journey has its own rewards. These may stem either from a
plurality of intellectual formulations exploring the nature of complex political
phenomena, or indeed from wider methodological and/or epistemological con-
cerns. The theoretical examination of the Union qua polity or system of gover-
nance, and of European integration processes more generally, is no exception.
On the contrary, it is through the conceptual and analytical lenses offered by a
rich corpus of regional integration theory that one may develop a more pro-
found understanding of the structural properties, behavioural characteristics
and operational dynamics of what is frequently referred to as ‘the emerging
European polity’. The term ‘polity’ constitutes an appropriate point of reference
for two significant reasons: first, it is ideologically free from the narrow and
often analytically vulnerable insights offered by classical (realist) state-centric
approaches to European integration; second, it is capable of avoiding the
equally biased interpretations of a supranationalist conception of the larger
system.
On the other hand, that no present theoretical account of recent develop-
ments in the Union claims to represent the nucleus from which a new ‘grand
theory’ of regional integration might emerge, that is, one with widely applicable
comparative insights, is almost self-evident. Likewise, none of the prevailing
interpretations of the Union in general, and of EU polity-building in particular,
is capable of predicting with a degree of confidence the future evolution of the
regional system. On the contrary, prediction is altogether treated as a risky exer-
cise and has thus been avoided by most contemporary analysts, Schmitter’s
imaginative research on alternative and often unprecedented integration out-
comes notwithstanding. But there is something inherently fascinating and
rewarding in undertaking such risks – especially when there is no reason at all
for integration scholarship to be narrowly confined in the domain of traditional
descriptive analyses and exegetic patterns of real-life events.
With this in mind, and from a rather optimistic interpretation of European
polity dynamics, it is possible to suggest that a shift in paradigm has taken place
since the mid-1990s, namely ‘from policy to polity’ or, somewhat differently,
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‘from diplomacy to democracy’. This new transition stage is best captured by the
term ‘nascent Gemeinschaft’. Leaving aside for the moment the moderate reform
packages agreed in Amsterdam and Nice, especially with reference to the process
of democratising the Union, the post-Maastricht phase can be seen as part of a
wider political evolution – even constitutional if one were to describe the formal
treaty framework as the EU’s ‘political constitution’ – towards a European
‘public sphere’, comprising citizens capable of being simultaneously conscious
of their separate existence as distinct entities and of their collective existence as
a composite demos. In particular, nascent Gemeinschaft aims at distancing cur-
rent integration practices from the logic of consensus elite government by
means of stressing the democratic potential of European citizens. Instead of
large-scale decisions being the result of intensive interelite accommodation
mostly through in camera bargaining, they should be subjected as closely as pos-
sible to the conditions of the democratic process, the most crucial of which
refers to the notion of European ‘civic competence’: the institutional capacity of
EU citizens to be actively involved in the governance of the larger polity.77
Nascent Gemeinschaft focuses on the process of turning an aggregate of electors
into a politically responsible demos whose members feel part of a larger purpo-
sive whole and are capable of directing their democratic claims to, and via, the
central institutions, thus opening the way towards a new democratic civitas
in Europe.
In this sense also, nascent Gemeinschaft can be seen as both a conceptual
position and a new point of departure for citizens to develop a more profound
sense of civicness within an ‘inclusive’ European polity. Here, the term ‘polity’
refers to a system of governance capable of engaging its component state/citizen
parts in the making of authoritative political decisions which have implications
for the allocation of values in the transnational society. The characterisation of
the Union as an ‘emerging polity’, compound yet easily identifiable as a collec-
tivity, refers to no less. In fact, it is now possible to contemplate the idea of
replacing the rather deterministic concept of ‘integration’, whose teleology is
closely linked to the ‘directionality’ of the general system, with that of ‘polity-
formation’: the making of a large-scale political system composed of highly
interdependent states and demoi, characterised by overlapping, intersecting and
often competing policy arenas, public spheres and civic spaces. Although ‘inte-
gration’ remains useful in the vocabulary of EU studies, insofar as it purports
to explain the joining together of previously autonomous units under a new
regional centre, ‘polity-formation’ is better equipped to capturing the cons-
titutive nature of European governance. In short, for a polity that is constantly
under the scrutiny of international scholarship, but where no substantive
consensus or even convergent conceptual understandings exist on its social and
political ontology, the search for clear answers (and questions) is no easy
task. Such problems, however, will be compounded even further should we fail
to investigate the normative implications that polity-building generates for the
future of Europe.
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Keeping these theoretical notes in mind, we can now move on to the poli-
tics of the IGC 1996/97, and the extent to which the resulting AMT represented
a significant step towards furthering the democratic properties of the EU
system, or whether it corresponded to a largely managerial type of reform
designed to preserve the intrinsic nature of the Union as a confederal consocia-
tion, and with it the premium it places on consensus elite government and the
practice of political co-determination. We will then examine, in Chapter 4, the
Nice process and outcome, following the conclusion of the IGC 2000 and the
subsequent signing of the NIT in February 2001. In both case studies, our pre-
vious theoretical analysis will act as a wider laboratory of concepts and ideas so
arranged as to help us throw some additional light on the dynamics of European
governance since the late 1990s. It is to this demanding but no less exciting task
that we now turn.
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Introduction
As a result of the IGC 1996/97, the member governments of the Union signed in
Amsterdam, in June 1997, the Treaty which partially reformed the Maastricht
Treaty. All those who linked the outcome of the review conference with the
construction of a democratically organised European polity, or even regarded it
as an opportunity for a more or less permanent clarification of the physiognomy
of the Union, have no real grounds for celebration as realism, in the end, seems
to have had its way. Indeed, the changes introduced by the new Treaty, if
anything, failed to deliver the much-needed clarification of the properties of the
system towards more familiar models of governance and political organisation.
It is probably fair to suggest that the outcome of the prolonged negotiations
that led to the AMT, as well as the nature of the new Treaty itself, relates to
the well-known French saying, plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. As the
Economist put it, the Amsterdam Summit ‘produced more of a mouse than a
mountain’.1 Or, as the Guardian reported: ‘Europe is much the same this week as
it was last week.’2
The AMT represented the third formal reform of the original Treaties of
Paris (1951) and Rome (1957). Compared, however, with the two intervening
revisions, namely the SEA (1986) and the TEU (1992), it will most likely go
down in the history of European treaty reform as the ‘unnecessary Treaty’ or the
‘uncourageous’ one, since none of the major issues in its political agenda were
really touched upon. Contrary to the two earlier treaty-amending processes, the
AMT is characterised by a generalised lack of vision as to the political and con-
stitutional future of a Union about to embark on further enlargements. Perhaps
that was the reason behind the rather uncontroversial process of its ratification,
at least as compared with the TEU, which allowed the Treaty to come into force
on 1 May 1999.
3
The Amsterdam reforms
Partial offsets and unfinished business
The IGC 1996/97
From the outset, the review conference was greeted with mixed feelings:
some member states showed extreme caution, others thought it was too soon
to engage themselves in a process of reforming Maastricht, while others were
hesitant to disturb an already delicate balance brought about by the TEU. The
IGC opened its workings on 29 March 1996 in the north Italian city of Turin
under the auspices of the Italian Presidency, followed by the Irish and then the
Dutch Presidencies, while the Dublin European Summit of October 1996,
known also as Dublin I, stipulated that the Conference should be concluded at
the Amsterdam European Summit of June 1997. The reform process evolved via
no less than forty meetings at the level of the representatives of Foreign Affairs
Ministers, sixteen meetings of the Ministers, and five Summits of the heads of
state and government.
Although there is no doubt that important issues were indeed at stake
during the reform process given the prospects for further EU enlargement, it
would be even more accurate to note that what was not formally discussed in the
context of the IGC, intentionally or not, proved to be more significant, or even
consequential, for the future development of the Union. The adequacy of the
Maastricht provisions on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by 1999 in
relation to questions of economic and social cohesion, and the prospects for a
well-thought-out reform of the central institutions in relation to questions of
democratic legitimacy are good cases in point, and so are the extension of Euro-
pean citizenship rights, the need to bring national parliaments closer to the
European legislative process, as well as the problem regarding the allocation of
competences among different levels of governance. With the benefit of a poste-
riori knowledge, however, the fact that the IGC did not discuss EMU, consider-
ing that the Maastricht decisions in that regard were final, could be considered
a wise choice, although the same cannot be said for the remaining set of prob-
lems that were confronting the internal political organisation of the Union.
Instead, such issues formed part of a hidden political agenda concerning, inter
alia, the future of the European welfare state system, the economic costs of east-
ward enlargement, the social and political integration of European citizens,
questions of institutional equity, efficiency and legitimacy, as well as issues of
interinstitutional accommodation, to mention only a few.
Moreover, the rationale behind Art. N TEU had also to do with the need to
take stock of the CFSP in general and the role of the Western European Union
(WEU) in particular, a delicate subject upon which there was disagreement
during the twin IGCs of 1990/91. As the agenda of the IGC was expanding
rapidly, almost Summit after Summit, the December 1993 Brussels European
Council decided that the Conference should expand its agenda to include such
issues as the size of the Commission and the weighting of votes in the Council,
while the Corfu European Council opened the issue of QMV. In general, the
TEU came for re-negotiation in accordance with the procedural pattern that
forms part of the acquis communautaire. More specifically, the IGC 1996/97 was
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based on the following combination of Treaty articles and Declarations attached
to the Treaty:3
● The fifth case of Art. B TEU which states that ‘with a view to considering,
through the procedure referred to in Art. N(2), to what extent the policies
and forms of co-operation introduced by this Treaty may need to be revised
with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the insti-
tutions of the Community’.
● The eighth paragraph of Art. 189b EC, through which the co-decision pro-
cedure may be extended.
● Arts I.4 paras 6 and I.10, which provide for the revision of those articles
dealing with the CFSP.
● The attachments to Declarations 1 and 16.4
Following Wessels, the following four options seemed feasible during the review
conference: implementing Maastricht; reforming Maastricht; renationalising
Maastricht; and abandoning Maastricht.5 Essentially, this clarification of the
available options for European treaty reform was a task assigned to an ad hoc
group of representatives of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the member states,
which was set up following a decision by the June 1994 Corfu European Coun-
cil,6 and became known as the ‘Reflection Group’. The Group was mandated to
contribute to the review process, functioning as it were as a forum for discus-
sion, thus reflecting upon and elaborating, but not negotiating, issues and
options to be included in the IGC agenda. Chaired by Westendorp, the then
Spanish Secretary of State for the European Communities, the Group presented
its findings in two documents, the Interim Report of August 1995,7 and the Final
Report of December 1995.8
The reports of the Reflection Group
The Final Report was submitted to the December 1995 Madrid European
Council.9 In it, the Group had defined its tasks as being the improvement of the
workings of the Union, and the expansion of the capabilities of the Union to
enable it to rise to both internal and external challenges (including the new
rounds of enlargement towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE)). The Final Report was structured around three dimensions, namely
flexibility, efficiency and democracy.
‘Flexibility’ or ‘variable geometry’ or ‘enhanced co-operation’ or else
As discussed in Chapter 2, Schmitter had suggested an institutional transfor-
mation of the Union which he termed ‘condominio’.10 This form of governance
is based, in his words, on ‘a variation in both the territorial and the functional
constituencies’, and in our view draws heavily on Mitranian functionalism, save
for the fact that Schmitter’s approach is influenced by the ‘end of history’ thesis,
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rather than the by then not clearly defined ‘end of ideology’ thesis. More impor-
tantly perhaps, Schmitter’s integrative outcome also represents a reversal of the
Mitranian logic to integration, in the sense that ‘function follows form’ (see
Chapter 1). Notwithstanding the theoretical discussion of the Union as a con-
dominio-type organisation, and despite the fact that ‘flexibility’ or ‘enhanced
co-operation’ between the member states has been hailed as a major opera-
tional principle of the Union, clarifying such concepts within the latter’s multi-
level and plurifunctional system of governance has time and again proved
problematic. These principles involve some ‘variable geometry’ practices such
as those of the EMS/Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) arrangements in the
1970s, the Shengen Agreement before the AMT, and the Eureka programme.
The Final Report was quick to point out, however, that such an outcome could
be perceived only as a temporary arrangement and that it would not lead to a
‘Europe à la carte’ or similar forms of functional integration. Flexibility might
have become all the more important as an organising principle of European
governance in view of 1999, when the final stage of EMU commenced. Were
this type of organisation to prevail, ceteris paribus, a pattern of differentiated
participation in integration schemes, albeit for the medium term, would
emerge. EU members would find themselves split into different groups accord-
ing to each other’s domestic or other priorities. Some of them would not adopt
certain policies; others would not participate in the EMU arrangements, or
would remain outside the WEU, especially in the eventuality of the latter
emerging as the military branch of the Union, and so on. The above scenario
would only strengthen the intergovernmental features of the general system,
giving it a strong confederal bearing, and thus bringing it closer to a Europe of
‘concentric circles’.
Moreover, the debate on flexibility, in either the workings of the Reflection
Group or the meetings of the IGC per se, and the desire of the original members
of the Community and the Commission to include the principle in the revised
Treaty in the form of an article, draws an analogy with the inclusion of sub-
sidiarity in the TEU and the legalistic debate that surrounded its introduction.11
The rationale for the inclusion of a flexibility clause in the AMT was threefold:
first, as a reaction to the observed behaviour of certain member states and
the rights of opting-out that have been granted to them; second, owing to the
unwillingness of some member states and the inability of others to attain the
qualification criteria for entry in the third stage of EMU; and third, owing to
the urgent need to take into account the institutional accommodation of the
EU’s eastward enlargement, given that the latter would create a Union too large
and too heterogeneous to act in unison. On the other hand, flexibility entailed
a strong dose of political realism, particularly concerning the hidden agenda
of convergence, economic or otherwise. The dilemma that emerged in the
IGC 1996/97 was between a pragmatic (rational), a normative (radical), and a
mixed approach. Table 3.1 summarises the alternatives that were open to the
member states.
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Table 3.1 A typology of European constitutional choice
Approach
Properties Pragmatic Normative Mixed
End result Confederation Federation Confederal
consociation
Modus operandi Flexibility/ Demos formation Controlled pluralism
effeciency
Locus of sovereignty State rule Civic rule Consensus elite
government
Central arrangement Constitutions Constitution Constitutional
engineering
Flexibility was finally included in the new Treaty, though in a way that pre-
cludes the creation of a Europe à la carte by introducing scores of strict condi-
tions. In particular, Art. 1 of the general clauses to be inserted as a new Title in
the AMT reads thus:12
Member states which intend to establish closer cooperation between them may
make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down in the Treaties
provided that the cooperation aims at the furthering of the objectives of the Union
and the protection and servicing of its interests, respects the principles of the
Treaties and the single institutional framework of the Union, is only used as a last
resort . . . concerns at least a majority of the member states, does not affect the
acquis communautaire, does not affect the competencies, rights, obligations and
interests of the member states which do not participate therein, is open to all
member states . . . [and] is authorised by the Council .
In addition, Art. 2 states that the new flexible arrangements will be governed
by the same decision-making rules as in the TEU/EC adjusted accordingly for
membership, and that the EP will be regularly informed by the Commission and
the Council (Art. 3). However, additional conditions are to apply if flexible co-
operation is introduced under the EC Treaty.13 In particular, Art. 5a EC precludes
member states from initiating flexible arrangements in the areas which:
● fall within the exclusive competencies of the Community;
● affect the Community policies, actions or programmes;
● concern the citizenship of the Union or discriminate between nationals of
member states;
● fall outside the limits of the powers conferred upon the Community by the
Treaty;
● constitute discrimination or restrict trade and/or distort competition
between member states.
Furthermore, an additional condition is inserted in Art. K12, paras 1, 2 and 3 (all
of which are subject to the jurisprudence of the ECJ) of the Treaty,14 insofar as this
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stipulates that the new ‘flexible’ arrangements aim at enabling the Union to
become an area of freedom, security and justice. Authorisation for the creation of
these arrangements will be granted by the Council acting by QMV after an
opinion by the Commission and the EP. Any objection, however, by a member
state on grounds of ‘important and stated reasons’ results in the whole decision
being referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity. This provi-
sion accords fully with the consociationalist nature of European decision-making
when vital national interests are at stake (see Chapter 2).
Efficiency and democracy
Efficiency was the second major organising principle of the Union to be included
in the Report of the Reflection Group; arguably, a rather nebulous concept that
was badly in need of further clarification. In conjunction with the flexibility
principle, it might have addressed the potential of the general system to produc-
ing policy outcomes without any reference to their quality, or the number of the
participating states for that matter. The Report, however, did not hint at an insti-
tutional set-up capable of satisfying the conditions of flexibility and efficiency. It
did state, however, that the IGC should also preserve the single institutional
framework of the Union, in that the composition of the ECJ, the Commission
and the EP would be fixed, but that of the Council and the procedures therein
would vary.
The picture was further complicated by the introduction in the Report of
the issue of democracy and the oft-quoted ‘need to bring the Union closer to its
citizens’, as a third major organising concept. This might have been a reference
to the ‘democratic deficit’ of the Union, one of its celebrated structural short-
comings, but the emphasis of the Report was rather on the third pillar of the
Union than on the interinstitutional balance of power within the first pillar.
There was no consensus in the Group on the extension of the competences of
the EP and only marginal modifications were considered. On the other hand,
the Commission, in its Report on the TEU, has pointed to the importance of
and the need to take measures to bring the Union nearer to its citizens. As the
Report stated: ‘Democracy comprises the very essence of the Union, while effec-
tiveness is the precondition for the future.’15 Regardless of the above discussion,
however, the outstanding issues in the institutional agenda of the IGC were as
follows:
● the Union and its citizens (including issues related to the transparency of its
workings, the need to strengthen its democratic legitimacy, and a possible
revision of the principle of subsidiarity);
● the introduction of a flexibility clause;
● the hierarchy of Community Acts;
● the Comitology phenomenon;
● the rationalisation of the decision-making processes and decision-taking
arrangements in the Council in view of future enlargement;
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● the composition of the Commission and the EP, and the latter’s electoral
system;
● Common Foreign and Security Policy;16
● Justice and Home Affairs.
Transparency and subsidiarity
These issues are dealt with together since they tend to have overlapping conse-
quences. At any rate, they are part of the package, which is linked to the rela-
tionship between the Union and its citizens. The AMT has elevated the
importance of the issue by including ten chapters dealing with various relevant
subjects. Increased transparency is vital if the Union wishes to close the gap
between the functioning of its institutions and the way in which its citizens can
identify with its emerging governance structures. The term was linked to a right
of information of Union citizens and the need for a more simplified and thus
more comprehensible Treaty. In its report on the functioning of the TEU,17 the
Commission stated that there have already been steps in that direction, which
should nevertheless be improved. There were twenty-two meetings of the Coun-
cil of Ministers that were held in public – mostly during the Danish Presidency
during the first half of 1993 – which dealt, however, with secondary and mani-
festly insignificant matters. By the same token, the Commission received 220
applications requesting access to its documents, 53.7 per cent of which were
accepted, 17.9 per cent rejected, and 28.4 per cent concerned documents already
in circulation or published by another EU institution.18 The AMT acknowledged
the need for increased transparency in the workings of the Union by including
a special chapter (Chapter 10) and a new Art. 191a, whereby ‘any citizen of the
Union . . . natural or legal person shall have a right of access to European Par-
liament, Council and Commission documents’,19 subject to certain rules and
conditions as specified on the Declaration to the Final Act on Art. 191a.20
The principle of subsidiarity is found in Art. 3b TEU. We have had the
opportunity to comment elsewhere on its various shortcomings.21 The topic is
by now well documented and it suffices to point out that there is a need for fur-
ther clarifications for the principle to become operational. The majority in the
Group, however, wished that Art. 3b should remain unchanged. The Commis-
sion, in its Report on the TEU, suggested that: ‘The concepts of the directive, of
mutual recognition or that of the partnership [in the case of regional policy]
reflect the principle of subsidiarity.’22 This probably reveals that there is a mis-
understanding of the meaning of the principle or that this is used in a way that
suits the interests of EU institutions. In federal systems, the principle refers to
concurrent competences defined by Toth as the ‘authority of two different
bodies to intervene with the same authority at the same time’.23 Community law
does not recognise ‘concurrent powers’ given that the powers of the Community
are in principle exclusive in nature. In addition, the legal community resented
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the inclusion of the principle in the Treaty on the grounds that it could not be
properly checked by the ECJ. The necessity for the conception of a specific body
to examine the employment of the principle was reflected in the Group’s Report,
where it was intended that a ‘higher consultative body’ should be set up. But its
composition and functions were not designated and there was an interesting
reference made to a new role envisaged for national parliaments, since this new
body would have been composed of their representatives.
In the end, however, a Protocol and a Declaration were attached to the
AMT, providing guidelines for the application of the principle by Commu-
nity institutions. Para. 5 of the Protocol stipulates as a prerequisite that any
action by the Community has to be a priori justified on the grounds that such
action cannot be achieved by the member states alone, and also that it can be
better achieved by the Community. Strict guidelines were also set before the
Commission initiates its policies: the issue under consideration must have
transnational aspects; it has to be demonstrated that action by member states
alone or lack of Community action would conflict with the Treaty; and that
Community action would produce benefits of scale.24 There is an attempt in the
Protocol to refine the meaning of this dynamic yet elusive concept, although it
sets some strict conditions for its application. Thus, each institution must
respect the principle of subsidiarity and that of proportionality (sustained by
qualitative and, if possible, by quantitative indicators; see Art. 4), according to
which any action by the Community shall not go beyond any action necessary
for the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty (Art. 1). The application of
these principles must respect the acquis communautaire and the institutional
balance, the powers of the ECJ and Art. F(3) TEU, according to which ‘the
Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and
carry through its policies’ (Art. 2) and will be applied in the areas where the
Community does not have exclusive competences (Art. 3). Ceteris paribus,
directives should be preferred to regulations and framework directives to
detailed measures (Art. 6), thus leaving as much scope for national decisions as
possible (Art. 7). The Commission must act cautiously in this context, prefer-
ring as much prior consultation as possible before initiating legislation, except
in cases of urgency or required confidentiality (Art. 9); minimise administrative
or financial burdens on national or subnational institutions; and submit an
annual report to the European Council, the Council of Ministers and the EP on
the application of the principle.
The rationalisation of the decision-making process
The TEU has created a complicated institutional structure under the heading
‘European Union’, in the form of an ancient Greek temple based on three sepa-
rate pillars – the EC, the CFSP and JHA.25 Under Art. C TEU, the three pillars
share a common institutional framework under the aegis of the European
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Council. A closer examination, however, reveals that this framework is not so
common after all, as the TEU has brought about a rather messy institutional set-
ting, whereby the members states and the central institutions intermingle in no
less than twenty-nine different decision-making procedures, depending on the
policy area and/or the pillar in question: some procedures may or may not
require consultation with the EP and/or other EU bodies depending on the issue
at hand, a proposal from the Commission, a simple or qualified majority in the
Council, and so on. This has become even more messy after the so-called ‘Ioan-
nina Compromise’ of July 1994, whereby, under certain conditions, the minor-
ity veto in case the Council operates under QMV is not the normal twenty-three
votes, but instead twenty-six.
The co-operation and co-decision procedures in Arts 189b and 189c EC
were hailed as the procedures that were instituted to bridge the Union’s ‘parlia-
mentary deficit’ (with reference, however, to direct legislative involvement of the
EP, as such a ‘deficit’ also has an important national component). As we have
argued elsewhere,26 these procedures help to co-opt the EP closer to the locus
decidendi of the Union, in spite of their use in only fourteen and fifteen policy
areas, respectively. The Interim Report suggested that a near-consensus was
formed in favour of preserving the status quo and only of marginal modifica-
tions in the EP’s role were considered. Hence, a clear majority was recorded in
the Group against any changes in the position of the EP within the interinstitu-
tional balance of power. In any case, it is our contention that the evolution of the
Union towards a federal-like polity would require the introduction of a repub-
lican system of ‘checks and balances’ as an interim arrangement on the way to
fully blown demos control. This view is justified further, by considering the
marginal influence national parliaments and subnational assemblies have in the
determination of EU legislative outcomes.
The AMT, however, introduced changes in the co-operation and co-deci-
sion procedures as a move towards the declared aim of simplifying EU decision-
making. In particular, the following changes were introduced in Art. 189b EC
regarding co-decision. The procedure starts off with the submission by the
Commission of a proposal to the Council and the EP, as was previously the case
under the TEU. Here, a new stage is introduced before the adoption by the
Council of its Common Position requiring first the EP to deliver an opinion
before the Council acts. If the Council approves the amendments of the EP, if the
latter has tabled amendments, or if the EP does not propose amendments in the
Council’s opinion, then the Council adopts the act by QMV. Otherwise the
Council adopts a Common Position and sends it to the EP. (Under the original
procedure in the TEU, the EP had the opportunity to indicate that it intended
to reject the Council’s Common Position. Under the new procedure this has
been dropped.) If within three months of such communication the EP approves
the Common Position or does not reach a decision, the act is deemed to have
been approved. If the EP rejects the Common Position by an absolute majority
of its members, the act fails. Otherwise, the EP sends its amendments to the
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Table 3.2 Areas in the Treaty requiring co-decision
Art. 49 Free movement of workers
Art. 54 Right of establishment
Art. 56 Right of establishment
Art. 57 Right of establishment
Art. 66 Services
Art. 100a Internal market
Art. 100b International market
Art. 126 Education
Art. 130s. 3 Environment
Art. 129d Trans-European networks
Art. 129 Public health
Art. 129a Consumer protection
Art. 128 Culture (+ unanimity)
Art. 1301 Research
New Articles in the AMT
Art. 5 Employment
Art. 119 Social policy – equal opportunity
Art. 191a Transparency (general principles)
Art. 209a Countering fraud
New article Customs co-operation
Art. 213a Statistics
Art. 213b Authority on data protection
Added to co-decision from other procedures
Art. 6 (from co-operation) Discrimination on grounds of nationality
Art. 8a(2) (from assent) Free movement
Art. 51 (from consultation) Internal market (rules on social security for
immigrant workers)
Art. 56(2) (from consultation) Right of establishment of forein national
Art. 57(2) (from consultation) Right of establishment of self-employed persons.
Conditions of access for natural persons
Art. 75(1) (from co-operation) Transport policy
Art. 84 (from co-operation) Transport policy
Art. 2(3) (from co-operation) Social policy
Art. 125 (from co-operation) European Social Fund
Art. 127(4) (from co-operation) Vocational training
Art. 129d (from co-operation) Other measures (trans-European netowrks)
Art. 130E (from co-operation) European Regional Development Fund
Art. 130o (from co-operation) Research
Art. 130w (from co-operation) Development co-operation
Council. If the Council approves Parliament’s amendments by QMV, and by
unanimity those for which the Commission has expressed a negative opinion,
then the Common Position is adopted thus amended. Otherwise, the Concilia-
tion Committee is convened within six weeks. At this stage, a prima facie sub-
stantial change has been introduced which seems to be adding weight to the
co-decision procedure: for an act deemed to have been approved, a joint text has
to be approved by the Council and the EP; otherwise, the act fails. Thus, the
Council no longer has the opportunity to reaffirm its Common Position by una-
nimity and have the act adopted. Instead, agreement on the joint text of the
Conciliation Committee is a sine qua non for the adoption of the act. As the new
paragraph 5 of Art. 189b EC states:
If within six weeks of its being convened, the Conciliation Committee approves a
joint text, the European Parliament, acting by an absolute majority of the votes cast,
and the Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall have each a period of six weeks
from that approval in which to adopt the act in question in accordance with the
joint text. If either of the two institutions fails to approve the proposed act within
that period, it shall be deemed not to have been adopted.
In addition, para. 6 reads thus: ‘Where the Conciliation Committee does not
approve a joint text, the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted.’
Table 3.2 shows all the areas in the AMT that fall within co-decision (in all
thirty-seven areas). As the table indicates, after the AMT, the co-operation pro-
cedure of Art. 189c EC has been almost eradicated from day-to-day decision-
making, save only for two cases relating to EMU. The main decision-making
procedures are now reduced to three: assent (five cases), consultation and co-
decision. The co-decision procedure has been simplified and extended in its use
to twenty-three more issue areas under the Treaty. The much discussed Art.
138B concerning the right of initiative of the EP and its interpretation has not
found any support in the Reflection Group. The Commission, in its Report on
the TEU, explained the meaning of Art. 138B, in that such requests do not
require the Commission to put forward a proposal;27 the Commission has only
to take the ‘greatest possible account of them’.28 Accordingly, any such request by
the EP is not legally binding on the Commission as is the case with Art. 152 EC,
when the Council requests the Commission to put forward a proposal. The
AMT did not in the end alter Art. 138b and, hence, yet another opportunity was
clearly missed for further democratisation.
QMV
The voting mechanisms in the Council have also been altered with the AMT. In
particular, QMV has been expanded into new policy areas, while decisions
requiring unanimity have been reduced in a modest attempt to unify and sim-
plify the relevant procedures. QMV was extended to sixteen new areas of the
Treaty, as illustrated in Table 3.3. The general assessment to be made here is that,
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similarly to the extension of QMV in previous treaty reforms, majority decisions
are allowed in non-controversial and, by extension, non-conflict-prone areas,
rather than in areas where the states want to speed up legislation.
The hierarchy of Community Acts
This is hardly a novel issue since it was raised during the twin IGCs of 1990/91
on Political Union and EMU that led to the signing of the TEU in February 1992.
In reality, it has been an issue waiting to be settled since 1984, when it was first
presented in the EP’s Draft Treaty on European Union.29 During the IGCs
1990/91, it was rejected on the grounds that such a system refers to a de facto clas-
sification of levels of governance as well as a de jure classification of institutions
involved in policy-making top-down. Nevertheless, Declaration 16 attached to
the TEU proclaims that ‘The IGC agrees that the IGC to be convened in 1996
will examine the degree to which it is possible to revise the classification of the
Community Acts so as to arrive at a hierarchy in the various Community Acts’.
The source of the following classification of Community Acts was the EP’s
Institutional Affairs Committee and the Italian government during the IGCs,
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Art. 4 Employment guidelines
Art. 5 Incentive measures
Art. 118(2) Social exclusion
Art. 119(3) Equality of opportunity
Art. 129(4) Public health
Art. 191a Transparency
Art. 209a Countering fraud
Art. 213a Statistics
Art. 213b Authority on data protection
Art. 227(2) Outermost regions
New article Customs co-operation
Previous treaty provisions
Art. 45(3) Aid on imports of raw materials
Art. 56(2) Right of establishment of foreign nationals
Art. 130i(1) Research framework programme (adaptation and
supplementation
Art. 130o Joint undertakings in R&D
when four types of Community Acts were suggested: Constitutional Acts, refer-
ring to the process of treaty reform; Organic Laws, referring to the functioning
of EU institutions; Regular Laws, referring to the formal decision-making
process of the Union; and Regulations, referring to policy implementation. Dif-
ferences between these types reflect mainly the differences in the decision-taking
mode for each category, since the required majorities get lower as one moves
down from Constitutional Acts to Regulations. There was a slight modification
of this proposal in the Group’s Interim Report where Regulations and Regular
Laws were merged into one. The Reflection Group did not seem to have dis-
cussed this issue in any great detail and referred the whole subject to the IGC.
Differences between the member states seem to have been a mere reproduction
of those at previous Conferences. In the end, nothing of this sort was included
in the AMT.
Table 3.4 summarises the positions of the member states on the general
theme of ‘a Union closer to its citizens’. The table is exhaustive on the issues that
were discussed in the context of the IGC 1996/97. Some explanation of this table,
however, is in order. One of the seemingly key issues in the IGC agenda was the
legal personality of the Union. Its non-existence runs counter to the overall
objectives of the Treaty and is a real obstacle to the Union’s role in international
affairs. In the Reflection Group there was a clear preference in favour of grant-
ing the Union with legal personality, which was abandoned at the last moment.
Thus, as a result of the AMT, the Union does not possess a legal personality of
its own; does not have the capacity to enter into binding agreements; is not
recognised as a subject under international law; does not possess institutions or
a budget of its own, but rather continues to rely on those of the Community.
Similarly, on the question of nationality, there was a clear majority during the
negotiations for Union citizenship not to replace national citizenship, and this
was reflected in the amended Art. 8: ‘every person holding the nationality of a
member state shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall com-
plement and not replace national citizenship.’ Likewise, the attempted dropping
in the TEU of the requirement on Art. 8e was not successful. The Council will
still need unanimity if it wishes to strengthen the common citizenship provi-
sions. Art. 8d TEU was also amended to enable citizens of the Union to address
EU institutions in one of the official languages and receive a reply in the same
language. Finally, an addition to the Preamble of the Treaty exhorts the virtues
of education and its continuous upgrading. Culture and sport were also
included in the AMT in recognition of their special significance for citizens’
identities and welfare.
For the Union to become part of the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), an amendment to the TEU was
required. But this never materialised and the Union after the AMT is still not part
of the Convention, in spite of a clear majority to the contrary during the negoti-
ations (see Table 3.4). However, Art. F TEU was amended to include para. 1,
according to which ‘the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy,
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Table 3.4 A Union closer to its citizens
COM EP B DK D GR E F IRL I LUX NL A P SF S UK
Chapter on fundamental and 
human rights in the Treaty y y y y y y y y np y y y y n y np n
Become part in ECHR y y y np np y y n R y y np y y y y n
Equal treatment and non-
discrimination clause y y y np y y y y y y y y y y y y n
Add social rights y y y np np np y n n n np np np y np n n
Direct effect for Art. 8A np y np np np y n n n np np np y np np n n
p
EU citizenship does not 
replace national y y y y n[ y y y np y y np y y np y np
No unanimity for Art. 8E np y n np n y n n n np n n y np n n n
Public meetings of Council np y R R np np n n y np np y n y y y n
Equality clause for women y y y np np np y y np y y y y np y y n
Protection by the ECJ y y y np y np n y np y y y np y np np np
p
Political control: suspension 
of certain rights np y y np y y y np y np y y np np np y n
Political control: exclusion 
from EU meetings np n n np np n n np np np np np n np np n np
Right of information on EU 
affairs y y y y y y y y y y y y y np y y y
Development of nationality np y np np np y y y np y y y y np y n n
List on fundamental rights n y y np y y y np np y n np y y np np n
Source: European Parliament, the Secretariat, JF/bo/234/96, p. 1.
Key: y, affirmative; n, negative; R, reserve position; np, no position.
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, princi-
ples which are common to the member states’. A new Art. Fa provides, under
rather strict conditions, for penalties to those member states that are found in
breach of the principles in Art. F(1) above. A new Art. 236 EC has also been
inserted to expand penalties under the TEU to the EC Treaty as well. Both arti-
cles seem to be outward-looking, in that they were included in the AMT with the
eastward enlargement in mind. The only amendment to the TEU, which is
directly related to enlargement, concerns the supplement of the first sentence of
Art. O TEU, according to which ‘any European state which respects the princi-
ples set out in article F(1) may apply to become a member of the Union’. Note
should also be taken of the new Art. 6a EC, which prohibits discrimination based
on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orienta-
tion. A unanimous Council is foreseen to be taking measures to combat discrim-
ination on the above grounds.
Section II of the AMT, concerning the ‘Union and the Citizens’, consists of
nine chapters and deals with such diverse issues as consumer protection, qual-
ity of legislation, social policy, public health, subsidiarity, transparency and
employment. A new Title VII on employment has been added to the Treaty in
response to the widespread belief that some action on that front was urgently
required, not least because the EMU arrangements, as well as the general eco-
nomic philosophy spread in the TEU, have been increasingly identified as one
of the reasons leading to the current poor employment situation in the Union.
The Title consists of six articles and two declarations, constituting a rather
loose framework of co-operation, with the Union in a primarily co-ordinating
role. A new Employment Committee (Art. 6) is also introduced, consisting of
thirty-two members with an advisory role, but overall responsibility for action
rests firmly with the member states. According to Art. 4, each year the Council
and the Commission will draw up a joint report on the employment situation
in the Union to be discussed at Summit level. On the basis of the conclusions
to be reached at the Summit, the Council, acting by QMV, will draw up guide-
lines for the member states. The latter will each year provide the Council and
the Commission with an annual report of their activities in the light of the
guidelines which, if necessary, may lead to the issuing of Council recommen-
dations to the member states, after a recommendation by the Commission.
Finally, the circle is squared, in that the Council and the Commission, on the
basis of the national reports, will draw up reports to the European Council
on employment. Art. 5 foresees the possibility for adopting incentive measures
via the co-decision procedure to encourage co-operation between the member
states, by providing incentives aimed at developing exchanges of information
and best practice, offering comparative insights and advice, as well as promot-
ing innovative approaches and evaluating experiences by recourse to pilot
projects. The duration of these incentive measures may not exceed five years,
and the maximum amount of their financing should always be specified.30
Whatever the merits of the new Title, its inclusion in the AMT cannot but be
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considered a positive step towards confidence-building between the Union and
its citizens.
The Protocol on Social Policy attached to the TEU,31 together with the
annexed Agreement on Social Policy, have been inserted in the AMT, with the
UK becoming part of it. Simultaneously, the Protocol and the Agreement are
repealed from the Treaties. According to Art. 117 the objectives to be attained
include the promotion of employment, the improvement of living and working
conditions, the establishment of proper social protection, dialogue between
management and labour, the development of human resources and the com-
bating of social exclusion. Art. 118 lists the areas in which the Community shall
support and complement the activities of the member states, introducing con-
currently changes in the decision-making arrangements. Table 3.5 shows which
areas of action in the field of social policy require unanimity and co-decision,
and which minimum standards are to be introduced so as to avoid adverse
effects to medium-sized enterprises.
Table 3.5 Areas of action by the Community: co-decision and unanimity in social
policy
Co-decision Unanimity
1 Improvement of the working 1 Social security and social protection of
environment to protect health and workers
safety
2 Working conditions 2 Protection of workers where their
employment contract is terminated
3 Information and consultation of 3 Representation and collective defence
workers of the interests of workers and
employers, including co-determination
4 Integration of persons excluded from 4 Conditions of employment for third-
the labour market country nationals legally residing in the
Community
5 Equality between men and women 5 Financial contributions for promotion
with regard to labour market of employment and job creation,
opportunities and treatment at work without prejudice to the provisions
related to the ESF
Note: Pay, right to strike, right to impose lock-outs, right of association are excluded.
An interesting case of macrocorporatist arrangement seems to have been
instituted with para. 4 of Art. 118, foreseeing the possibility, on a joint request
by labour and management, allowing member states to entrust the organisa-
tions of management and labour to implement any directives of the issues
included in Table 3.5. Were such a situation to arise, member states would only
have to guarantee to the Community that the required directives would be
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implemented. Last but not least, the provisions of Art. 118 do not apply to pay,
rights of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs.
Arts 118a and 118b in the new Title seem to be quite significant. The AMT,
in its Art. 118a (para. 14), instructs the Commission to promote the consulta-
tion of management and labour at Community level before drafting any pro-
posals in the field of social policy. Management and labour not only have the
right to forward an opinion but, if so required, to issue a recommendation as
well. This is a clear institutionalisation of the social partners at the larger level.
The organisations of management and labour, if they so wish, may demand the
Council to conclude an EU-level agreement on the issues provided for in the
Table 3.5 (Art. 118b) with due regard to the specified exceptions. However,
member states are neither obliged to apply the agreements, nor to work out
rules for their transposition, nor even to amend existing national legislation to
facilitate their implementation.32 Well, so near and yet so far!
Art. 118c entrusts the Commission to encourage co-operation between
the member states, by conducting studies, delivering opinions, and arranging
consultations in social policy issues, including:
● employment;
● labour law and working conditions;
● basic and advanced vocational training;
● social security;
● prevention of occupational accidents and diseases;
● occupational hygiene;
● the rights of association and collective bargaining between employers and
workers.
The principles of equal pay, equal opportunities, and equal treatment for men
and women are strengthened in the AMT by virtue of Art. 119, and the mean-
ing of the term ‘equal pay’ is clarified beyond doubt. Finally, and courtesy of
Art. 120, the Commission shall draw up each year a progress report on Art. 117
concerning the developments in the field of social policy.
The Preamble of the TEU and Arts B and 2 EC were amended to include ref-
erences to the need to attain the objective of sustainable development. A new
Art. 3d in the AMT integrates environmental protection in all sectoral policies
with the view to promoting such development. Paras 3–5 of Art. 100a EC have
been replaced by paras 3–9 in the revised Treaty, introducing escape clauses
regarding harmonisation measures on the environment. Member states may
retain national policies and avoid the harmonisation measures decided by the
Council or by the Commission on the grounds of major needs referred to in Art.
36 or may adopt national policies based on new scientific evidence. They only
have to notify the Commission of their intentions. The Commission may in turn
accept or reject the national provisions within six months after having verified
that such policies do not constitute a form of disguised discrimination, restric-
tion to trade or an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. If the
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above possibilities are ruled out in the process, it follows that the national
measures stand. The same applies if the Commission reaches no decision within
the period of six months.
Art. 129 EC was amended with the view to enabling the Community to take
measures on the issue of public health which, after the eruption of the BSE dis-
ease and the criticisms directed towards the Commission, received a top place in
the agenda of the IGC. According to the amended Art. 129, Community action
will be complementary to that of the member states and will attempt to
strengthen co-operation between member states towards the improvement of
public health, the prevention of human illness and diseases and the obviation of
sources of danger to human health. Finally, consumer protection was included
in the AMT through the amendment of Art. 129a. In para. 1, the Community
pledges to protect the interests of consumers and to promote their rights to
information and education as well as to organise themselves so as to safeguard
their interests, given that consumers represent the least organised interest not
only in the majority of member states but at the Community level as well. Of
greater consequence seems to be para. 3 of Art. 129a, which states that the Com-
munity shall contribute to the objectives stated above through measures
adopted in the context of the completion of the internal market, as well
as measures supporting, supplementing and monitoring national policies.
Politically though, para. 4 may prove to be more relevant for the interests of con-
sumers, as the measures in para. 3 will be taken on the basis of the co-decision
procedure, with a keen EP to act in the direction of consumer protection.
Decision-making and enlargement
The Union seems to be in trouble as it is confronted with the effects of the 1989
‘annus mirabilis’33 in its internal institutional equilibria, and is forced to expand
eastwards for a variety of reasons and motives. It has been suggested that the real
task of the IGC 1996/97 was to provide for the necessary mechanisms to prepare
the Union for a smooth accession of CEE countries,34 and others in its Mediter-
ranean periphery like Cyprus and Malta. On that account, the AMT was disap-
pointing given that the decisions on this issue were thrown ad calendas Graecas.
The Treaty itself suggests that this issue should be addressed one year before
membership of the Union exceeds twenty, but without specifying any further
concrete timetable. In particular, a specific Protocol attached to the Treaty,35
consisting of two articles and a declaration to the Final Act, provides for the
institutional accommodation of the prospective rounds of enlargement. Art. 1
of the said Protocol states that:
on the date of entry into force of the first [fifth]36 enlargement of the EU the Com-
mission shall comprise one national of each of the member states provided that, by
that date, the weighting of the votes in the Council has been modified, whether by
reweighting of the votes or by dual majority, in a manner acceptable to all member
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states, taking into account all relevant elements, notably compensating those
member states which give up the possibility of nominating a second member of the
Commission.
Art. 2 in the same Protocol reads thus:
At least one year before membership of the European Union exceeds twenty, a con-
ference of the representatives of the member states shall be convened in order to
carry out a comprehensive review of the provisions of the Treaties on the composi-
tion and functioning of the institutions.
The whole issue of institutional reform eventually became subject to the
successful outcome of yet another IGC, which was convened in February 2000
(see Chapter 4). Institutional accommodation of the prospective rounds of
enlargement presents potentially insurmountable problems in a Union of
twenty-seven or so members. Flexibility and efficiency, as major operational
principles of European governance, might have been in support of this
appendage. Equally, the third stage of EMU might also have helped in the same
direction in view of the fact that, ceteris paribus, a number of member states may
not participate (either willingly or necessarily) in its structures. It was thus
expected that a variable geometry scheme would again be established in 1999,
on the occasion of the final stage of EMU. The issue, however, is complicated not
only because the present institutional set-up of the Union is dated, as it was orig-
inally designed for six members, but also by the fact that the vast majority of the
prospective newcomers are small states which, if added to the existing small EU
states, will upset an already delicate balance in joint decision-making in favour
of the smaller and weaker states. Hence, a new decision-making formula should
be so devised as to ensure that, after enlargement, neither the larger nor the
smaller states become alienated.
Perhaps, a system of double concurrent majorities may be required on the
lines suggested by Vibert.37 According to Tables 3.6a–c, after the forthcoming
waves of enlargement, the Union will consist of thirty members. A system of
double concurrent majorities means that for a decision requiring a qualified
majority vote (70 per cent), 70 per cent of the member states representing 70 per
cent of the population will also be required. This is facilitated with the grouping
of the member states by size (Table 3.6b), whereas the minority veto will consist
of states from each size group (Table 3.6c). In this context, and for the purpose
of accommodating future rounds of enlargement, membership of the Commis-
sion and the EP was also discussed in both the Reflection Group and the IGC.
The discussions led to the introduction of an amendment to Art. 137 EC,
according to which the number of MEPs will not exceed 700. As to the mem-
bership of the Commission, it became plain earlier on that such an issue was
part of an unsuccessful trade-off with the voting arrangements in the Council
and any decision had to be postponed. Table 3.7 summarises the main terms of
discussion within the Group.
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Table 3.6a Concurrent majorities
Share of Share of
No. of population population Minimum no. No.
Majorities countries (%) (minimum) (%) of countries overruled
Simple 16 (12.7) 51 (4) 14/49
2/3 20 (21.8) 66 (6) 10/34
3/4 22 (24.8) 75 (8) 8/25
4/5 24 (32.6) 800 (11) 6/20
Unanimity 30 (100.0) 100 (30)
Table 3.6b Categories
Category A Category B Category C
(up to 10 m pop.) (11–40 m pop.) (above 40 m pop.)
No. of states 22 4 4
Population (m) 120 116 249
% population 25 24 51
Table 3.6c Voting thresholds
No. countries % of population
needed needed
Simple concurrent majority
(50% + 1) 16 51
Ordinary qualified majority:
Two measure (2/3) 20 66
Three measure (8/4/2) 75–85)
High qualified majority:
Two measure (4/5) 24 80
Three measure (5/3/1) 85–94)
Unanimity 30 100
Source: F. Vibert, ‘A core Agenda for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference’, European
Policy Forum, London, 1995, pp. 54–5.
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Table 3.7 Main items discussed within the Reflection Group
CFSP Mutual assistance for the defence of the external
frontiers of the Union
CFSP Gradual incorporation of the WEU in the EU
CFSP Representation of the Union through ‘Mr or Mrs
FSP’
CFSP Vital national interests to block common action
General Enlargement negotiations six months after the IGC
General Discussion on the relationships between resources
and costs in view of enlargement
Commission One member per member state
Decision-making in the Council No to the criterion of the population
Presidency Yet to rotation on a six-monthly basis
National Parliaments Increased role
Institutional set-up No to à la carte Europe
Justice and Home Affairs
JHA is the third pillar of the Union and an almost purely intergovernmental
construction, although a majority in the Group was in favour of its further inte-
gration with the Community pillar. Under its auspices come crucial subjects
such as immigration, the protection of human rights, police and customs co-
operation and co-operation in civil and criminal matters. As Art. K1 TEU
stipulates, there are nine policy areas attended to in JHA, all of which touch
upon the ‘hard core’ of national sovereignty. The structure is a pyramid-like
form, at the top of which is the Council of Ministers, and below it three com-
mittees (asylum, police and customs, and judicial co-operation) and twenty
working groups, with the K4 Committee – the CoR (COREPER) equivalent of
the third pillar – as the overall co-ordinator.38 As in the second pillar (CFSP),
JHA falls outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ, while the policy input of the Com-
mission and the EP is very limited, if non-existent. The purely intergovern-
mental disposition of the third pillar is of great importance for the political
physiognomy of the Union as, without doubt, if third-pillar issues were to be
included in the Community Method, this would be a serious push towards the
impending transformation of the Union into a federal-like polity. Arguably, this
largely state-centric pillar may become the master key to the integration puzzle
in the not-too-distant future.
The creation of JHA as a separate pillar consisting of ten articles, and its
inclusion in the TEU (Title 6) – mainly on Chancellor Kohl’s insistence, owing
to the single market programme – was hailed as an important new integrative
element. Previously, these areas were covered by a plethora of ad hoc groups
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(such as the 1986 ad hoc group on immigration, the 1988 Rhodes group, the
mutual assistance group, the horizontal group, the European Committee to
combat drugs, the Trevi group, and the Schengen Secretariat). Its inclusion also
owes much to the collapse of the communist bloc, the economic degeneration of
the CEE countries, and the demographic trends and poor economic conditions
in the Maghreb and Mashreq countries, as well as those of the sub-Saharan
region. The acknowledgement of the significance of the third pillar was a more
recent development, first with the report of the Reflection Group, and second
with the revised Draft Treaty presented by the Dublin Presidency in December
1996. The following points summarise the workings of JHA since its original
inception with the TEU:
1 Title VI of the TEU has had the least possible productivity since 1993. Only
two Joint Actions and one convention have gone past the institutional
impediments of the pillar.
2 The provision of Art. K.9 (passerelle) has been virtually ignored.
3 Title VI is full of institutional rigidities with obvious consequences for its
workings.
4 Unanimity was the rule in the workings of the pillar, adding further obsta-
cles to the production of legislation.
5 The right of legislative initiative in the pillar was divided between the Com-
mission (Arts K1–K6) and the member states (Arts K7–K9).
An area of freedom, security and justice
The debate in the IGC, as depicted in Table 3.8 summarising the positions of the
member states, has found some expression in the AMT, which produced a whole
new Chapter 2 on the ‘Progressive establishment of an area of Freedom, Secu-
rity and Justice’. The fourth indent of Art. B TEU was amended so as ‘to main-
tain and develop the Union as an area of Justice, in which the free movement of
persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures to respect border
controls, immigration, asylum and the prevention and combating of crime’. A
new Title is also inserted in the AMT concerning the ‘free movement of persons,
asylum and immigration’, and consisting of nine articles and several declara-
tions to the Final Act. According to Art. A of the new Title, within a five-year
period, measures aimed at ensuring the free movement of persons, measures in
the fields of asylum, immigration and the safeguarding of the rights of third-
country nationals, and measures in the field of judicial co-operation in civil
matters and police, as well as in criminal matters, will be introduced. These
measures will, at least, provide for the same level of security as in the Schengen
Agreement according to a Declaration attached to the Treaty.39 Art. B provides
for the legal authorisation for the adoption of measures that will ensure the free
movement of European citizens and the same treatment of third-country
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Table 3.8 Negotiations on the third pillar
COM EP B DK D GR E F IRL I LUX NL A P SFSF S RU
Third pillar in the EC y y y y y np np np np np y y y np n[ np n
Partially in the EC np np np np np y y y y np np np np y y y n
Not in the EC np np np y np np np np np np np np np np np np y
Improved third-pillar instruments y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y
Improved K9 process y y y y np y y np np y y y y y np y
Policy on visas in the EC y y y np y y y y y y y y y y y y np
Policy on asylum in the EC (K1.1) y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y np
Immigration policy in the EC (K1.3) y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y n
Rules of franchising external 
frontiers in the EC (K1.2) y y np np np np y np np np y np y y np np np
Fight against internal fraud in the 
EC (K1.5) y y np np np np np np np np y np y np np np np
Fight against drugs in the EC (K1.4) y y y y np np np np y np y np np n np np n
Judicial co-operation in civil 
matters in the EC (K1.6) y y np np y np np np np np np np np n np np np
Police co-operation (K1.9) n y n np y np np np np np np np np n np np n
Source: European Parliament, JF/bo/234/96, p.3.
Key: y, affirmative; n, negative; np, no position.
nationals when crossing the frontiers of the Union, including the regime gov-
erning the issuing of visas. This article, however, is followed by a Protocol and a
Declaration to the Final Act on Art. B(2)(b), by which the application of Art.
B(2)(b) seems to be negotiated, provided that ‘due consideration shall be taken
in the application of the said article [of] the general foreign policy considera-
tions of the member states’, and that its application will be ‘without prejudice to
the negotiation or conclusion (by individual member states) of agreements on
related matters’. Furthermore, according to Art. C of the revised Treaty, within
five years of its entry into force, the Council, acting unanimously (and through
the co-decision procedure after the five years) will introduce sets of minimum
requirements on asylum, measures on refugees and displaced persons, measures
on immigration policy (issuing of long-term visas and residence permits, illegal
immigration and illegal residence) and measures defining the rights and condi-
tions under which third-country nationals who are legally residing in one
member state may reside in another. With a Declaration attached to the Final
Act on Art. C(3)(a), member states may negotiate and conclude agreements
with third countries in the domains of the said article, as long as such agree-
ments respect Community law. Moreover, measures by individual member
states are foreseen if confronted with an emergency situation stemming from a
sudden inflow of refugees. In such cases, Art. D(2) stipulates that the Council,
on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt temporary measures (but not
for more than six months) for the benefits of the member states concerned.
Britain, Ireland and Denmark, the countries of the Community’s second
wave of enlargement, have been granted an opt-out from the provisions of this
new Title in the AMT and the Schengen Agreement. Protocols Y and X concern
the positions of Britain and Ireland, and Protocol Z that of Denmark. Accord-
ing to Protocol Y, Britain and Ireland maintain full control of their external bor-
ders. According to Art. 8 of Protocol Y, Ireland may at any point notify the
President of the Council that it no longer wishes to be part of this Protocol, a
clear indication that this country was ‘forced’ into opting out so as to have its
bilateral relations with Britain undisturbed, and particularly with reference to
‘the common travel area’, as stated in the Declaration by Ireland to the Final Act
on Protocol X. As for the position of Denmark, Art. 5 of Part 1 of Protocol Z, as
if opting out were not enough in itself, gives this country the right to become
part in the new Title and the Schengen Protocol in the future under the terms of
international but not Community law! In this case it seems that Denmark will
not participate in the decision-making structures nor will it accept the jurisdic-
tion of the ECJ when acting under the terms of the new Title, if and when of
course the country decides to join in these provisions.40
With the AMT a revised Title VI has been inserted on police and judicial co-
operation in criminal matters. Title VI under the TEU consisted of ten articles
referring to JHA. Six new articles (Arts K1, K2, K3, K4, K7, K10) are inserted in
the Title in order to ‘provide citizens of the Union with a high level of safety
within an area of Freedom, Security and Justice’. Art. K1 stipulates that, in order
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to attain the above objectives, measures should be introduced for the prevention
and combating of organised crime, terrorism, arms- and drug-trafficking,
offences against children, corruption and fraud. For these reasons, closer co-
operation between judicial authorities, police forces, customs authorities and
other competent agencies, either directly or through Europol, should be fur-
thered and accompanied by measures to approximate legislation on these mat-
ters if and when appropriate. The Council shall lay down the conditions and
limitations under which the competent authorities of one member state or
Europol may operate in the territory of another member state (Art. K4). The
Council, according to Art. K6 and at the initiative of one member state or the
Commission, can adopt: common positions to define the approach of the Union
in a particular matter; framework decisions for the approximation of national
laws and regulations which are binding as to the end result; binding decisions
with no direct effect, for any purpose under this Title; and conventions entering
into force when ratified by at least half of the member states concerned. This last
instrument is an interesting example of ‘flexibility’ in practice.
The AMT spells out in detail the meaning of common action in the area of
police and judicial co-operation. In the new Art. K2, police co-operation is
taken to include operational co-operation in relation to the prevention, detec-
tion and investigation of criminal offences; the collection, storage, analysis and
processing of the relevant information through Europol; co-operation and joint
initiatives in training; exchange of liaison officers; secondments; the use of
equipment and forensic research; and the common evaluation of particular
investigative techniques. Five years after the entry into force of the AMT the
Council will develop a new supportive role for Europol, with new leadership
capabilities but subject to the appropriate judicial review from the member
states, by allowing Europol to ask the competent national authorities to conduct
and co-ordinate their investigations in specific cases, to promote, in co-opera-
tion with it, liaison arrangements between prosecuting/investigating officials in
the fight against organised crime, and finally to establish a cross-border data-
base on organised crime.
Common action on judicial co-operation in criminal matters (Art. K3) is
taken to facilitate and accelerate co-operation between ministries and judicial
authorities in relation to the enforcement of decisions; facilitate extraditions
between member states by ensuring compatibility in the rules between them;
prevent conflicts of jurisdiction between member states; and develop minimum
rules relating to the definition and penalties in the fields of organised crime,
terrorism and drug-trafficking. According to Art. K7, the ECJ may offer prelim-
inary rulings on the validity and interpretation of decisions, framework deci-
sions, and on the measures for their implementation. This process, however,
does not seem to be ‘automatic’, for acceptance by any member state of a pre-
liminary ruling by the ECJ is also subject to that state’s acceptance of the juris-
diction of the ECJ through a special declaration (Art. K7(2)). This is a practice
long established for the International Court of Justice in The Hague. According
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to Art. K7(5), the ECJ will not have jurisdiction to review the validity or
proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law-enforcing
agencies of the member states, or the exercise of responsibilities incumbent
upon member states with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the
safeguarding of internal security. And all that in spite of the fact that the
Ombudsman is entitled to receive complaints under this Title (Art. K13, para.
1).41 Instead, under Art. K7, para.6, the ECJ shall have jurisdiction to review the
legality of decisions and framework decisions for lack of competence, breach of
an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of
law relating to its application, or misuse of powers. The ECJ can also rule on any
dispute between member states on the condition that the Council has not man-
aged to settle that dispute after six months of its having been referred to it by one
of its members. Finally, the ECJ will have jurisdiction to rule on any dispute
between member states and the Commission regarding the interpretation and
application of conventions. The extension of the ECJ’s jurisdiction in JHA can
only be considered as a development to be welcomed, considering the past state
of the play under the TEU, where the ECJ was almost totally excluded. A little
more courage to have its jurisdiction extended to the realm of private citizens
would have done a world of good to the credibility of the new Title VI. But let
us now turn to the recent reforms introduced by the NIT.
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Introduction
In February 2000, yet another IGC, the fourth since the entry into force of the
SEA in 1987, inaugurated its workings with the explicit objective to arrive at a
resolution on the so-called ‘Amsterdam leftovers’. That is to say, on those deci-
sions that should have been decided upon during the June 1997 Amsterdam
Summit, where a pronouncement had not proved possible. This was no easy
task given the animosity of the deliberations during the Amsterdam process and
the high stakes drawn in case of breakdown and, by extension, a likely collapse
of the integration process: the next round of enlargement involving up to twelve
new member states from Central and Eastern Europe, Malta and Cyprus. A spe-
cial Protocol attached to the AMT on ‘the enlargement and the institutions of
the Union’ stated thus:
On the day of the entry into force of the enlargement of the Union and in spite of
the provisions of Articles 157.1 TEC, Article 9.1 of the ECSC Treaty and Article
126.1 of the EAEC Treaty, the Commission shall include one citizen per member
state provided that, by that date, the weighting of votes in the Council would be
modified either through reweighting or through a double majority system, in a
manner acceptable to all member states . . . Ministers who are members of the Gen-
eral Affairs Council will assume full responsibility for the Conference.1
At the second Part of the said Protocol it was stated that:
One year before the number of the member states of the European Union exceeds
twenty, an IGC will be convened in order to proceed to a comprehensive reform of
. . . the composition and functioning of the institutions.2
The decision to convene the IGC 2000 was taken at the Cologne European
Summit on 4 June 1999. In the resulting Presidency Conclusions, it was stated
that:
4
The Treaty of Nice and its critics
The European Council confirms its decision to proceed with an Intergovernmental
Conference of the representatives of the member states early in 2000 in order to
solve the institutional questions that remained open during the Amsterdam process
. . . which must be decided upon before enlargement. The IGC must conclude . . .
at the end of 2000.3
As possible items in the IGC agenda, the Cologne Summit proposed the
composition and size of the Commission, the reweighting of votes in the Coun-
cil and the extension of QMV.4 The Presidency Conclusions did not fail to point
out, however, that other items related to the institutions should have been
included, which were not specified at that stage. This was rectified immediately
afterwards and, as a result, the IGC agenda expanded. In particular, the Decem-
ber 1999 Helsinki European Council concluded that the
Conference will examine the size and the composition of the European Commis-
sion, the weighting of votes in the Council as well as any other necessary changes
in the treaties related to the institutions and the implementation of the Treaty of
Amsterdam. The next Presidency [Portugal] will report to the European Council on
the progress of the Conference and may propose additional items in the agenda of
the IGC.5
As the report of the Portuguese Presidency to the European Council in Santa
Maria de Feira stipulates,6 the IGC 2000 should have reached a conclusion on
eight issues with the view to preparing the Union for its subsequent round of
enlargement. These issues concerned the composition of the major EU institu-
tions (including the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) and the CoR), the
weighting of votes in the Council, the extension of QMV, improvements in the
procedures on enhanced cooperation7 and various minor issues.
Outside the formal confines of the IGC two more issues were taken up: a
proposal for a Charter of Fundamental Rights (see Chapter 7) and the common
European Security and Defence Policy (see Chapter 6), both of which could have
had much more serious and lasting ramifications on the physiognomy of the
general system and, more generally, on the future direction of the integration
process. It is worth recalling that other important issues were also discussed on
the sidelines of the IGC, mainly at the initiative of the Commission, such as the
hierarchy of Community Acts and the simplification of the Treaties (see below).
The Commission and the Nice process
The views of the Commission
On 1 September 1999, the Commission appointed an ad hoc working group
chaired by the former Prime Minister of Belgium, Dehaene, the preceding
German President, Weizsäcker, and Lord Simon of Haighbury, chairman of the
British Petroleum. The task of the group was to report on institutional reform in
view of enlargement. The Dehaene Report was published on 18 October 1999. It
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was structured around a number of initiatives. More specifically, it wished for
the broadening of the Cologne agenda to incorporate questions of Treaty sim-
plification and reorganisation, a step of substantial consequence which, had it be
taken, it would have led to an altogether different reform outcome (see Chapter
7). It also suggested ways to improve the workings of all the institutions of the
Union. Its recommendations on the Commission included the strengthening of
the powers of its President and the organisation’s overall political direction.
Moreover, it was stated that the deficient democratic legitimacy of the larger
system entailed that QMV should be generalised and accompanied by parlia-
mentary co-decision in the first pillar and, gradually, in the remaining two.
According to the Report, the Amsterdam provisions on enhanced co-operation
have not been used owing to an overabundance of built-in inflexible require-
ments and should therefore be taken up for reform. Transparency and the ensu-
ing enlargement, suggested the Report, point to the reorganisation of the
Treaties. This should be done by dividing the existing Treaties into two parts: the
first would contain a Basic Treaty, enlisting the general orientations and objec-
tives of the Union, citizens’ rights and provisions on the institutional frame-
work. A second, separate part, would include all the other provisions – i.e.,
common policies – which could be reformed only by a unanimous Council or
by a super-qualified majority, after however an opinion of the EP was taken by a
reinforced majority. Overall, the Report favoured a substantial simplification of
the reform procedures.
The Commission, in its report on institutional adaptation to enlargement,8
took on board the Dehaene proposals, pointing out that the issue of the reor-
ganisation of the Treaties had been taken up during the IGC 1996/97, but with-
out success. This issue was also met with the support of the EP.9 The
simplification of the reform procedures could follow the logic of Art. 95 (2 and
3) of the ECSC Treaty that provides for reform of the Treaty provisions without
the interference of national parliaments. This so-called ‘small reform’ facility in
the ECSC Treaty, under which the EP must give its approval by a 2/3 or 12/15
majority, was also suggested by the first Report of the European University Insti-
tute (EUI), in a study undertaken at the Commission’s request.10 Briefly, the EUI
Report suggested the following (see also Chapter 7): first, that Treaty simplifica-
tion makes sense only in the cases of the TEC and the TEU. Second, that the
TEU, as reformed by the AMT, should be replaced by a Basic Treaty, which
would include only the fundamental provisions of the TEC and the TEU. The
rest of the provisions would be attached to the Basic Treaty in the form of Pro-
tocols. In this way, Treaty simplification becomes a straightforward exercise. A
second EUI Report considered whether a possible simplification of the Treaties
might also require a change in the reform procedures themselves. Here, the EUI
suggested that unanimity should be abolished during the reform process and be
replaced by a super-qualified majority with a right of opt-out to those member
states that would find themselves in a minority position. The Report also rec-
ommended the strengthening of ‘autonomous’ reform procedures – i.e., the
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ECSC small-reform model; the need for organising better the work of European
Councils at the end of review conferences to improve the quality of its decision-
taking; and that the Convention model, as applied in the case of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, be used as a vehicle for formal treaty change.
Discussions in the IGC on the Commission
During the IGC 2000, those negotiations that were of consequence to the Com-
mission focused on the need to find suitable ways to preserve the fundamental
principle of its working method – i.e., collective responsibility – in view of
prospective enlargements and the resulting increase in its membership. In its
opinion on the IGC, the Commission emphasised this very point by stating that
The Commission reaches thousands of decisions each year . . . approximately 200
per week . . . is embarking upon a reorganisation of its internal services . . . because
after the enlargement the preservation of its collective responsibility will be a far
more difficult exercise.11
The Commission suggests that in a Union of twenty-five–twenty-seven members,
a Commission of thirty-three–thirty-five members would find it all the more dif-
ficult properly to exercise its leadership and, hence, the IGC should reach an
agreement on its future composition. The Commission itself has put forward two
alternative scenarios: the first referred to a system of rotating membership,
whereby the order of membership had to be explicitly mentioned in the Treaties
and under which every member state would have one Commissioner in every five
out of seven Commissions.12 The second scenario involved a system whereby each
member state would have the right to nominate one Commissioner. This would
lead to a Commission of thirty-five members in a Union of twenty-eight (includ-
ing Turkey) – or, a Commission of thirty-three members were Turkey to be
excluded – under the existing system in which the bigger member states have two
Commissioners each. This scenario was advanced with the proviso that there
would be a massive reorganisation of the Commission to enable it to offset any
possible functional difficulties resulting from an increase in its size.13
The Commission Report also emphasised the need to increase the powers
of its President and the way of his/her election. In particular, it was suggested
that the President should be able to dismiss individual Commissioners for seri-
ous misconduct or inefficiency during their term of office. This would
strengthen the position of the President and would allow him/her to apply
his/her political leadership function more efficiently than presently. A different
way of electing the Commission President was also in order according to the
Report with the view to bestowing the political system of the EU with a higher
degree of democratic legitimacy. Table 4.1 shows the Treaty provisions related to
the Commission that were discussed in the IGC 2000.
In the IGC discussions, significant changes in Arts 219 (para. 2), 217 and
215 were tabled even if the results obtained were more modest than originally
hoped for by the Commission. To give an example, a change common to the Law
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Table 4.1 Treaty provisions related to the Commission
Article Subject
219 TEC first paragraph The Commission functions under the
political guidance of its President
219 TEC second paragraph The Commission decides with the majority of
its members
217 TEC The Commission elects two Vice-Presidents
from among its members
218 (2) TEC The Commission decides on its Rules of
Procedure
Table 4.2 Proposed changes in Art. 217
Art. 217 Proposed new Article IGC Conclusion
The Commission may elect The President will determine The Commission works 
two Vice-Presidents from the political orientation of under the political 
among its members. the Commission. guidance of its President
who determines its
internal organisation,
and that it functions
efficiently on the basis of
collective responsibility.
The President may appoint The functions of the 
two vice Presidents from Commission will be 
among its members. structured and allocated











The President may entrust On the agreement of the 
members of the Commission Commission, the 
with special duties and President may demand 
responsibilities for part or the the resignation of 
whole of their term of office. individual members.
of Associations was suggested, that the Commission may reach a decision by a
majority of its members but in case of a split vote, the side including the vote of
its President wins through.14 This addition, however, was not accepted by the
IGC. More significant still were the changes proposed for Art. 217,15 according
to which the President of the Commission would have acquired more powers
vis-à-vis the rest of the Commissioners and would have been elevated from his
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Table 4.3 Member state positions on the Commission
Member state Position 
Belgium One Commissioner per member state, appointment of the
Commission by common accord of national governments,
strengthening of the President, no hierarchy of
Commissioners
Denmark One Commissioner per member state, more Vice-Presidents,
internal reorganisation of the Commission
Germany Limit to the size of the Commission
Greece One Commissioner per member state, more Vice-Presidents,
internal reorganization of the Commission
France Limit to the size of the Commission
Ireland One Commissioner per member state, more Vice-Presidents,
internal reorganisation of the Commission
Italy Limit to the number of Commissioners
Luxembourg One Commissioner per member state, appointment of the
Commission by common accord of national governments,
strengthening of the President, no hierarchy of
Commissioners
Netherlands One Commissioner per member state, appointment of the
Commission by common accord of national governments,
strengthening of the President, no hierarchy of
Commissioners
UK Limit to the number of Commissioners
Spain Limit to the number of Commissioners
Portugal One Commissioner per member state, more Vice-Presidents,
internal reorganisation of the Commission
Austria One Commissioner per member state, more Vice-Presidents,
internal reorganisation of the Commission
Sweden One Commissioner per member state, more Vice-Presidents,
internal reorganisation of the Commission
Finland One Commissioner per member state, more Vice-Presidents,
internal reorganisation of the Commission
current primus inter pares status. Table 4.2 shows the proposed changes to Art.
217 by the Commission and the IGC conclusions.
Table 4.3 supplies information on the positions adopted by the member
state representatives during the IGC on the Commission. On the basis of the
data presented by Table 4.3, it seems that the bigger countries demanded a limit
to the number of Commissioners. In most cases in the positions of the bigger
countries there is no mention on the internal reorganisation of the Commission
as a serious enough issue to warrant attention in the official documents pro-
duced during the IGC. On the contrary, the smaller members made an issue of
the size and the political role of the Commission, being unanimously behind the
initiative on its internal reorganisation, insisting on the principle of one Com-
missioner per member state, while rejecting any limit to the size of the Com-
mission. The smaller members also rejected the hierarchy among
Commissioners, but on the whole supported an increase in the number of Vice-
Presidents.
Changes with the Treaty of Nice
The result of the IGC deliberations and the negotiations that took place during
the December 2000 Nice Summit are shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Summary of the provisions on the Commission in the Treaty of Nice
Subject Arrangement Time
Size of the Commission One Commissioner per 1 January 2005
member state
Powers of the President Increase in the powers of With ratification of the 
the President Treaty of Nice
Responsibility for the internal 
organisation of the Commission
On the Commission’s accord, 
the President can ask a member 
to resign
Rotating membership When the 27th member joins Unknown
the Union
Internal reorganisation In progress 
In the Protocol on the ‘enlargement of the Union’,16 and particularly in its
Art. 4, it is stated that Art. 213 TEC would be amended to reflect the changes
decided at the IGC 2000 and the Nice Summit. More specifically, it was decided
that Art. 213(1) would be so revised so that the Commission would consist of
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one Commissioner per member state, effective on 1 January 2005. Such a deci-
sion was accompanied with an unspecified system of rotation – with the explicit
task of ensuring both geographical as well as demographic balance in the col-
lege of Commissioners – which will be effective for the first Commission
appointed after the twenty-seventh member joins the Union. The Council,
acting unanimously, will decide on the number of Commissioners and the
system of rotation, with due attention to the preservation of a working equilib-
rium between the member states. More important, though, proved the changes
inflicted upon the process of electing the new Commission and its President.
The whole system now evolves in four phases and has been aptly communi-
tarised. The new Art. 214 TEC specifies that the new President will be elected by
QMV by the European Council acting as General Affairs Council. This is Phase
I of the new and quite lengthy process. Phase II involves the EP, which must
approve the Council’s choice. Were that to be the case, then (Phase III) the
chosen President and the General Affairs Council, acting by QMV, will draw up
a list of the members of the new Commission on the basis of proposals received
by the member states. The President and his/her Commissioners must be
approved en bloc by the EP. Finally (Phase IV), following the approval of the EP,
the new Commission and its President must be appointed by the General Affairs
Council (with the European Council again acting as General Affairs Council)
on the basis of QMV.
Changes were also introduced in Art. 215 TEC regarding the powers of the
Commission President. Under the revised arrangement of Art. 215 (para. 2),
any member of the Commission who resigned, was forced to resign, or died will
be replaced by the Council acting by QMV. It should be noted though that under
the revised Art. 215 (para. 4) it becomes feasible for a unanimous Council to
decide not to replace a member of the Commission who does not fulfill his/her
duties on the above-stated grounds. Under the revised Art. 217, the position of
the Commission President is strengthened, although not at the extent originally
desired by the Commission. The President is now responsible for the internal
organisation of the Commission in order to protect its principle of collective
responsibility, as well as its internal effectiveness and cohesion. Para. 2 in Art.
217 offers the President the opportunity to reshuffle the responsibilities of indi-
vidual Commissioners during their term of office. This is an important devel-
opment and is expected to lessen the intergovernmental grip upon the
Commission, and in particular the horse-trading associated with the allocation
of Commission portfolios among the member state governments. Moreover, the
President, after obtaining the Commission’s agreement, can appoint Vice-Pres-
idents whose number is not specified, thus increasing his/her margin of
manoeuvre in the allocation of competences in the body. Finally, para. 4 of
the same Article stipulates that the President, after obtaining the agreement of
the Commission, may request the resignation of a member of the Commission.
Overall, therefore, the hold of the President is strengthened as a result of
the NIT.
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Decision-making in the Council
Reweighting of votes or a different voting system in the Council (double major-
ity system) was the demand put forward by the AMT, as mentioned earlier in
this chapter. This was probably the more important element in the institutional
package that became subject to an extensive and arduous negotiation during the
IGC 2000 and the Nice Summit. In general terms, the deliberations in the IGC
evolved along two alternative scenarios: reweighting of votes in favour of the
bigger member states, which might have lost their second Commissioner, or a
system of double majority voting. In each system, there are pros and cons, as will
be discussed below. The Report of the Portuguese Presidency at the Santa Maria
de Feira European Council mentioned that there was convergence in the IGC on
the following five points:17
● Any chosen system should reflect the double nature of the Union, in the
form of a union of states and a union of peoples.
● The chosen system should guarantee equity between the member states,
transparency and effectiveness in the workings of the Council, and should
also be simple and easily comprehensible by the citizens of the member states.
● Any chosen system should represent at least 50 per cent of the population
of the Union.
● The reweighting of the votes is part and parcel of the issues of the composi-
tion of the Commission and the allocation of seats in the EP.
● Any chosen system should facilitate decision-making in the Council.
Table 4.5 illustrates the existing weighting of Council votes and the population
of the member states as reported by Eurostat in 1999.
Table 4.5 Weighting of votes and population of the member states
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On the basis of the data provided by Table 4.5, a decision by the Council
requires 62 out of 87 votes. These 62 votes in percentage terms represent 71.26
per cent of the total votes in the Council and require the votes of at least eight
member states. This is the minimum number of states required for a decision to
be reached. This minimum number also represents 58.16 per cent of the com-
bined population of the fifteen members. Conversely, 26 votes cast are required
for the rejection of a proposal by at least three member states representing 12.38
per cent of the Union’s population. In theory, only three of the bigger member
states with 10 votes each may form a blocking minority. Table 4.6 shows the
informal population threshold as it has evolved in the EU since 1958.
Table 4.6 shows that in every instance since 1958 any decision taken by
QMV was always the expression of the majority of the member states and, more
importantly, of the majority of the population. Tables 4.7–4.9 project the cur-
rent QMV system to an EU of twenty-seven or twenty-eight members.
Table 4.6 Informal population threshold since 1958
EEC 6 (%) EEC 9 (%) EEC 10 (%) EEC 12 (%) EU 15 (%)
67.71 70.49 70.1 4 63.27 59.83a
58.18
Note: a This was after German reunification.
On the basis of the data provided in Table 4.7, under the existing decision-
making system – i.e., before the entry into force of the NIT – for a decision to be
blocked it requires 43 votes cast by at least five member states representing 10.45
per cent of the combined population of the member states. Moreover, accord-
ing to the same data, a blocking minority can be formed by eight new enlarge-
ment member states, for example by Turkey, Poland, Rumania, the Czech
Republic, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary and Malta (total votes 44). Turkey alone
could cover the minimum required population threshold! In an Union of
twenty-seven members, the danger of blocking minorities formed exclusively by
the new member states is more remote because of the absence of Turkey. In the
system under discussion there is no compensation for those member states that
lose their second Commissioner. The double majority systems discussed in the
IGC exhibit a number of interesting features and advantages. Table 4.10 offers
the necessary information.
Population weights add up to 1,000 and thus become easy to verify whether
a decision taken carries the necessary population support, as expressed by the
percentage of the combined population of the member states supporting a par-
ticular decision. For the approval of a proposal, a majority of the member states
is required – i.e., fourteen member states in an EU-27 and the satisfaction of the
existing population threshold of 58.2 per cent. For the rejection of a proposal,
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Table 4.7 Existing QMV system projected for EU-27 and EU-28





























Total EU-28 144 545,566
Total EU-27 134 481,181
Table 4.8 EU-28
Votes % of votes Minimum Minimum % of
number and (%) population
of member states 
QMV 102 70.83 14 (50.0) 51.36
Blocking minority 43 29.86 5 (17.9) 10.45
Total 145
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Table 4.9 EU-27
Votes % of votes Minimum Minimum % of
number and (%) population
of member states 
QMV 96 71.64 14 (51.85) 50.20
Blocking minority 39 29.10 4 (14.81) 10.50
Total 135
Table 4.10 Double majority systems





























Total EU-27 1,000 1,000
again a majority of the member states is required or, alternatively, four member
states whose population adds up to 419 units (1,000 – 582 = 418 + 1 = 419) rep-
resenting 11.62 per cent of the combined population in the Union. A simple
majority is required for the adoption or the rejection of a particular proposal.
There is no weighting of votes and each member state has only one vote. The para-
dox in this approach relates to the fact that the higher the population threshold
for the approval of a proposal the smaller it becomes for its rejection. The diffi-
culty here is self-evident: there is no compensation to the bigger member states
for the loss of their second Commissioner. In addition, such a system does not
take into account the differences in the political weight of the member states,
thus making it less popular with some of them. Had the political problem of
the physiognomy of the Union been resolved, this system would have been a
front-runner. A version of a double majority system which combines features
from the existing QMV arrangements was also discussed in the IGC as shown
in Table 4.11
Table 4.11 Double majority system with features of existing QMV arrangements
Votes Population % of votes Minimum Minimum % 
weight number and of population
(%) of 
member states
QMV 102 and 582 70.83 14 (50.00) 58.20
Blocking 
minority 33 or 419 29.86 4 (14.29) 10.45
Total 135
The difference between this and the previous system has to do with the fact
that this system requires a weighted instead of a simple majority for the rejec-
tion or approval of a decision. Thus, this system takes due account of the differ-
ences in political (and economic) weight between the member states. The
population threshold is the same as in the previous system – i.e., 58.2 per cent,
that under the QMV system currently in force. Adoption of a proposal requires
102 out of 135 votes cast by at least fourteen member states which gather
between them 582 units (58.2 per cent population threshold required). The
blocking minority consists of 33 weighted votes (135 – 102 = 32 + 1 = 33)
or, alternatively, by 419 units from four member states. The QMV threshold is
at normal levels inside the 1958–2000 average (70 per cent). The ‘deficiency’ of
this version of a double majority system is that there is no compensation for the
loss of the second Commissioner on the part of the bigger members, although a
version taking account of just that could have been easily recommended.
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Changes in the weighting system with the Treaty of Nice
The issue was finally resolved in the December 2001 Nice Summit. After a
marathon session, the Summit concluded in favour of a system resembling the
last system discussed above with some interesting features borrowed from the
double majority models; Table 4.12 supplies the details. In Art. 3 of the Protocol
on the enlargement of the Union, which was attached to the NIT, it is stated that
the above changes will come into force on 1 January 2005.18 In effect, this is the
necessary transitional stage required for the smooth accession of the new mem-
bers. When the Council decides on a proposal from the Commission, the QMV
is set at 169 out of 237 votes cast by at least the majority of the member states
(eight), expressing at least 62 per cent of the population of the Union, which is a
specific Treaty requirement (see below). The blocking minority is set at 69 out of
237 votes, which can be formed by at least three member states representing 30.6
per cent of the combined population of the Union (Italy, Spain and the Nether-
lands are used in the above example – i.e., 29 + 27 + 13 = 69). The point is that
this blocking minority can be easily formed by a number of combinations
between the member states. Three bigger member states can reach the required
level of votes (29  3 = 87), which is something that may happen at the existing
QMV system as shown in Table 4.12. On the whole the votes of the bigger
member states nearly tripled, from 10 to 29, those of the medium-size member
states more than doubled (for example, Belgium, Portugal and Greece moved
from 5 to 12 votes with the Netherlands winning an additional vote, moving
from 5 to 13). The countries of the northern EU enlargement moved from 4 to
10 votes with the exception of Finland (and Ireland), which moved from 3 to 7
The Treaty of Nice and its critics 107
Table 4.12 EU-15: new weighting of votes in view of enlargement
Member state QMV in force New QMV Population
Belgium 5 12 10,213
Denmark 3 7 5,313
Germany 10 29 82,038
Greece 5 10 10,533
France 10 29 58,966
Ireland 3 7 3,744
Italy 10 29 57,612
Luxembourg 2 4 429
Netherlands 5 13 15,760
UK 10 29 59,247
Spain 8 27 39,394
Portugal 5 12 9,980
Austria 4 10 8,082
Sweden 4 10 8.854
Finland 3 7 5,160
QMV 62/87 (26) 169/237 (69)
votes and seem to be on the losing side in that regard. The bigger gains seem to
be those of Spain, which moved from 8 votes at the current system to 27 at the
new one. In fact, Spain demanded during the IGC to have the same number of
votes as Germany, France, Italy and the UK, while France contributed to the
near-collapse of the Nice Summit by refusing to have fewer votes than Germany.
Table 4.13 shows the allocation of votes in the Council as agreed at Nice for the
enlarged Union.
Table 4.13 EU-27: weighting of votes





























In both cases shown above, it seems that the Nice European Council did
not accept the introduction of a double majority system, but only elements of
it in the form of a required population threshold for the taking of a decision in
the Council (62 per cent) instead of the far simpler and more legitimate ver-
sions discussed during the IGC. This population criterion though is not a
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condition for the taking of a Council decision. It becomes one only if one or
more member states demand verification, in that any taken decision in fact
reflects the 62 per cent population requirement. Even so, this system does not
include a weighting of the population like the double majority systems dis-
cussed during the IGC and as such the verification process may run into diffi-
culties. As the Protocol on the Enlargement and the Final Declaration of the
review conference states:
When the Council acts on a qualified majority, one of its members may demand
verification that the qualified majority consists of 62 per cent of the total popula-
tion of the Union. If this condition is not met the decision will not be taken.19
Overall, the new system resembles the one discussed during the IGC, a
system on the lines of the existing one, but with adjustments in favour of the
bigger states, compensating them for their eventual loss of their second Com-
missioner. It should be reminded that the new QMV system will come into
force on 1 January 2005 at the same date as the provisions on the Commission
(see above). The system itself, which in fact represents a neorealist triumph,
bears some marks of a compromise struck in the Nice Summit with reference to
the population threshold, thus adding a double majority perspective in the
agreed system. The QMV threshold set at nearly 75 per cent, mainly at the insis-
tence of Germany, brings the whole system one step backwards towards the
direction of unanimity, and is expected to complicate the taking of decisions in
the first pillar. Overall, it seems that the bigger member states (the ‘big four’
plus Spain) increase their influence under the new system disproportionately in
comparison with the rest of the member states. It also seems that the bigger
states during the Nice negotiations acted in concert to achieve a reweighting of
votes in their favour. The informal institutional implications of such a practice,
if sustained, are pretty obvious: the bigger member states occupy the driving
seat in the general system.
If we attempt to judge the new system using the criteria mentioned in the
Feira Report, it is possible to conclude that not a single condition was fulfilled: the
chosen system only partially reflects the double nature of the Union as a union of
states and a union of peoples, and it adds little to the need for more transparency
and effectiveness in the workings of the Council; in fact, it can be safely argued that
it does exactly the opposite. Moreover, it is not a system that can claim the sim-
plicity required to be easily comprehensible by the citizens of the member states
and does not seem to be facilitating decision-making in the Council. Wessels
makes the same point, stating that there are still 38(!) different ways for the Coun-
cil and the EP to interact in decision-making and 11(!) different ways of decision-
making in the Council.20 In summary, the new system in a Union of twenty-seven
or more states consists of three interrelated qualifications: the majority of the
member states, a qualified majority, and a population threshold.
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The other institutions and the Nice process
The EP
The EP formally presented its views on the basis of Art. 48 (2) TEU.21 They were
structured around three main lines of argument: first, the EP called for a more
democratic process of union on rather conventional lines, with its membership
not exceeding the Amsterdam threshold and a transitional period for accom-
modating the MEPs from the new member states. Second, it suggested that there
should be a provision inserted in the Treaty related to the 2009 Euro-elections,
according to which 10 per cent of the EP’s membership will be elected in a single
constituency with two lists, one European and one national. This means that
the EP is proposing a limited transfer of the German electoral system at the
larger level. The pro-federal features of this suggestion are evident and need
no further comment! Third, regarding both the operation and organisation of
EU-level political parties, the EP proposed the following change in the wording
of Art. 191:
The European political parties contribute to the development of a European con-
sciousness and the expression of the political will of the peoples of Europe. On a
proposal from the Commission, the EP and the Council, on the Article 251 proce-
dure, will lay down the criteria, the rules and the procedures for financing (includ-
ing Community financing) the European political parties.22
It is clear that the debate on European political parties is closely linked to their
financial links with the national level, an issue with serious political ramifica-
tions in some member states such as Germany, Greece and Italy, among others.
In any case, there should be greater transparency on this issue given that the EU
experiment cannot afford further legitimation crises. The financing of political
parties at the European and national levels must be two altogether separate
issues. Moreover, it is a well-documented fact that the EP lacks a permanent
seat. Its plenary sessions are held in Strasbourg and Luxembourg and its com-
mittees meet in Brussels. Apart from the South African Parliament during the
period of Apartheid it is the only other Parliament whose seat is different from
the seat of the Executive. To address this long-standing problem, the EP has sug-
gested the following new provision in the NIT: ‘The EP with an absolute major-
ity of its members will decide on the location of its permanent seat where all its
meetings would be taking place.’23
As far as the structure and workings of the Council are concerned, the EP
proposed its reorganisation along federal lines, again without any serious prior
debate on the justification of these proposals. As such, the Council should
decide on the basis of a double majority system, should become accountable for
its acts or its omissions to act on the EP and should be divided into an executive
and a legislative Council.24 The Commission President should be elected by the
EP from a list drawn up by the Council and should have sufficient power to dis-
miss individual members of the Commission for serious misconduct during
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their period of office. The same right, the EP suggests, should be given to the EP
on the basis of Art. 216, that is after the EP’s application to the ECJ.25
On the issue of the reorganisation of the ECJ, the EP suggested that it should
consist of a number equal or higher to the number of the member states. The
Court of First Instance should be given the right to deliver opinions on the basis
of the Art. 234 procedure (preliminary ruling). The jurisdiction of the ECJ
should be extended to all the issues in Title VI of the TEC (visa, asylum, free
movement of persons including migration) and Title VI of the TEU (Judicial
and Police Cooperation). The EP should be given the same right afforded to
the Council and the Commission to appeal in front of the ECJ by reforming the
provisions of Arts 230 and 232 TEU.
Unanimity in the Council should be limited to all issues of constitutional
nature with parliamentary co-decision being the main decision-making mech-
anism in the Union. The Treaties should be simplified on the basis of the EUI
Reports (see above), the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be incorporated
into the Treaties (see Chapter 7), and a hierarchy of Community Acts be duly
established. The enhanced co-operation provisions in the AMT should be
reformed to enable a smaller number of states to take the initiative for flexible
integration schemes and the various restrictions attached in the AMT should be
eased. Finally, the EP called for the setting up of a new institution, the European
Prosecutor’s Office, to combat fraud in the EU.26 Table 4.14 summarises the
position of the EP during the IGC 2000.
Table 4.14 Views of the European Parliament (EP)
Hierarchy of Community Acts Yes
Incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Treaties Yes
Unanimity in the Council abolished Yes
Loosened enhanced co-operation provisions Yes
Double majority system in the Council Yes
Co-decision and QMV main decision-making mechanisms Yes
Reform of the ECJ and of the Court of First Instance Yes
One Commissioner per member state Yes until 2010
Simplification of the Treaties Yes
Gradual abolition of the pillar system Yes
Generalisation of the ascent procedure Yes
Table 4.15 shows the results of the negotiations during the Nice Summit on
the allocation of seats in the EP in an EU-27. It reflects the third element in the
package deal agreed in the Nice Summit besides the size and composition of the
The Treaty of Nice and its critics 111
Commission and the weighting of votes in the Council. The French refusal
during the negotiation for the reweighting of Council votes to accept more votes
for Germany preordained that from the ‘big four’ countries only Germany man-
aged to come out of the negotiations without any losses in the new allocation of
seats in the EP. Indeed, all current EU members lose seats, save for Germany and
Luxembourg, who retain the same number of seats. France, Italy and the UK
lose 15 seats each and Spain loses 14. The four bigger states and Spain lose 59
seats between them, whereas the other members lose from 3 to 6 seats each. It
seems that in the new EP, and especially that of 2009–14, one-seventh of all
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) will be coming from Germany.
Hungary and the Czech Republic are the losers in the new system, having fewer
seats than countries with similar population sizes. The total number of seats is
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Table 4.15 Allocation of seats in the EP
Member state EU-27: New EU-15: Current Difference between 
allocation of seats allocation of seats EU-15 and EU-27
Germany 99 99 0
UK 72 87 –15
France 72 87 –15
Italy 72 87 –15
Spain 50 64 –14
Poland 50 – –
Rumania 33 – –
Netherlands 25 31 –6
Greece 22 25 –3
Czech Rep. 20 – –
Belgium 22 25 –3
Hungary 20 – –
Portugal 22 25 –3
Sweden 18 22 –4
Bulgaria 17 – –
Austria 17 21 –4
Slovakia 13 – –
Denmark 13 16 –3
Finland 13 16 –3
Ireland 12 15 –3
Lithuania 12 – –
Latvia 8 – –
Slovenia 7 – –
Estonia 6 – –
Cyprus 6 – –
Luxemburg 6 6 0
Malta 5 – –
Total EU-27 732 626 91
732, well beyond the limit of 700 set at Amsterdam, courtesy of the new Art.
189(2). Article 2 of the Protocol on the Enlargement attached to the NIT states
that the total number of MEPs for the period 2004–9 will be equal to the number
of seats specified in Art. 190(2) TEC plus a number of MEPs from the member
states that will sign their Accession Agreements to the Union. If the total number
of MEPs is less than 732 it will be corrected in such a way so that it will be as close
to that number as possible. The correction will be made by the Council and the
total number of MEPs may be temporarily higher than 732 if new members
accede after the corrective decision of the Council.
The new Art. 300(6) offers the EP the same right as the other major EU
institutions, namely the right to appeal in front of the ECJ for questioning the
compatibility of international agreements with the EU legal order. If these
agreements are found by the ECJ to be incompatible with the Community’s legal
order, then these can enter into force with the procedure specified in Art. 48
TEC, that is, after ratification by national parliaments. Other changes related to
the EP include Art. 191 on European political parties, which has been changed
so that ‘a legal basis for the financing of the political parties could be created’
according to the reasoning offered by the Commission.27 In the new Art. 191, a
paragraph was inserted under which the Council and the EP (co-decision) are
authorised to issue regulations on the financing of political parties after observ-
ing certain conditions. The EP, by virtue of the reformed Art. 190(5), is given the
right to draw the statute (regulations and general conditions governing the per-
formance of the duties of its members) of the MEPs requiring also QMV in the
Council and an opinion by the Commission, although the taxation issues of the
MEPs will require unanimity in the Council.
The ECJ
The ECJ, in spite of the pro-integration activism that characterised its rulings
over time, was very careful to avoid addressing the political issues in the agenda
of the IGC 2000, preferring instead to focus on issues directly involving its
organisational set-up, improvements in its workings, the creation of special
bodies – Judicial Panels, to take up cases involving the employees of EU institu-
tions – and the allocation of the workload between itself and the Court of First
Instance.28 All in all, the ECJ tabled five proposals in the IGC, three of which
were of major importance. First, the ECJ and the Court of First Instance asked
to acquire the right to modify their Rules of Procedure as is the case with the
European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice in The
Hague, in the place of the present arrangement under which this is the task of
the Council acting unanimously. The Nice Summit granted the ECJ the right to
draw its Rules of Procedure to be decided by the Council acting on QMV. As a
result, Arts 223 and 224 were modified accordingly. Second, the ECJ asked for
the introduction of a screening system on the choice of cases to be addressed to
it, involving annulment of decisions by the Court of First Instance. The Treaty
was thus modified to give the latter the right to hear at second degree decisions
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by the Judicial Panels (Art. 225(2)). It also granted the ECJ the right to hear at
second degree decisions by the Court of First Instance. After the entry into force
of the NIT, the Court of First Instance acquires the right to hear cases under the
following Articles:
● Art. 230, legality of Acts adopted jointly by the EP and the Council, of Acts
of the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank
(ECB), other than recommendations and opinions, and of Acts of the EP
intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.
● Art. 234, preliminary ruling giving under conditions the right to the Court
of First Instance to refer to the ECJ, and to the ECJ the right to review, under
conditions, decisions by the Court of First Instance.
● Art. 230, direct action.
● Art. 238, arbitration.
● Art. 236, employment differences involving employees of EU institutions.
● Art. 225(2), decisions of the Judicial Panels. Successive declarations by the
governments of the member states attached to the Treaty clarify the details
in the implementation of this Article.
● Art. 229a, the ECJ acquired the right to review cases related to industrial
property.
Overall, this is a major review of the EU judicial system, which is expected to
have significant consequences in the future direction of the integration process.
Students of European integration should be aware of such developments, prin-
cipally because they are expected to contribute further to the political activism
of the ECJ.
The ESC and the CoR
In its opinion on the IGC 2000,29 the ESC presented a shopping list designed to
improve its status in the interinstitutional balance of power within the Union.
In fact, it tabled four main demands. First, it should be stated clearly in the new
Treaty that the ESC is an important forum of social dialogue. Second, the ESC
should acquire the role of a moderator in cases where the Treaty requires its
opinion on complex issues. Third, the obligatory consultation of the ESC by
the Commission when the latter prepares its legislative proposals. Fourth, the
term of the ESC should be five years, to coincide with those of the Commission
and the EP. All of the above demands were rejected by the Nice Summit. For its
part, the CoR in effect adopted the positions of the EP as stated above and
demanded that the regions be acknowledged as having equal status with the
national and Community levels,30 by reforming Art. 5. Such a demand was also
rejected by the Summit. There was, however, a reallocation of seats in both
institutions in order to take into account the prospects for further enlargement,
as shown in Table 4.16. All of the current member states retain the same
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number of seats after Nice and the total membership in both institutions
increases from the current 222 to 344 (not more than 350 in the wording of the
NIT) after enlargement (EU-27).
Table 4.16 New allocation of seats for the Economic and Social Committee (ESC)
and the Committee of the Regions (CoR) 




























Total EU-27 344 222
Unanimity, QMV and co-decision
Table 4.17 sums up the modest results of the IGC 2000 and the Nice Summit. All
in all, forty-nine provisions came up for negotiations including some repre-
senting a clear procedural anomaly such as that of Art. 42 (measures of social
protection in the context of the free movement of persons) or Arts 62, 63 and
67, which require simultaneously unanimity in the Council and co-decision
with the EP. The Commission proposed that unanimity should be preserved in
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Table 4.17 From unanimity to QMV
Article Subject Notes
7.1 Establishment of a breach of fundamental 
rights by a member state 4/5 Council special super-
qualified majority
23.2 Nomination of special representatives of CFSP
24 Binding international agreements CFSP/JHA
13.2 Measures to promote non-discrimination QMV and co-decision
18.2 Free movement of persons QMV and co-decision
65 Judicial cooperation in civil matters excluding 
family law QMV and co-decision
67 Common rules on asylum policy Unanimity and co-decision
100 Emergency aid for natural disasters EP informed
111.4 International representation in economic and 
monetary policy
123.4 Introduction of the Euro to new member states
133 Trade in services and commercial aspects of 
intellectual property (with exceptions)
137 QMV and co-decision may be used for protection 
of sacked workers, co-determination and collective 
protection of workers and employers and conditions 
of employment of legitimate third-country nationals
157 Measures to support action in industrial policy QMV and co-decision
159 Action to support economic and social cohesion 
outside structural funds QMV and co-decision
161 Reform of structural and cohesion funds QMV and assent of EP as
from 2007
181– Economic, financial and technical co-operation 
with third countries
190.5 MEPs statute except taxation
191 Statute of political parties QMV and co-decision
207.2 Appointment of Secretary General and Deputy 
Secretary General of the Council
210 Salaries and pensions of Court of First Instance
214 Nomination appointment and replacement of 
members of the Commission
223 Rules of Procedure of ECJ
224 Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance
247 Appointment of the Court of Auditors
248 Adoption of Rules of Procedure of the Court of Auditors
259.1 Appointment of ESC
263 Appointment of CoR
279 Financial regulation for EU budget As from 2007
five groups of decisions and that QMV should become the dominant modus
decidendi in the EU;31 these were:
● In the case of Arts 22, 190(4) and 269, according to which any decisions
taken have to be ratified by national Parliaments.
● In thirteen cases related to institutional issues affecting the political equi-
librium between the member states (Arts 67(2), 100(1), 100(2), 104(14),
107(5),123(5), 202, 221, 222, 225(2), 245, 290, 308).
● In three cases related to taxation and social policy not related to the inter-
nal market (Arts 93, 95, 137(3)).
● In three cases related to deviations from the internal market rules (Arts
57(2), 72, 88(2)).
● In four cases of unity of law between international agreements and internal
legislation (Arts 111 (1), 187, 300, 310)).
However, reactions by a number of member states but principally from the
UK, Sweden and Denmark and to a lesser extent from France, Ireland, Spain and
Luxembourg, resulted in the decision of the Nice Summit which is shown in
Table 4.17, according to which twenty-seven provisions move to QMV,
Enhanced co-operation
The debate about ‘flexibility’ or ‘enhanced co-operation’ is old enough to be
traced back to Dahrendorf, who proposed an à la carte arrangement of the
Community as early as 1979 and continued with Giolliti in 1982,32 who sug-
gested that differentiation should become a principle of the Community’s future
evolution. Stubb undertook the useful task of explaining the jargon used on this
issue in several European languages.33 The term ‘variable geometry’ refers to a
situation in which several member states co-operate in order to satisfy specific
objectives in a more or less exclusive fashion, in the knowledge that the rest of
the members cannot participate lacking the necessary know-how (and know-
why) prerequisites. Examples of this kind of co-operation are abundant during
recent years. The Eureka project, the JET project, the Airbus or the ESA,34
all involve interstate co-operation outside the formal confines of the Treaties
and are all more or less permanent and exclusive forms of international co-
operation. In an à la carte co-operation scheme, the member states are allowed
to choose the kind of co-operation to be associated with and accept their par-
ticipation in the attainment of a limited number of common objectives. The
idea of ‘multispeed co-operation’ involves several member states in a less exclu-
sive fashion than before, in which other members will be allowed to join in
whenever they find it advisable.35
The AMT (see Chapter 3) introduced the ‘flexibility’ provisions in Arts 11
TEC, 43 and 44 AMT. The relevant provisions have not been used up to now,
principally because it was felt that such provisions were introducing scores of
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strict requirements that were not facilitating the development of such forms of
co-operation. The French Presidency circulated a questionnaire to the represen-
tatives of the member states in the IGC that attempted to pinpoint the reasons
for the non-use of the flexibility clauses.36 Returns from the questionnaire almost
unanimously blamed the plethora of requirements in the AMT. The flexibility
clauses became part of the IGC agenda during the Portuguese Presidency. The
latter’s Report to the Santa Maria de Feira Summit revealed that during the IGC
two alternative scenarios were discussed for changing the flexibility clauses: the
Report calls the first scenario ‘the enabling clauses scenario’, drawing from the
situation in the first and third pillars; the second scenario is referred to as the
‘predetermined model’, rooted in the Schengen and EMU provisions and expe-
rience and attempted to built on the AMT provisions.37 It was the latter scenario
that effectively prevailed. The reasons advanced in the Report relate to the chal-
lenge of further enlargements and in particular the avoidance of the impression
that the changes in the flexibility clauses were taking place with the prospective
members in mind. Possible areas of enhanced co-operation were also mentioned
in the Report such as the CFSP and defence, police and judicial co-operation, the
environment, research and development (R&D), and industrial co-operation.
The EP through the Delgado Report also supported the envisaged changes in the
AMT provisions.38
Changes with the Treaty of Nice
There were two important changes in the clauses on enhanced co-operation: the
first involved a change in the minimum number of member states to embark on
such projects, from the majority of the member states in the AMT to eight in the
new Treaty. Second, the ‘emergency brake’ procedure was abandoned, according
to which the whole issue could be referred to the European Council to make a
unanimous decision (see Chapter 3). This was replaced by a provision whereby
a proposal for enhanced co-operation may be deferred to the European Coun-
cil by the Council of Ministers acting on QMV, which will discuss the proposal,
but no vote will be taken. The proposal will then go back to the Council of
Ministers to decide by QMV.
According to Art. B, any enhanced co-operation will be regarded as a solu-
tion of the ‘last resort’ in the sense that any decision to that effect will be taken
only if it becomes plain that the required majorities in the Council will not
be forthcoming and the Union cannot move in toto towards new areas of co-
operation. Art. C gives the opportunity to any member state to join in an
enhanced co-operation scheme at any time, provided that they ‘respect the basic
decision and the decisions taken herewith’. Moreover, Art. D asserts the institu-
tional procedures to be adopted in the context of enhanced co-operation. All
Council members are allowed to take part in the deliberations, but only the par-
ticipating members have a right to vote. Decisions will be taken by QMV defined
for the purposes of the enhanced co-operation as a proportion of the weighted
votes and as a proportion of the number of the participating states. Unanimity
consists exclusively of the latter, whereas the decisions adopted within an
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enhanced co-operation will not form part of the acquis communautaire and will
be binding only on the participating states. Consistency between the policies
of the Union and those involved in an enhanced co-operation is left to the
co-operation between the Council and the Commission.
In the first pillar, the interested member states must submit an application
for enhanced co-operation to the Commission. The latter may submit a pro-
posal to that effect to the Council or notify the applicant member states for the
reasons of not doing so. In the first pillar, the whole process rests decisively with
the Commission. If it chooses not to submit a relevant proposal to the Council,
then the whole process stops right there since there is no alternative open for the
applicant member states. The Council, acting by QMV on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the EP (or with its assent if the proposal con-
cerned relates to an issue area covered by co-decision), will give authorisation to
set up such flexible integration schemes. Any operating expenditure will be
borne by the participating members, whereas the expenditure associated with
EU institutions will be borne by the general budget.
There is also a provision in Art. E giving the opportunity to a unanimous
Council to decide that all costs associated with enhanced co-operation is cov-
ered by the general budget of the Union. According to clause H, any member
state wishing to participate in an enhanced co-operation in the first pillar must
notify the Council and the Commission of its intentions. The latter will give its
opinion on the subject to the Council within three months and will reach a deci-
sion on the member state’s request within four months of its submission.
Clauses I–M refer to the conditions for establishing a framework of enhanced
co-operation in the second pillar. This must respect the principles, general
guidelines and consistency of the CFSP and the decisions taken in this context,
the powers of the Community, and must observe that there is consistency
between the policies of the Union and its external activities.
According to clause J, the foundation of enhanced co-operation in the
second pillar relates only to the implementation of a common action or a joint
decision and is forbidden expressis verbis in matters having military or defence
implications. The new Treaty, in its clause L, assigns to the High Representative
of the CFSP – the Secretary General of the Council – the task, if not duty, of
fully informing all members of the Council on the implementation of enhanced
co-operation in second-pillar issues. Clause M specifies the procedure allow-
ing other member states to join in an enhanced co-operation scheme in the
CFSP framework. These must notify the Commission and the Council of their
intentions. Within three months the Commission shall give its opinion to the
Council, which will decide by QMV within four months, unless it decides to
hold the member states’ request in abeyance, though specifying a date for the
re-examination of the issue.
Clause O specifies the procedure for enhanced co-operation in the third
pillar. Again, the interested member states must address a request to the Com-
mission, which in turn must decide whether to submit a proposal to the
Council. If the Commission decides not to submit a proposal, it must notify the
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member states concerned of the reasons of not doing so. Contrary to the
arrangements in the first pillar, in the third pillar, interested members are given
the option to initiate a discussion in the Council which, after consulting the EP
and acting by QMV, may concede authorisation. Other member states wishing
to join an enhanced co-operation scheme in the third pillar (Clause P) will
have to go through a procedure similar to that described in the case of the CFSP.
Table 4.18 summarises the situation in each pillar.
Table 4.18 Enhanced co-operation
Pillar Initiative Proposal Decision 
EC Member state (min. 8) Commission Commission
CFSP Member state (min. 8) Commission Council/ QMV
CJHA Member state (min. 8) Commission or Council/QMV
member states
Concluding remarks
The negotiations during the IGC and the Nice Summit were successfully
concluded, in the sense that a compromise was eventually struck, leading to
a new institutional equilibrium. The bigger member states, above all Germany
and to a lesser extent Spain, seem to be on the winning side if we reflect on the
new equilibrium in each of the EU institutions. But the decision-making system
in the Council has become less citizen-friendly, if not more complex and
conspicuously less efficient. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that a Final
Declaration attached to the NIT calls for yet another reform process leading
to an IGC in 2004, which may in turn lead to a new Treaty (see Chapter 7).
The rationale for further reform attempts to face the ‘real’ issues of the EU’s
evolving agenda: democratic participation, openness and transparency in
decision-making, civic rights and duties, the wider issue of the constitutional
identity of the Union and, in short, the perennial issue of legitimising its politi-
cal constitution. Before moving on to these themes, Chapters 5 and 6 attempt to
assess the international post-Cold War environment and the new European
security architecture.
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Introduction
This chapter addresses the question of how change at the international system
level has produced those political outcomes related to European security and
defence design post-Cold War. It is both a description and an evaluation of the
way in which Europe’s security arena has changed, as well as an attempt to come
to terms with the process that led to the ‘internalisation’ of system change. By
‘internalisation’ we mean the process – or better, the causal relationship –
between system change and policy response. Our argument is that the nature of
the post-Cold War systemic reality has been instrumental in sustaining and even
increasing actors’ faith in co-operative frameworks and in further advancing
rule-governing state behaviour and interaction in the European region. The dis-
cussion aims at assessing not only the impact of change on the Union per se, but
also the way change has been translated into policies and strategies that led to
the further transformation of the European institutional environment in the
field of security and defence. In particular, the argument put forward is that the
nature of the new systemic reality in Europe, contrary to realist and neo-realist
predictions, can be conducive to the efforts of EU member states to formulate
norms and rules which can promote co-operative state behaviour and advance
the integration process – slowly and painfully – in foreign and security policy.
The analysis deals with the theoretical debate in the field and aims at tracing the
defining features of the ‘new European order’. Concepts such as globalisation,
multipolarity, anarchy, national interests, roles and identities are examined,
albeit briefly, in an attempt to understand the structure of the European regional
subsystem in relation to state behaviour and interaction.
Although highly unoriginal, there is no other way but to indicate, right
from the beginning, that the geopolitical earthquake of 1989–91, which entailed
the demise of communism and ignited a process of dissolution of the CEE order,
5
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has also eliminated the basic elements of the postwar global as well as regional
structure. History and geography, which tight bipolarity had kept in limbo for
over forty years, have re-emerged as factors reconstituting Europe’s identity. The
scope of political change, the rapidity with which events become known at the
global scale, and the complexities involved in trying to understand the new
security challenges, have been and continue to be discussed. Our traditional
conception of the classic factors of power in analysing and explaining the chang-
ing security environment is still relevant. The difference today, as Dewitt put it,
is ‘the reach of impact, the complexity of the causal process, the range and capa-
bilities of actors involved, and the acknowledgement that threat and response
are no longer within the sole or even primary purview of the military’.1
Against this background, the discussion in the following pages addresses
two important dimensions of current international concern. The first is the
evolution of the European security system in the new millennium, taking
account of the changing properties of world politics since the collapse of bipo-
larity and attempting to assess the extent to which structure, power and actors
have been assigned new meanings under the impact of uncertainty and unpre-
dictability following the tectonic shifts in world affairs. Second is the extent to
which the strategic ramifications of the new geopolitical realities and the new
security challenges, although lacking a unified concept of threat, can adequately
‘provide’ rules for state interaction and, crucially, for reinforcing the ‘institu-
tionalisation’ of security. Moreover, can process and institutions be instrumen-
tal in redefining identities and interests towards a less competitive and even
non-conflictual European system, especially when – as in the case of the Union
– the negative impact of international anarchy is neutralised by the long-term
experience of co-operative institutional frameworks of normative interaction?
In the context of the latter, the analysis in this and in Chapter 6 is directed
towards the examination of (not only) EU institutional response and adapta-
tion to the new structural elements, but also towards assessing the development
of strategies, both national and institutional, as well as the formulation of
effective policies.
The overall question is one of rationale in the context of security elusiveness
in a turbulent world. A discussion of key components of national and institu-
tional policy-making and of the key transformation elements that crowd the new
European security agenda contributes to this overall understanding. Common
themes involve debates about stability and instability; continuity and change;
multipolarity and leadership; co-operation and discord; power capabilities and
patterns of behaviour.
Rethinking security
The dramatic change of international systemic polarity clearly reflects the devel-
opment of new structural variables as products of trends aiming at revising
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institutional entities and state policies. These trends can be seen as directly
linked to problems and challenges of redefining basic tools of analysis: structure
and the nature of the system, national interest, state sovereignty and power. In
this context, any discussion about the prospects of a new system of collective
security in Europe – as they have been expressed through the decisions taken in
Maastricht, Amsterdam, Berlin and Madrid – should take account of the con-
stituent elements of change that produced the ‘new order’.2
With respect to the international system, the term ‘structure’ refers to the
ordering of principles and priorities, as well as to the distribution of capabilities
among units that lead to the various forms of polarity. Among the several uncer-
tainties arising from the new structure, there is one persisting ‘certainty’: the
anarchical nature of the international system. Anarchy has been constant
throughout the history of the interstate system. At the same time, the range of
options available to any state is constrained by the international distribution of
power.3 That a multipolar order has succeeded the bipolar one is clear, and so is
the fact that the emerging multipolarity will differ markedly from the multipo-
larity of previous eras. Whereas the multipolarity of the 1970s and 1980s took
on meaning within the broader context of persisting bipolarity, the multipolar-
ity of the 1990s and (possibly) beyond does not do so.4 During the Cold War, the
Union and Japan were great powers when judged by their economic productiv-
ity, trade balances and financial surpluses; but they were scarcely such when
judged by their continued security dependence on the US. Post-1989, these
actors could be great powers not only in the economic sense, but also because
the political impact of their economic power will no longer be qualified by a
security dependence that imposes substantial constraints on their freedom of
action in foreign policy.
The 1991 Gulf War had complicated things, for in the midst of the dust
and fire, the rhetoric of American politics turned to talk of a ‘new world order’.
This phrase has come to symbolise, for many, a set of expectations and hopes, few
of them terribly clear or well articulated, and even fewer so far fulfilled. If there
is to be a new order, it will have to emerge not simply out of the ashes of the
old, but rather in a dynamic tension with the powerful legacy of great-power war
and resulting international institution-building during this century. There is,
therefore, a critical evaluation problem, which is linked to the need for concep-
tualising the changing European order. It is of paramount importance to identify
the nature of the post-Cold War order in Europe, and at the same time to trace
the implications of systemic change both for the order itself – as a structural
construction – as well as for the state units that lend legitimacy to that order.
According to Smith, there are essentially four dimensions to this probléma-
tique. The first has to do with the nature and character of ‘order’ in general. The
second has to do with the concept of change. The third concerns the response(s)
to the process and the products of change, and the fourth addresses ‘the issue of
impact, and the ways in which changes in the order and in the actions of major
participants feed into further processes of change’, which influence both the
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nature of the whole (system) and the behaviour of the parts (state or other
units).5 At an empirical level, the changing nature of the order can be linked to
a series of important developments. First and foremost, it is the existence of
structural change that produces a rearrangement of European state relation-
ships, especially in the field of world economy. More and more, ‘globalisation’
enhances the interdependence of national economies and undermines the tradi-
tional relationship between state power and the market. Globalising production
and global finance transform global economy into a system of ‘governance
without government’.6 As noted briefly by Cox:
there is a transnational process of consensus formation among the official caretak-
ers of the global economy. This process generates consensual guidelines, under-
pinned by an ideology of globalisation, that are transmitted into the policy-making
channels of national governments and big corporations . . . The structural impact
on national governments of this global centralisation of influence over policy can
be called the internationalising of the state. Its common feature is to convert the
state into an agency for adjusting national economic practices and policies to the
perceived exigencies of the global economy.7
An important implication of Cox’s argument is that the state becomes a
transmission belt from the global to the national economy, ‘where heretofore it
had acted as the bulwark defending domestic welfare from external distur-
bances’.8 As he points out, ‘different forms of state facilitate this tightening of the
global/local relationship for countries occupying different positions in the
global system’.9 In this context, Held argues that relations of economic, political
and cultural interdependencies across the globe – and more so in Europe – are
undermining the sovereignty and autonomy of states in all aspects of their secu-
rity (and elsewhere).10 Closely linked with this process is the emergence of new
states in Europe, and hence the need to trace the components of the new Euro-
pean system. At the same time, revision of the economic and security status
outside Europe has raised questions about the boundaries of the system and the
interests of European state actors. More often than in the past, there are new
and sometimes unexpected linkages between political, security and economic
concerns that increasingly undermine the capacity of states, as foreign policy
actors, both to recognise and to respond to new challenges and needs for
(collective) action. Finally, there has been a major institutional challenge relat-
ing to the adequacy of existing institutions for concerted international action,
as well as to the potential for co-ordination between state and non-state forces,
transnational or subnational.
This last issue is of paramount importance for Europe: European transna-
tional forces, combined with fragmenting subnational ones, create ambiguity
and fluidity; the Union forms an ‘island of peace’: a unity of transnational net-
works and a common retrenchment from a violent periphery. Paradoxically,
however, these processes are also reproduced within the single state with
national networks, security zones and areas of violence. Transnational forces
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and the growth of cosmopolitanism have weakened the nation-state, but this
challenge has led to the emergence of nationalist reactions and the legitimation
of subnational secessionist forces. As Hassner put it, ‘the nation-state is both
obsolete and obstinate’.11 In Western Europe, the challenge to the nation-state
comes primarily from the process of integration and globalisation; in the his-
torically imperial Eastern Europe, the challenge comes from a reconstructed
national–romanic ethic primordialism, which could lead to the disconnection
of the assumed unity of state and nation. As the locus of international security
shifts in practice from state to nation, the unchallenged, and uncritical, accep-
tance of the unity of state and nation has become problematic. The amalgam of
state/sovereignty is contested within and across international boundaries, as it
is confronted by a competing amalgam: nation/identity. The implication is that,
although the state remains a central actor in the international system, it is not
the sole actor in the area of security. Ethnonationalism and identity politics also
have system-transforming effects in international relations.12
In attempting to respond appropriately to the new conceptual and, eventu-
ally, policy challenges, we must do more than merely add new issues to the
global agenda. Our thinking about the nature and pursuit of security must
change. The attempt to understand the new European order and security should
take account of its geographical and functional scope, its degree of institution-
alisation, its strength and fragility and its ideological and normative elements.
While the collapse of the Soviet bloc and accelerating globalisation have funda-
mentally altered the structure of geopolitics, ‘our conceptual frameworks and
menu of policy prescriptions are indelibly infused with a Cold War political
logic’.13 The definition of security issues, the way in which they were analysed,
and the policies that resulted were the products of the dominant geopolitical
and ideological environment. Consequently, security was understood primarily
in military terms, and security studies fixated on the problem of achieving and
maintaining a stable balance of nuclear and conventional forces between two
ideological–political blocs. The militarised conception of security that
grounded international relations during the Cold War is being challenged
simultaneously both by multifaceted and holistic conceptions.14
The collapse of communism, and with it of Soviet hegemony in CEE,
removed the immediate military threat. A threat to national security no longer
necessarily evokes images of invading armies. The concepts, labels and even
norms to which those in the Western security community have grown accus-
tomed over the past fifty years are no longer so clearly applicable. While the mil-
itary dimension of security is no less important in the post-Cold War
environment, there are clear limitations on the application of conventional
interstate-level analysis to the examination of international security in general,
and European security in particular. Strategic studies are now viewed as focus-
ing on more than the use of military force; security no longer presumes a prin-
cipal concentration on challenges to a government and country from outside its
borders; conflict no longer necessarily means only the violence of armed force;
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central governments are no longer viewed as the sole legitimate authorities for
the use of coercive means; and defence no longer presumes that military force is
either the first or the most appropriate instrument for action.
All this amply proves that Laidi is right in stressing that the ‘reconstruction
of meaning or purpose’ and its linking up with the exercise of (military) power
cannot be settled through ‘any ideological or teleological deintoxication which
the proponents of Popper’s open society seem to be advocating at times’.15 For all
that, the divergence between meaning and power cannot be reduced to the ten-
sion between the integrative logic of the economy and the disintegrative
dynamic of identity. It triggers off a ‘chain’ reaction affecting all the factors
related to the exercise of political sovereignty, the most important being the
military instrument. Russia provides the best example: while it remains by far
the leading military power in Europe, the way we view the collapse of Russian
power is governed less by its inherent weaknesses than by the fact that, today,
there is no underlying plan to this power. This leads us to the commonplace but
nonetheless essential observation that a military power, no matter how large,
suffers a considerable loss of meaning the moment it is unable to connect power
with a military policy.16 The divergence between military power and military
policy affects not just Russia but also, albeit to a lesser extent, the US and the
other European powers.
Moreover, the replacement of the major military threat from the East by
multilevel and multidirectional threats, though admittedly of lower tension, has
lent great fluidity and instability to the European security system, which was not
well equipped, in terms of policies, competences and institutions, to deal with
it. The avalanche of change has clearly demonstrated the difficulties in meeting
the new problems that have arisen from the debris of the old order. Instability
and a perception of insecurity have resulted from the change in the power struc-
ture and ideological configuration of the international system caused by the col-
lapse of the entire deterrence regime as previously defined; namely, the
encompassing of those norms, rules and procedures, which provided for the
system’s governance. It may well be true that the end of the Cold War provides
an opportunity to raise the strategic threshold and thereby reduce substantially
the possibility of a global conflict; and while this may be true for Europe, one
should not be too sanguine about the prospects for a ‘peace dividend’ in many
parts of the world, some of them being worryingly close to or even inside the
‘European perimeter’.
For all that, the new Europe makes prediction about the course of interna-
tional politics difficult. Ambiguity and the dynamics of transformation pervade
the immense and unique problems posed in the post-Cold War world by the
challenge of achieving security. In the 1990s, policy-makers confronted circum-
stances that were more diffuse, multiple and uncertain than those faced by ear-
lier generations. The ending of the Cold War has loosened the bonds of
patron–client politics, thereby giving licence to the rise of micronationalisms,
encouragement to narrow sectoral interests, and legitimacy to unilateral efforts
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to redraw subnational, national and even international boundaries. The rules
are yet to be defined, where the true nature of threats remain shrouded by their
multiplicity and complexity, and where it is hard to judge what constitutes win-
ning and losing.17 In straightforward terms, the end of the Cold War has
removed the ultima ratio for crude distinctions not only between friends and
foes, but also between primary and secondary conflicts. The result has been a
structural modification of the international stakes, from a vertical pattern (con-
flicts are not all of equal importance) to a more horizontal logic (conflicts are
too complex and too specific for their settlement to be fungible).18
Security challenges become even more complex when one turns to those
issues that may not directly challenge the viability of the state in traditional
terms, but that may nevertheless undermine its sovereignty, compromise its
ability to control the penetrability of its borders, and exacerbate relations,
whether between groups within the polity or between states within the
regional or global system. Increasingly, it is argued that individual and collec-
tive security are dependent on our ability to confront the new challenges.
Among the new factors that transcend boundaries and threaten to erode
national cohesion, the most perilous are the so-called ‘new risks’: drug traf-
ficking, transnational organised crime, nuclear smuggling, refugee move-
ments, uncontrolled and illegal immigration, and environmental risks.19 These
are not new sources of potential conflict. They all existed to some extent or
another during the Cold War, but were largely subsumed by the threat of mil-
itary conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the
Warsaw Pact countries.
Responding to these threats, especially to wide environmental degradation
in the former communist states, will be an important dimension of preventive
defence. The political and economic costs of environmental degradation and
mismanagement, such as the high disease rates and safety shortcomings in
nuclear plants in the former Soviet Union (FSU), are proving to be formidable
challenges to economic development and stability. The simple recognition of
such problems, however, has not always elicited effective responses from the
international community. Instead, nations have frequently opted to focus their
energies on the more manageable manifestations of pending conflicts, such as
arms build-ups, that result from disagreements between nations over non-
traditional security issues.20 Because Europeans face so many difficult security
challenges, all of which compete for attention and resources, it will be difficult
to tackle these kinds of non-traditional threats. Yet, they cannot simply be
ignored for long: the environmental threats posed by the aging nuclear infra-
structure in CEE and the former Soviet states, inadequate controls over highly
enriched uranium and other nuclear materials (including weapons-grade mate-
rials) in Russia, and the deterioration of nuclear-powered vessels (some of
which literally are rotting in port), could all soon reach crisis proportions.21
Although these problems have not gone unreported, much more needs to be
accomplished if future disasters are to be avoided.
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Refugee movements and illegal immigration represent additional layers of
non-traditional threat to Europe’s security and stability. While the most publi-
cised refugee flows in the past few years have occurred in Central Africa, more
than 800,000 Bosnian refugees remain in Germany and other European states,
and almost 500,000 Albanians have entered Greece and Italy. Many other
refugees have resettled in Europe after fleeing or emigrating from former
colonies. The economic and social burdens these refugees place on government
services have become substantial. As a result, numerous countries in Europe are
beginning to re-examine their immigration policies and enforce more stringent
standards. This could have a destabilising effect on the less economically
advanced European nations and could threaten interstate relations. It could also
lead to domestic unrest if more is not done soon to regulate the flow of refugees
and expedite safe repatriation of those not accepted for long-term residence. In
the interim, Europe is experiencing an increase in crime rates and hate crimes,
any of which could lead to instability and thence to conflict and insecurity.22
These factors, probably as much as the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) (nuclear, chemical and biological), their means of delivery,
and human rights abuses, pose profound challenges to the viability of a new
global order, as they are more than capable of contributing to violence and other
forms of coercion. Contrary to other global challenges (the communications
revolution, water shortages, access to energy resources, financial flows), they call
directly into question the very authority of the state and are therefore poten-
tially, if not openly, subversive. This multifaceted conception of security entails
a multifaceted approach to security itself. While an exclusively state-centred
analysis is capable of illuminating some facets of discord and conflict in the
1990s (e.g., proxy wars and irredentism), it is limited by its one-dimensional
optic: the distribution and character of military power.23 This multifaceted/mul-
tidimensional security concept means that there is no rigid link between a com-
prehensive concept for understanding a new situation and the quality of the
response. On the contrary, a broad concept allows a flexible, tailored policy in
which force is only one of the various means employed.24 In the final analysis,
security is a politically defined concept. It is open to debate whether the widen-
ing of security might be a good or a bad political choice, but security is not
intrinsically a self-contained concept, nor can it be related to military affairs
only. If political priorities change, the nature and means of security will
inevitably follow and adapt to the different areas of political action.25 Security is
also multidimensional, in that individual welfare is more central to policy-
making than it was fifty years ago. Individual security can no longer be satisfied
only through military measures; it needs a multidimensional understanding. As
Politi notes, ‘individual security and international stability are becoming
increasingly interwined and a security threat is anything that hampers any rele-
vant organisation in ensuring individual security’.26 This means that security is
elusive; more than ever, it is embedded in the interaction of localising and glob-
alising forces. The axes of conflict in the shadow of the Cold War will probably
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be more complex, not less, and more difficult to manage. Policies begin to blur
traditional dividing lines, both between jurisdictions and between concepts that
once were discrete.
What does the above discussion mean for the prospects of co-operation in
Europe? Contrary to Mearsheimer’s predictions, and the ever-heightening com-
plexity and unpredictability of world politics, today’s anarchy and multipolarity
do not necessarily undermine such prospects, especially in Europe and the
Atlantic arena. World politics should not be viewed as a historically frozen realm
of power-hungry states, but rather as a dynamic process of interaction among
individuals, groups, states and international institutions, all of which are capa-
ble of adapting their sense of self-interest in response to new information and
changing circumstances. Under the proper conditions and adaptive foreign
policy responses, multipolar systems, not bipolar ones, can produce relatively
greater stability. This observation does not ignore the fact that the multipolar
systems of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were structurally unstable.
Far from avoiding war, they used it to preserve the essential variables of the
system, primarily the rights of the major powers, in a status of greater or lesser
dynamic equilibrium. The latter was subject to much erosion at the edges and
uncertainty as to the growth and decline of relative power positions. Europe’s
security problématique has changed too much in the 1990s and possible
responses are too different to expect that future security dilemmas will be clones
of those that plagued Europe in the past. In the eighteenth, nineteenth and
much of the twentieth century, the essential action in the global balance of
power had taken place in Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, the European
Continent is no longer necessarily the focus of shifting alignments and multi-
lateral security. A balance of power could still be maintained in Europe but dis-
orderly developments in Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere, could negatively
affect the stability of the European subsystem. In other words, although a stable
Europe may be a necessary condition for world peace, it is by no means a suffi-
cient one.27 Thus, the connection between multipolarity and European instabil-
ity is rather simplistic, as it is only when bipolarity is combined with other
systemic conditions that European instabilities are exacerbated. In that sense
also, it is not polarity but polarisation that can lead to conflictual situations. And
there is no evidence that such a process will occur in the European subsystem,
at least in the foreseeable future.
On the contrary, as the analysis that follows illustrates, the European pro-
tagonists (the US included), while still part of an anarchical environment, have
not pursued a relatively simple process of behavioural adaptation to post-Cold
War systemic realities. Rather, they have embarked upon a more complex
process of an ab intra redefinition of their identities, roles and, to an extent,
interests, mainly by protecting and on many occasions reinforcing the sui
generis European institutional environment that has proven instrumental in
stabilising their expectations. In one sense, the European ‘model’ represents a
fusion between liberal and realist visions of the international system: it retains
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states as the basic units, but contains the security dilemma within a non-
conflictual, if not co-operative, culture. In this context, the analysis in the
following two sections focuses on the changing roles, structures, power capa-
bilities, strategies and patterns of behaviour of the main actors as a response to
systemic change.
The issue of leadership: the US in the new Europe
Although security concerns have been fundamentally influenced by changes in
the European and international state system and by the reallocation of power on
a structural level, security and defence policies will continue to be defined by
traditional ‘constituent elements’: the Atlantic connection (which will remain of
fundamental importance to Europe even if the US reduces its involvement); inde-
pendent national strategies and choices; and a densely institutionalised environ-
ment. As a result, the internal distribution of roles will probably remain unclear
because of overall systemic uncertainties. The foundations, however, will remain
broadly the same, at least in the short and medium run. Perhaps the most impor-
tant issue is the extent to which American power and behaviour should and could
influence the course of events and the shape of European developments.
What might be called ‘structural heterogeneity’ is one of the main features
of the new international system; it refers to the existence of different interna-
tional structures corresponding to the different kinds of power: military, mon-
etary, trade, industrial, energy, and so on. This formation has given rise to a
major academic debate about US power capabilities. It could be argued that the
present and likely future distribution of capabilities will take new forms in dif-
ferent spheres. The military sphere is dominated by the US and is expected to be
so in the foreseeable future. The economic sphere, on the other hand, is multi-
polar, with a high degree of transnational interdependence and a profound
trend towards power diffusion. This phenomenon has resulted in an even more
significant decline of US effectiveness to ‘arrange things’ according to its own
perception of world order. Viewed in historical perspective, the Europe of the
Cold War was distinctive not so much because it was stable – Europe had expe-
rienced nearly comparable periods of stability before – but because the US was
the linchpin of Europe’s order. That state of affairs became natural to most
Americans actively involved in international affairs, and public opinion polls
suggest that it became part of the US foreign policy landscape.28
Throughout the history of Atlantic relations, the question of ‘leadership
and followership’ has dogged the steps of policy-makers and has constrained the
lines of policy itself. While it might be argued that during the 1950s and 1960s
the sheer preponderance of US power rendered such issues redundant, it was by
no means clear that structural power could eliminate the diversity of national
role conceptions and perceptions of stakes which inevitably underlay the devel-
oping EU–US relations. It was apparent by the 1960s that American leadership
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was often mercurial and increasingly questioned within the US itself, and that
the role of follower was not attractive to some EU members. Perceptions of the
costs and benefits arising from adherence to the Atlantic norm were certainly
not uniform, as shown by the tangled history of trade and monetary relations.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the underlying diversity and contention in this
area became increasingly apparent, although it is open to question how far they
fundamentally modified the structure of Atlantic relations.
It could be argued that with the decline of the US vis-à-vis the Union in
non-military matters, vestiges of American hegemony in EU–US relations
appeared anachronistic. Politically, the Nixonian definition of the US as an
‘ordinary country’ during the early 1970s was disingenuous to say the least, but
it did express an important perception held by US policy-makers and the atten-
tive public: that Americans were asked to sacrifice their natural interests and
instincts for the benefits of their allies (especially those in Europe) who were no
longer incapable of fending for themselves. This perception persisted and has
strongly influenced the spirit in which the development of the Union and its
political presence have been received. Alongside this went the tendency for the
US to attempt periodic redefinitions of the Atlantic relationship and thus, by
implication, relations with the Union and Western Europe more generally. Per-
ceiving the Union as a predominantly regional economic actor, and the Euro-
peans as ‘partial partners’, was indicative of the American unease with
developments in Europe, leading the US to castigate the Europeans for not
acting politically, and then to reprimand them for their more assertive actions
through EPC or other channels. For their part, the Europeans found the role of
followership increasingly irksome as their collective consciousness progressed; a
development fostered, in large measure, by the erratic nature of US leadership
itself. As Featherstone and Ginsberg have put it: ‘The hegemon tried to hold on
to its outdated prerogatives in an increasingly interdependent (as opposed to
dependent) world, while the former client did not initiate a new, more rounded
relationship with its former patron but instead moved toward greater economic
and foreign policy independence from it.’29
The developing security relationship between the US and Western Europe
also reflected the tensions between structure, stakes and role that have been iden-
tified above. One key feature of the 1970s and 1980s was the questioning of the
foundations of US security policies – questions which led to wide oscillations
around the central adherence to multilateral structures; key amongst them,
NATO. Unilateralism and Soviet–American bilateralism cast doubts over the
ability of the US leadership to reflect the needs and aspirations of Western
Europe, from SALT I to Reykjavik and beyond. At the same time, for the US, the
Europeans’ self-identification as a ‘civilian’, if not a ‘civilising’, power was sug-
gesting the very kind of free-riding behaviour which Americans were increas-
ingly ready to identify. Since the late 1980s, EU–US relations have been very
different from any previous period post-1945. In the 1990s, not only did an era
pass but also a way of thinking. As noted elsewhere, profound international
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events have raised questions at the very heart of our understanding of interna-
tional politics. America’s place in the world is debated and old thinking will not
suffice. In 1991, Roberts noted that the specific intellectual agenda within the
debate about US foreign policy after the Cold War is defined by three challenges.30
The first is to evaluate how long-standing policy priorities and instruments carry
over into the new era. The second is to identify new foreign policy issues that have
emerged in the shadow or wake of the Cold War. The third is to pose the larger,
transcendental questions about what the US stands for in the world and what
Americans want to accomplish as a nation. Without answers to these questions,
the evaluation of priorities and policies is sterile and impractical. Not since the
late 1940s has the policy research community faced such an all-encompassing
task. The US cannot simply carry forward the strategies, policies and concepts of
the past into a quite different future. One clear lesson of the 1990s, though, is that
very little concerted international action is indeed possible without American
leadership. The reunification of Germany, the liberalisation of world trade
arrangements, the Gulf War and strong intervention in the former Yugoslavia –
military and otherwise – all required the US to articulate policies, as well as to
convince and sometimes pressure others into joining.
The Gulf War and the admittedly impressive US exhibition of ‘capacity to
go to war’ shows that military power is not obsolete. However, the assumption
that the military victory of the US in the Gulf implies that the US has become
once again ‘hegemonic’ would be simplistic.31 In the twentieth century, the US
was forced to intervene in Europe in order to rescue a faltering balance of power
from aspiring hegemons. The post-Cold War multipolar balance of power,
unlike those of the past, cannot rely on war as a cheap means by which the strong
restrain those who aspire to join the majors’ club. Nuclear and high-technology
weapons make even small-scale wars unacceptably costly for developed democ-
racies. And those weapons will be of limited value in deterring and coercing
non-state actors who engage themselves in micro-wars within and across state
borders.32 Within the subsystem of the advanced capitalist and ever-globalising,
if not already globalised, world, where the Union and the US act and interact
without the presence of the communist threat, the significance of military
strength is being reduced. Threats or promises concerning force are very diffi-
cult to make on issues of trade barriers or macroeconomic policy co-ordination.
Estimates of future power will be more than ever based on the power of state-
supported trade, finance capital, investments and other non-military aspects of
power. The diffusion of effective power resources between the Union and the US
(and Japan) has resulted in power becoming multidimensional and difficult
to exercise. In that respect, the promise contained in President Bush’s concept of
a ‘new world order’ should not be viewed as a new Pax Americana, for no such
US dominance can either be effective or viable in the long run, without support
from international coalitions including West European states. If there is ‘order’,
it will surely not be premised on the primacy of the US alone, save where, as
in the Middle East, military power can still be a major arbiter of events with
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implications far beyond the region.33 The concept of a ‘new world order’ was
born at a time when the US had put together an unprecedented coalition of
states to act for a common purpose. The coalition’s rationale in ‘Operation
Desertstorm’ was not military: the US possessed the necessary capacity of its
own, although it welcomed the efforts of key European allies. Instead, it served
political purposes: to convince Americans that the US was not acting alone to
secure an asset (oil) that was more important to other countries; and to counter
Iraq’s charges that it was championing the cause of the downtrodden against the
‘enemies of Arab people’. Also, the situation in the Soviet Union meant that the
ample US forces still in Europe could be withdrawn without fear.
The coalition’s success does not necessarily set a precedent, however. There
is, in fact, no other place on earth about which so many countries care so much,
because of oil. As Calleo observes: ‘the conditions in the Gulf War did provide a
near perfect occasion to demonstrate American power . . . Militarily and geopo-
litically, however, these were not conditions that could be generalised into a new
American-dominated world order.’34 Likewise, Yugoslavia and the 1998 Iraqi
mass destruction weapons crisis have shown that, important as it may be for the
US to take the lead, it is unlikely that military power alone will be offered as a
solution, at least not without ‘objections’. Europe after the Cold War has new
security problems, with new complex political and economic dimensions for
which the US does not seem well prepared nor much disposed to take the lead
in addressing. Nor did the major Western European powers seem eager to legit-
imise a renewed American hegemony, without some share in the power of deci-
sion in terms of defining problems, suggesting remedies, creating strategies and
assigning roles. The emotional and psychological adjustments that the US faced
in the 1990s is not limited either to changes in the agenda or in the tools most
likely to be prominent in conferring power and influence. By the end of 1990,
the Soviet threat to American and Western European interests had been replaced
by less focused fears of economic and political disruption in Eastern Europe.
One might have thought, on the basis of either ‘balance of power’ or ‘balance of
threat’ theory, that European alignments with the US would have weakened
more than they did in the 1980s. Signs of tensions in EU–US relations over
trade, the international role of the Union, and relations with the East, had begun
to mount in the later years of the Reagan administration. Changes in America’s
relative position in influencing and, to the extent possible, determining great
events had affected its hegemonic role.
This prospect caused confusion regarding America’s post-Cold War role.
The confusion, however, did not express itself with the familiar dichotomy of the
1930s, that is, between imperialism and isolationism. Rather, it reflected the fact
that identifying interests, setting goals and choosing instruments in contempo-
rary US foreign policy had become a more formidable task than ever before.
Kissinger was quick to point out that the end of the Cold War, in a manner sim-
ilar to the end of Second World War, has produced a great temptation to recast
the international system in America’s image.35 Kissinger, however, rejects the
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notion of a ‘unipolar’ or ‘one-superpower’ world, as power has become more
diffuse and America’s ability to shape the rest of the world has actually
decreased.36 This means that the American exceptionalism, which was the basis
for a Wilsonian foreign policy, appears less relevant for the coming years. For
Kissinger, the nineteenth-century concept of ‘balance of power’ is the way for-
ward for the US, whose foreign policy-makers have to articulate a notion of the
national interest that is served by the maintenance of an equilibrium in Europe
and in Asia, as America cannot ‘remedy every wrong and stabilise every disloca-
tion’. But at the same time, it cannot afford to ‘confine itself to the refinement of
its domestic virtues’ because that would lead to American security and prosper-
ity being dependent upon decisions made by others, of which the US would pro-
gressively lose control.37 Kissinger’s preference for a ‘Congress of Vienna’-like
framework for American post-Cold War strategy says little about how the US
and the rest of the major international players (Europe, Russia, China and Japan)
will achieve this kind of interaction in the world arena, when their governments
and societies are facing enormous challenges domestically. As Miller has indi-
cated, ‘state-to-state balancing is also more complicated when there are no
significant adversarial relationships among these five. Such balancing provides
no guidance when non-state actors and functional topics crowd agendas.’38
Nevertheless, the US has attempted to make its policies compatible with its
relative decline in power and the expansion and globalisation of interdepen-
dence, but this process of change has been undermined by a lack of strategic
vision. Adopting a realist perspective, Krasner argues that US behaviour is con-
strained by its own capabilities and the distribution of power in the international
system.39 The external environment will inevitably pressure the US to move
towards congruity between commitments and capabilities. In short, because the
US is the main loser (in relation to its Western European allies) from structural
change in world politics, it is bound to adjust its foreign policy behaviour. There
has been, therefore, an undercurrent of disorientation in American foreign
policy resulting from difficulties in translating the abstract of military might into
actual political success. Having claimed credit for winning the Cold War, US
policy-makers have been faced with the equally daunting task of managing
peace. Building constructive relations among all the emerging great powers has
been a challenge exacerbated by the co-existence of military and economic com-
petition. Because both the issues as well as the hierarchy of power are different
in each of these spheres, solutions on one level are likely to pose problems on the
other and vice versa.
Although international policy co-ordination was never more difficult, there
is evidence to support the thesis that the US foreign policy-making elites are
attempting to craft policy by pursuing a strategy that promotes American power,
position and primacy in order to enhance the capacity of the US to exercise influ-
ence abroad. The issue here is one of continuity and/or change. American
actions in the Gulf (both in the early 1990s and in 1997–98), Somalia, Haiti,
the Korean Peninsula and Yugoslavia, although problematic and incoherent,
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represented the continuation of Washington’s commitment to an active interna-
tional agenda, even without a geopolitical and ideological rival. A global foreign
policy inspired by Realpolitik efforts to prevent other states from ‘renationalis-
ing’ their foreign and security policies is a clear manifestation of continuity. This
policy framework is based on the conviction that America’s prosperity depends
on the preservation of an interdependent global political economy, and that the
precondition for economic interdependence is the geopolitical stability and reas-
surance that flows from US security commitments. Policies of renationalisation
would destroy this reassurance and stability upon which US interests are pre-
sumed to rest. The assumption is that, if Washington cannot or will not solve
others’ problems for them, the world order strategy will collapse. Compelled to
provide for their own security, others would have to emerge as great or regional
powers and behave as independent geopolitical actors.40
This American globalism, then, is compatible with a set of principles that
have come to be associated with world order, stability and, hence, vital US inter-
ests. Three principal objectives remained as they had for forty years: to maintain
a strong European defence capacity, led by the US; to encourage a process of
European integration that remained compatible with a ‘US-made’ liberal inter-
national political economy; and to continue global liberalisation of trade and
investment on terms favourable to American interests. To attain all three objec-
tives, the US had to maintain a strong influence in Europe, and either co-
operation on economic and security issues had to be mutually reinforcing or, at
worst, conflicts in one area (especially economic) had to be prevented from con-
taminating relations in the other. The fact that the US sought to institutionalise
its relationship with the Union almost at the same time as the collapse of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks in 1990 is a case in point.
The 1990 Transatlantic Declaration can be interpreted as the institutional recog-
nition of the changing nature of the EU–US relationship, in which the US is
coming to terms with its reduced capability to influence EU behaviour within
the old and outdated structures of the ‘hegemonic era’. The Declaration not only
formalised pre-existing linkage processes between the two, but it also confirmed
the weakening of US leverage. Growing and intensifying interdependence forced
the US to seek to formalise the process of co-operation with the Union, in the
face of important changes both within the Union – the completion of the single
market programme, the Maastricht process (especially EMU) and further
reforms to accommodate prospective enlargements – and in the new Eastern
Europe. The Declaration was an important, though modest, step in the direc-
tion of ‘re-fashioning’ EU–US political relations.
The ancillary objectives of US foreign policy in Europe also displayed a
degree of continuity: to secure European support, where possible, for American
actions outside Europe (e.g., in the Gulf), and to avoid increased financial or
military obligations on the Continent. Fiscal pressures in the US made the latter
objective even more important and reinforced American interest in European
initiatives for greater burden-sharing in defence, preserving at the same time the
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centrality of NATO with a new command structure, albeit at lower force levels.
American attitudes towards increased European defence co-operation had
always been ambivalent, with the US willing to see greater co-operation in order
to reduce its own burden, but not to the point of undercutting NATO. That is
why the American reaction to the Franco-German initiative of reviving the
WEU as an exclusively European defence capability was one of concern. How-
ever, the policy outcome of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Berlin, which left the
WEU subordinate to NATO, the inability of the Union to develop a common
position on the Gulf and Yugoslav crises, and the de facto effective co-operation
of the US, Britain and France in the Gulf War, diminished American concerns
about NATO’s role, even though it played no official part in out-of-area crises
(until 1994 in the former Yugoslavia). The issue here is that the decline of Amer-
ican hegemony does not suggest that American leadership is on the wane. To
be sure, the US overall material capabilities and power position have declined
significantly since the early postwar years. But the political institutions and
structures of relations that were built under American sponsorship after the
Second World War still provide channels and routines of co-operation. America
will not (and probably cannot) play the leadership role it did a generation ago,
but that leadership has been reinvented in the form of a dense set of institutional
and transnational linkages among major actors and regions in the world. Con-
flicts and disputes are as ubiquitous as ever, but they have become more domes-
ticated and contained. Ikenberry summarises this argument most succinctly:
Those who believe that American leadership is unlikely, if not impossible, look at
past cases, particularly the end of World War II and a mythical version of the nine-
teenth century, to argue that the necessary conditions are missing: the hegemony
needs overwhelming power, a clear purpose, and a large reservoir of political will.
The error in the reasoning is not in failing to see that these factors are absent, but
rather in failing to understand that they are not necessary in the current conditions,
which call for a quite different kind of influence that relies on different instruments
and that can thrive in the absence of these factors.41
While the actual record of US foreign policy in the late 1990s had by no
means been a great showcase of global or Western leadership, the habits and
institutional foundations of American leadership were still in place. For Iken-
berry, the widespread worry about the end of US leadership is partly a result of
a misunderstanding of what leadership is and the changing conditions in which
it must operate. If leadership means the ability to foster co-operation and com-
monality of social purpose among states as well as the ability to reinforce insti-
tutionalisation at a systemic level, then American leadership and its institutional
creations will long outlast the decline of its postwar position of military and eco-
nomic dominance; and it will outlast the foreign policy stumbling of particular
US administrations.42 In this regard, the far-flung political institutions, rules,
norms and relations that the US built during the Cold War are still in place, and
these overall macro-structures can be seen to work despite the steady decline in
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America’s hegemonic position and the failings of its leaders. Indeed, the overall
US-shaped system is still in place. It is this macropolitical system, a legacy of
American power and its liberal polity, that remains crucial in generating agree-
ment in the post-Cold War international relations.
Brzezinski goes further in arguing that American global power is exercised
through a global system of distinctively American design that mirrors the
domestic American experience.43 Although America’s international pre-
eminence unavoidably evokes similarities with earlier imperial systems, the dif-
ferences are more essential. They go beyond the question of territorial scope. As
the imitation of American ways gradually pervades the world, it creates a more
congenial setting for the exercise of the indirect and seemingly consensual
American hegemony. And as in the case of the domestic American system, that
hegemony involves a complex structure of interlocking institutions and proce-
dures, designed to generate consensus and obscure asymmetries in power and
influence. American global supremacy is thus buttressed by an elaborate system
of alliances and coalitions that literally span the globe.44 As Nye and Keohane
have commented, American influence in Europe was greater in the 1990s than
during the 1980s.45 During the Cold War, international institutions such as
NATO, GATT, and the Union were essential instruments in the implementation
of American global strategy. The US successfully sought to prevent further loss
of influence by maintaining a congenial political–economic order in Europe.
Successful institutions tend to create interests that support them: even if NATO
and GATT could not have been formed ab initio under the conditions of the
1990s, they were able to persist under these conditions.46 Although the Bush
administration implemented a 25 per cent reduction in the US force structure,
including a sharp cutback of American troops in Europe under strong Congres-
sional pressure to cut the defence budget in the spring of 1990, it succeeded in
maintaining the centrality of NATO in European defence and was, by and large,
able to keep US policy, preferences and interests intact. NATO remained central
to the American internationalist strategy post-Cold War, and emphasis on the
alliance was consistent with the US position throughout the Cold War years. By
adapting NATO doctrine and structure, and by fending off French efforts to
replace it as the central focus for the organisation of defence, the US was able to
maintain its long-standing interest in NATO as the central focus for European
defence, and thus to maintain its own influence as a central participant in the
European security debate. Also, continuing US support for greater European
integration must be interpreted as a realisation that the Union can act as a sta-
bilising force in Western Europe and a catalyst for smooth democratic transition
in the East. It is interesting, as the following section shows, that even the EU
member states chose ‘institutionalisation’ as a response to systemic transforma-
tion: Germany sought to use institutions to reassure its neighbours as it regained
a central role in Europe, and Britain tried to retain institutions such as NATO
that magnified its influence. Washington viewed reliance on a web of interna-
tional institutions (especially NATO) as the best way to preserve a strong
138 Theory and reform in the European Union
position in the tactical bargaining with both Russia and West European powers.
The process of institutional adaptation which has been the outcome of interstate
bargaining is at the heart of the new European security architecture.
The post-11 September 2001 context
Nobody can credibly deny the fact that the terrorist attacks against the US have
in effect ushered in a new era in international politics. The priorities of interna-
tional relations, the nature of regional politics, the shape of political alliances,
the driving purpose of US foreign policy, the nature of international cleavages,
the evolving role of military forces and the risks of WMD were all affected by the
epoch-making events. The terrorist attacks have altered the Western strategic
threshold but they have not really challenged the American position in the
world, although the impact on the US strategy debate is profound. In terms of
international distribution of power, the overall international security paradigm
remained reasonably clear-cut. The US occupies a dominant place in the post-
Cold War international system, especially in those aspects of the system dealing
with national and international security. Again, one clear lesson of the Afghan-
istan campaign – like Bosnia and Kosovo – is that all major post-Cold War
‘strategic projects and challenges’ require effective US leadership.
In the campaign against international terorism, the US – once more – took
the lead. By exercising its right of self-defence, it built a varied coalition in
support of that right and has sought to develop a strategy to defeat terrorism
with a global reach. A new strategic era has thus dawned. The US has a newly
defined enemy, which is neither the old Soviet Union nor a, potentially, resur-
gent China, but international terrorism and terrorist sponsored states.47 The
pursuit and defeat of these enemies has become the overarching goal of US
President G. W. Bush and his administration. It has, therefore, become a defin-
ing feature of international relations today. Countries formerly having difficult
relations with the US, ranging from Russia, to Pakistan, to Iran, have an oppor-
tunity to develop a new strategic framework for themselves. New relationships,
even alliances, will be built on the campaign against global terrorism, and these
may endure well into the future. These radical and, in large measure, structural
changes in the international political scene will have a considerable impact
on the domestic context in which foreign policy is being conducted. Grand
strategy, in the difficult circumstances of the ever-globalising information age,
has returned to the fore with the US adopting a strategy of large-scale coalition-
building.
Indeed, American diplomacy, since 11 September 2001, has been predicated
on the need to build a large coalition of sorts, in order to fight the campaign
against terrorism on many fronts and by employing a multitude of means. It is
a coalition of sorts, because it is essentially one of variable geometry. Britain has
been involved from the outset in all elements of the campaign; broad political
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support, direct military involvement, military assistance, intelligence sharing,
co-operation on financial controls, collaboration in UN Security Council
(UNSC) diplomacy, co-ordination of national diplomatic efforts, development
of long-term geopolitical strategy (and capacity for co-ordinated action),
humanitarian and refugee policy, consultation on macroeconomic dimensions
and sundry work. Other countries are involved in a subset of these activities.
Moreover, the coalition is not merely led by the US but cannot be much influ-
enced by others precisely because it is of such varied and inconsistent participa-
tion. These realities mean that there has been no major change, despite what
some have suggested, in the instincts that animate the present US administra-
tion of G. W. Bush. Despite the latter’s decision to pay United Nations (UN)
dues and consult widely, US foreign policy has not embraced multilateral diplo-
macy in the traditional meaning of the phrase, nor found a new affection for
international treaties. Indeed, the anti-terrorist campaign shows that the US
has been adapting a more traditionalist view of international politics and taking
harsher judgements about the relevance to its own security of actual or pro-
posed international instruments and will be more, rather than less, vigorous
in ensuring that it is not constrained by them when it seeks to act in self-defence.
This could lead to a zero-sum struggle for power between the US and those that
could threaten its territory, allies, friends or interests. According to Daalder,
‘this is a view . . . that places military–security issues on the top of the US
foreign policy agenda and focuses on threats to security as the main rationale for
American engagement abroad’.48
At the level of scholarly debate, after the tragedy of 11 September, a stream
of analysts were quick to criticise Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis.49 Rather
emphatically, some went as far as to declare that history has only taken a break or
even that that was the end of the end of history! For his part, Fukuyama
responded by saying that such an unprecedented attack on thousands of civilian
lives constituted in itself a historical event, while pointing out that the way in
which he used the word ‘History’ in 1989 referred to the progress of humankind
toward modernity, namely the institutions of liberal democracy and capitalism,
in that it was difficult at the time to discern a viable alternative type of civilisation
that people wanted to live in after the demise of communism, monarchy, fascism
and the like. Such views were opposed by Huntington who, by dismissing the idea
of a single global system (or of world-wide progress toward it), pointed out that
the world was mired in a ‘clash of civilisations’, with several major groups,
defined in cultural terms, constituting the new fractures of world conflict.50 In
particular, although he admits to the emergence of non-state actors on the global
scene, holding however that nation-states will remain the most powerful actors
in world affairs, Huntington argued that conflict will continue to occur within
civilisations, but also that the most dangerous conflicts of all will occur on the
fault-lines between civilisations. His The Clash of Civilisations, however, may well
have raised the question of the cultural dimension of security, in that the ‘clash’
occurs along the lines of religiously inspired militancy against Western liberal
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values, but missed the underlying causes of Islamic resurgence itself, as it
was obsessed with the cultural symbols or the retrieval of collective historical
memories. A related criticism to his work was that, by rewriting Muslim history,
he failed to encourage intelligent dialogue between the two opposing cultures,
thus fostering fragmentation and prolonging historical stereotypes.
Fukuyama, on the other hand, sees the end of the Cold War as evidence of
the triumph of liberal democracy over any oppressive and/or authoritarian type
of regime: liberalism, in short, reigns triumphantly as the only remaining ideol-
ogy. While Fukuyama admits that certain internal conflicts exist within liberal-
ism, for instance, among classes, he dismisses these conflicts on the grounds that
they are manageable. Conflict is central to his view of the future of international
politics, its most important sources being ideological. Although he posits two
possible ideological challenges to liberalism – religion and nationalism – he dis-
misses the threat posed by religion by claiming that religion is ill-suited to the
realm of politics, suggesting at the same time that the liberal political process
may help to resolve nationalistic tensions. In both cases, Fukuyama’s faith in lib-
eralism is overly optimistic. Irrespective of whom of the two wins the argument
– and it is too early to even speculate on that – it is worth noting that, although
they both see religion as threatening either the so-called ‘Western civilisation’ or
for that matter ‘liberalism’ as its major constitutive feature, each seems to be
employing a rather different approach. More specifically, Huntington rejects
ideology and focuses on culture, while Fukuyama emphasises ideology. The fact
that these apparently different perspectives lead to similar insights is not coinci-
dental, as both theorists find religion as an inherently non-rational, pre-modern
phenomenon. Yet, the question persists: is there a distinction to be drawn
between, on the one hand, a generalised image of modernity based on an evo-
lutionary model projected by the West to the outside world and, on the other,
the way in which the institutions of modernity – formal and informal, political
and economic – are sufficiently enough developed or indeed well enough estab-
lished to be exported (at any rate of success) to non-Western polities? Be that as
it may, we claim that such a distinction is of relevance to developing a more pen-
etrating understanding of the form – or, better, forms – Western ‘domination’
currently takes in global politics, as well as to the very process of theorising,
albeit mostly at the normative level, whether or not Western-style liberalism has
reached a posthistorical stage. Before we bring this problématique to a close,
Fukuyama’s observations on the endurance of modernity post-11 September
2001, merit our attention:
We remain at the end of history because there is only one system that will continue
to dominate world politics, that of the liberal-democratic West. This does not imply
a world free of conflict, nor the disappearance of culture as a distinguishing charac-
teristic of societies . . . But the struggle we face is not the clash of several distinct
and equal cultures struggling amongst one another like the great powers of 19th-
century Europe. The clash consists of a series of rearguard actions from societies
whose traditional existence is indeed threatened by modernisation. The strength of
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the backlash reflects the severity of this threat. But time and resources are on the
side of modernity, and I see no lack of a will to prevail in the United States today.51
European national visions, preferences and strategies
In the framework already described, the process of systemic transformation
lends new salience to the factors outlined in this chapter. In the first place, the
notions of leadership and followership in EU–US relations, based on the learn-
ing of the past fifty years, demand redefinition if not reconstruction. Within
Europe, the leadership role in many areas seems at last partly to be falling to the
Union, either by default or by design. For example, in 1989 the US and the EU
were the major actors in establishing a co-ordinated Western response to the
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. The Western Economic Summit in
Paris in July 1990 agreed on a programme to aid Poland and Hungary, with the
Union acting as the chief co-ordinator. The European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) began operating in 1991, in part to service the pro-
gramme. The initial subscribed capital of the Bank was ECU 10 billion, borne
by thirty-nine nations plus the EU institutions. Just over half the Bank’s capital
was committed by the twelve EU nations (45 per cent) and the EU institutions
(6 per cent) combined. The US contribution was 10 per cent.52 The programme
was later extended to cover Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (prior to
German reunification), (former) Yugoslavia and Romania.
However, the overall picture of the Union’s role after the Cold War is much
more complex and challenging. The war in the former Yugoslavia revived visions
of a Europe racked by discord and ancient rivalries.53 For the Union, the conflict
exposed its lack of unity and will to act as a custodian of European security. The
important issue here is the fact that the Balkan conflict has sapped the Union’s
confidence and undermined its credibility, thus contributing to the crumbling of
popular support for the TEU, which was already diminishing as a result of the
economic recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The eventual ratification
of the Treaty did not repair the image of the Union as incapable of shouldering
the responsibility of acting as the principal stabiliser in a meta-communist Euro-
pean context. At the same time, the Union’s evolution and search for a role were,
and still are, burdened by the reality of a reunified Germany, which threatens the
tacit bargain that has been at the heart of European integration: Germany’s
acceptance of French political leadership in the Union, in return for a prepon-
derant voice on economic affairs. Germany was thus tied to the West through US
leadership on security matters within the NATO structure and French leadership
on political issues within the Union. In the 1990s, Germany was suddenly trans-
formed from a middle power contained in a variety of constraining structures
and institutions into a major player, given its new size, economic might and
geostrategic location in the new Europe. As Hoffmann asserts, ‘within the EC,
the relative equilibrium among the “big three” – France, the Federal Republic,
and Britain – has broken in Germany’s favor’.54
142 Theory and reform in the European Union
Mearsheimer argues that nationalism, German reunification and the likely
reduction of American involvement in Europe will lead to intensified political
rivalry and conflict among the major European powers, essentially as a result of
the persistence of anarchy and multipolarity.55 Yet, breaking out of this kind of
realist straitjacket, it should be noted that the existence of international institu-
tions shows that anarchy does not necessarily prevent co-operation.56 In the
absence of institutional stabilisers such as the Union and NATO, multipolarity
and nationalism could be fatal, as the First World War demonstrated. In a case
such as this, expectations play a crucial role. States and leaders will expect con-
flict and seek to protect themselves through self-help, and by seeking relative
gains the potential of conflict will increase. International institutions, however,
exist, in large measure, because they facilitate self-interested co-operation by
reducing uncertainty and, hence, by stabilising expectations.57 Post-unification
German policies, like those employed post-1945, are closely linked to interna-
tional institutions. A united Germany did not revert to old-fashioned nation-
state manoeuvring. Genscher regarded his ‘policy of responsibility’ as a practice
beyond the traditional balance of power politics.58 This does not imply that Ger-
many does not pursue what it perceives as its national interests (see the former
Yugoslavia), only that it demonstrates a clear preference for co-operation forg-
ing multilateral structures like the Union, WEU, NATO or the Organisation on
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The account of Anderson and
Goodman shows that the German post-Cold War strategies reflected the instru-
mental role of these institutions for a German policy that depended on reassur-
ing both adversaries and allies.59 As in the half-century since 1945, it is crucial
for Germany to remain a reliable partner, ready, willing and able to shoulder
responsibilities with its allies. To remain an influential partner Germany must
fulfil its international obligations. A strengthened multilateralism in the Euro-
pean security environment is of vital importance for Germany, which not only
has more neighbours than any other European nation, but lies on the dividing
line between the affluent West and the fledgling democracies in CEE. It was,
therefore, in Germany’s interest to promote both integration and ever closer co-
operation in NATO and the Union, while simultaneously stabilising Central and
Eastern Europe. Germany had a vital interest in keeping the US involved in
European security affairs through a transformed and reinvigorated NATO, and
a WEU organically linked to the former.
For France, the demise of the Cold War order provided a test for the valid-
ity of a set of assumptions and attitudes towards European security, which have
constituted the French security model for almost three decades.60 The French
reaction has been one of confusion and ambiguity. French policies have been
mostly dictated by immediate perceptions and concerns, particularly those
dealing with German reunification and its consequences. The most striking fea-
ture of these policies has been the French preference for deepening European
integration as the best response to new systemic challenges. The implicit motive
was that further integration would alleviate the risk of a hegemonic Germany.
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But faithful to its Gaullist tradition, French foreign policy has also attempted to
preserve a degree of independence. According to Hoffmann, ‘it is the difficult
combination of anxiety about Germany and worry about French independence
which explains the subtleties and contradictions of France’s European policy’.61
While the deepening of integration was seen by French elites as the best way to
restrain Germany’s ‘operational sovereignty’, the very same process was seen as
potentially leading to a situation in which Germany might dominate the insti-
tutions designed for its containment. The dilemma for French policy-makers
was over integration and independence. The idea of an ‘organic link’ between
the WEU and the Union as independent from NATO as possible, while allowing
space for the preservation of French military independence, proved impossible
to realise, and led to unsuccessful initiatives and inconsistent attitudes. It is
indicative of the French confusion and inconsistency that while the rhetoric
used had a strong federalist colouring, the proposals submitted in the IGCs of
1990/91 and 1996/97 were compatible with intergovernmental premises. French
policy thus allowed the US to rally Britain and Germany behind the reform of
NATO’s force structure, which was endorsed in June 1991. The British plan that
prevailed increased the role of the Europeans (minus France) within NATO,
especially through the creation of a rapid reaction force integrated in NATO’s
command structure.62 While the British position was consistent with the basic
principle of keeping the US involved in Europe, what kept Germany from
endorsing the French ‘vision’ over NATO was not only the stabilising role of the
Alliance in Europe as well as its attraction to Eastern European governments,
but also France’s own reluctance to abandon its autonomy for the construction
of a truly collective European security system.
For Britain, the most important objective in the post-Wall period has been
to preserve its ‘special relationship’ with the US. The view has been that NATO
is the best vehicle for the preservation of the US commitment to Europe, which
was viewed as essential to European security. Moreover, the continuation of US
involvement was seen by London as the best way to neutralise the threat that
German reunification presented to the European balance of power and, hence,
to Britain’s position. Britain perceived NATO as the conditio sine qua non of the
post-Cold War settlement. Britain insisted throughout the ‘2 plus 4’ negotia-
tions that a unified Germany would have to be a NATO member and that NATO
should remain the linchpin of European security. Throughout the Cold War,
British defence policy had become so integrated with NATO policy that it was
difficult to separate the two.63 In the mid-1990s, the British view started shifting
towards supporting moves to strengthen a European pillar in security and
defence. However, this did not signal a fundamental change in British attitudes.
For Britain:
NATO must remain the bedrock of Europe’s security and its capabilities should not
be duplicated. However, we also need a stronger WEU so that European countries
can take on their proper share of the burden and act effectively in situations in
which the US may not wish to be involved . . . We need to take high-level decisions
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of policy and military action involving Western European countries at summit level.
That would keep co-operation on an intergovernmental basis, and not on the basis
of Community competence.64
This seemingly new British approach has been the result of US reluctance to
become involved in issues that do not constitute vital American interests, and of
the need to work out ways that foreign policy decisions by the Fifteen can be
translated into defence action by the WEU. For Britain, this will not mean a
European army or for that matter duplication of NATO. As Douglas Hurd has
observed, ‘some things will not change. Defence against invasion – defence
of our vital interests: these are NATO’s essential tasks. But Europeans can and
must respond to other demands in Europe and beyond: peace keeping, crisis
management, humanitarian operations, sanctions enforcement.’65
The foregoing discussion shows that European national responses to the
end of the Cold War were conditioned by the highly institutionalised European
environment. Not only that, but European governments promoted ‘institution-
alisation’, albeit in different forms (adaptation, reform, consolidation, etc.).
This, however, does not mean that institutions have dictated policies. Rather,
they have been used to accommodate national interests and to promote national
power and policy preferences in well-known co-operative frameworks. It should
not escape our attention that national positions and policies reflect deeper
antitheses, which relate to fragile balances, national visions and external orien-
tations and interests, both within and outside the EU system. These antitheses
derive from the lack of homogeneity of geopolitical perspectives, differing con-
cepts or evaluations of external threat and differing national strategies. The
result has been a divergence among fundamental interests and, consequently,
the development of divergent national strategic orientations and foreign policy
preferences and approaches.
Entering into the security realm is not uncontroversial considering that the
Union for a long time professed to be a ‘civilian power’, lacking military might
and ambitions in the military sphere. The European political system on the ‘high
politics’ level is still fragmented into nation-state units, which, throughout its
history, either used intergovernmental co-operation with participation in the
Atlantic Alliance or developed bilateral co-operation, like France and Germany.
This means that the European countries have almost always had the will to inte-
grate trade and economic policies, but not to abandon their authority and auton-
omy in the vital areas of security and defence, which allow them to behave as
independently as possible in the international system. The European defence
system was built – at both collective and national levels – on the basis of an
‘Atlantic’ rather than a ‘European’ logic. The presence of the US in Europe
‘undermined’ the need for excessive defence armaments, thus eliminating the
systemic causes of past European conflicts. The historical significance of the US
presence lies in the fact that it contained the traditional competitive and con-
flictual tendencies in Europe as well as a developed network of Euro-American
Geopolitical imperatives of system change 145
institutions and processes, within which defence and security policies were inter-
nationalised. What should be clear is that American involvement and the Soviet
threat led to ‘Atlanticism’ rather than the ‘Europeanisation’ of defence. The reac-
tions of the major European powers to the tidal changes of the 1990s are testa-
ment to this thesis. The calls for a more autonomous European defence system
that could be subject to supranational processes should not ignore national
strategies and preferences. Successful implementation of the CFSP, as well as of a
common defence policy, will continue to depend, as the Amsterdam outcome
clearly showed, less on legal obligations and more on favourable political and
strategic variables and factors in the European regional and global arenas.
In that context, implementation of the decisions made at Maastricht and
Amsterdam could not only be painful but may actually dampen European for-
eign policy activism and threaten the whole acquis communautaire. Joint secu-
rity policies backed by military options are likely to be possible only when all the
member states’ interests are under threat. Alternatively, they might refuse to
comply with the agreed guidelines. Amsterdam revealed that a modern Euro-
pean strategy document is not easy to write, given the very different foreign
policy traditions of the different EU members and the uncertainty of the con-
temporary world. What treaty reforms have done in the 1990s is to identify
defence as essential to EU construction. In such a context, a common security
organisation becomes a means to a compelling political end. Given this, imper-
ative practical issues such as military planning, command structures, effective-
ness and efficiency are in danger of becoming subordinate considerations. This
is against all historical experience. The history of international relations since
the Greek–Persian Wars has showed that states band together to meet perceived
security threats; they do not forge defence structures to achieve a preconceived
political federation. The implementation of Amsterdam stands this logic on its
head. The accelerated move to create a more than intergovernmental defence
regime as an (implicit) precondition for eventual political union seems to
ignore the fact that no functional equivalent to US strategic leadership exists in
Europe, nor is one likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. Moreover, regimes
should not be viewed as progenitors of regional security communities that sup-
plant national governments. This outcome is highly improbable and might in
the end prove to be dangerous. If states perceive that regimes are being con-
structed around and under them, they are apt to withdraw their co-operation,
with adverse consequences for peace and stability in Europe. Instead, the
regime-building process should draw from states their common interests in
redefining the terms of an interstate security community in Europe, recognising
non-state actors as critical supports for the process.
Moreover, successful regime-building requires identification and definition
of the threat. NATO experience has shown that there is a linear relationship
between the internal cohesion of an alliance and the way in which members per-
ceive external threats and challenges. The nature of European interstate rela-
tions post-1989 has changed to such an extent that the definition of a specific
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and identifiable threat is very difficult. The Soviet threat has been replaced by a
complex of fluid and ‘secondary’ dangers: local or regional instability, civil and
identity-based conflicts, revisionist tendencies in the regional subsystems,
nuclear proliferation, and even potential resurrection of past dangers such as
nationalist groups and parties in Russia. Failure of EU members to define the
nature and character of post-Cold War threats could not only undermine
attempts to transform the CFSP into ‘defence policy’, but could endanger the
integration process in other fields. The evolution of the European security insti-
tutional map in the 1990s confirmed that the compelling task was not to create
structures that derive from member states’ compulsions to assuage anxieties
about the future, which will erode further the EU’s credibility in defence and
foreign policy by ignoring the heterogeneity of the European system, but to ren-
ovate the transatlantic security arrangements by shifting from a US-led system
to a multilateral and more EU-involved one. It should be noted once more that
‘institutionalisation’ was chosen as the principled European security policy: the
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures (CSBMs) agreements, the Paris Charter, the creation of the
North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), the strengthening of the Con-
ference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)/OSCE’s conflict pre-
vention and peacekeeping machinery, NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PfP)
initiative, together with the decisions taken in Berlin for a European Security
and Defence Identity (ESDI) and a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), and in
Madrid for NATO’s enlargement, have already laid the foundations of a new co-
operative security order in place. It is to these developments that we now turn,
in an attempt to yield some further insights into the institutional and political
evolution of European foreign, security and defence policy.
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Introduction
The European landscape is changing rapidly, not least owing to a series of
decisions taken in the second half of the 1990s. In June 1996, NATO’s foreign
ministers decided to adopt ESDI ‘within the Alliance’ and to develop the CJTF
concept. In May 1997, NATO and Russia agreed to establish a Joint Permanent
Council. In June 1997, EU leaders reached agreement on the AMT. In July 1997
in Madrid, NATO agreed on the admission of three new members (Poland, Hun-
gary and the Czech Republic), while the Commission published its Opinion on
CEE candidates and presented its Agenda 2000 report on the implications of
enlargement. In 1998 and 1999 the Union began accession negotiations with
twelve countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Malta. In December
1999, the Union also re-affirmed Turkey’s candidacy status although no negoti-
ations have begun owing to the long path towards democratisation that Turkey
must embark upon if it is to fulfil the political side of the Copenhagen Criteria.
Economically, in late 2000 and early 2001, Turkey experienced massive financial
crises which means that meeting the economic criteria also has a long way to go.
In December 2000, the Nice European Council meeting formalised rapid devel-
opments in European security and defence, by creating within the CFSP context
an ESDP with new institutional arrangements in Brussels and a planned Euro-
pean Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), which was declared ‘operational’ at the
Laeken European Council in December 2001. Apart from the Union and NATO,
institutions like the WEU and OSCE also experienced developments, including,
in the case of the WEU, its own demise. This chapter considers the institutional
responses to the geopolitical and geostrategic challenges of system change in the
fields of European foreign policy, security and defence. It looks at the four insti-
tutions which lie at the heart of the debate about European security after the
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Cold War: the Union, NATO, the WEU and (to a lesser extent) the OSCE. It
examines their development and analyses their interrelationship: what we
have learned to call the European ‘security architecture’. The final section of the
chapter deals with the issue of the Union’s role in world politics post-Cold War.
European foreign and security policy
This section presents a detailed analysis of European foreign and security policy
as it has emerged after nearly fifty years of efforts by the EC/EU, dating back to
the early 1950s with the European Defence Community (EDC) saga, and bring-
ing us up to the Amsterdam and Nice reforms of October 1997 and February
2001, respectively. Attention is given not only to the CFSP itself, but also to its
predecessor, EPC, which spanned nearly a quarter of a century (1970–93) before
it was replaced by the CFSP with the coming into force of the TEU. One needs
to stress a fundamental difference in the efforts at foreign and security policy co-
operation before and after the Cold War, as the latter offered (Western) Europe
two fundamentally different scenarios, one prior to, and one after, its demise.
The dominant view from 1947 until 1989 was one favouring integration in an
effort to protect the free Western side of Europe from succumbing to the com-
munist threat of the Soviet empire (accompanied by similar economic and
social efforts against the internal threat of communism, especially in France and
Italy). This created a ‘West versus East’ divide that coloured all integration
efforts in ‘high politics’ areas prior to 1989.
After 1989, the security challenge has become one of integrating the East
into the existing foreign and security structures of the West and, of course, of
adapting them to this new international environment. Whereas the first phase
was one of ‘exclusion’, the second, and current, phase is one of ‘inclusion’. The
implications are enormous for integration theory and practice as they address
totally different requirements. Pre-1989, defence meant that integration efforts
were geographically limited to Western Europe and best served in practice by
NATO thanks to American leadership and capabilities. Post-1989, we are facing
the prospect of a Continent-wide security and defence system that may or may
not include the US. That is to say, the European security agenda is now one of
creating an overarching architecture that would include all European states and
all the many institutions on the Continent dealing with international affairs (the
Union, WEU, NATO, OSCE, and the Council of Europe). In practical terms, this
means that the future of the CFSP/ESDP is clearly linked to the institutional
reforms required to render the Union more efficient as it enlarges. This became
visible in recent treaty reforms, where future changes to the number of Com-
missioners have been made dependent on a reweighting of votes in the Council.
Amsterdam, in particular, also extended the scope of QMV in the CFSP, making
it clear that treaty reforms would take into consideration not only the ‘old’ argu-
ment about the international interests and duties of the big states, but also the
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fact that Germany is now a fully fledged actor in international politics (as it is
now reunited, fully sovereign, and its Constitution is being re-interpreted to
allow for a more active international role, seeking a seat on the UN Security
Council) and that the Union could consist of nearly twenty-seven or so mem-
bers in the not-too-distant future.
All this has of course impacted on the very definition of what ‘Europe’
actually means. In other words, where will the borders of the current Union end
in the longer term? This question goes beyond the mere geographical definition
of the Continent and will undoubtedly have implications for what kind of
Union and what international role for the Union will ensue. The nature of
the EU political system has been discussed earlier in this book (Chapter 2),
whereas the question of what type of actor the Union is in international affairs
is covered later. Before dealing with this issue, however, one needs to assess the
impact of the initial debate on integration theory and developments in Euro-
pean foreign and security policy, as what is debated today is a continuation of a
much longer discussion.
The initial debate
The fundamental question of the first two decades of European integration, that
is, up to the mid-1960s, had two main dimensions: federalism versus intergov-
ernmentalism, and big versus small states. This particular debate first occurred
in the late 1940s and early 1950s and culminated in the EDC saga of 1950–54.1
Such a debate was then repeated in the slightly different environment of the
1960s with the Fouchet Plans. The latter period was dominated by Gaullism and
was part of a wider malaise which culminated in the first major institutional
crisis of the Community in 1965, which was resolved by the Luxembourg
Accords of January 1996. The same year, however, also witnessed the French
withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command.
The questions of West European economic reconstruction and collective
defence had been temporarily settled with the 1947 Marshall Plan (OEEC) and
the creation of NATO in 1949. The sheer dominance of the US in both organi-
sations meant that immediate concerns had been dealt with. But foreign and
defence co-operation, both in more general terms and with a view to deepening
integration, remained largely unanswered all the same. The setting up of the
Council of Europe in 1949 had shown the limits of European federalism but the
debate carried on with the creation of the ECSC and, more importantly for our
purposes, with the EDC, where a clearly federal defence structure had been pro-
posed by the Pléven Plan in 1950. Important to note here is that the EDC pro-
ject eventually failed in 1954, and with it the prospects for the establishment of
a European Political Community. The key feature of the debate at the time was,
in our view, the question of sovereignty, which brings in the British stance on
the matter but, crucially, adds the issue of how to balance the national interests
of big states with those of small(er) ones, preferably within a structured, insti-
tutionalised framework. The question of ‘efficiency versus accountability’,
154 Theory and reform in the European Union
which reappeared later and has dominated European foreign and security policy
since the 1970s, contained then a different dimension to the current debate,
which mainly deals with democracy (see below). The older debate amounted to
how much power big states should have in the aftermath of the Second World
War in general, and before (EDC) and after (the Fouchet Plans) the Suez débâ-
cle of 1956 in particular. More recently, however, and in part owing to the rela-
tive small size of most applicant states (either engaged in current accession
negotiations or future ones), this debate has re-emerged, even if one must note
that not only the international context – political and economic – is different,
but also the very nature of the Union itself.
All this had normative and descriptive implications for the kind of structure
the integration process would allow in the fields of foreign and defence policy,
with the federalists offering a supranational entity and the intergovernmentalists
adamantly opposing it. The main arguments in favour or against a federal struc-
ture have been described at some length elsewhere (see Chapter 1). All that needs
to be added here is that the federalists favoured a constitutional solution to all
the problems of European foreign policy and defence at a stroke. The federalisa-
tion of Western Europe would have automatically created a common foreign and
security policy with a common defence (European armed forces). In order to
make the whole process politically acceptable, the EDC would have been part of
the European Political Community tied to the EDC plan, comprising a common
government, Parliament, and so on; that is, a federal political union. At the other
end of the spectrum, the intergovernmentalists basically argued that the collec-
tive defence of Western Europe had been taken care of by the creation of NATO,
and that defence and foreign policy should remain within the exclusive remit of
national control and traditional military alliances. In terms of which EC states
favoured which alternative in the 1950s and 1960s, a distinction can be made
between, on the one hand, the federalists in Italy, (West) Germany, and the
Benelux countries, and, on the other, France and Britain (the latter initially
as a non-member and then as a potential member), which favoured a more
intergovernmentalist approach.
As no compromise could be found between the two extremes, partly
because of fundamental differences and partly because Britain refused to join
initially and then was prevented from joining by the French in 1963 and 1967,
no further progress was achieved in foreign and defence matters within a strictly
European framework. As a result, the continuing debate over the desirability
and feasibility of such a project was dominated by the French and were linked to
developments in their polity. Indeed, domestic changes in Paris altered the over-
all European landscape when the EDC plan was overturned by an unholy
alliance of Gaullists and communists in the Assemblée Nationale in 1954, and,
once the Fifth Republic had been established in 1958, de Gaulle dominated
European politics. As a non-member, Britain was not directly involved in the
debate and did not gain much credibility or sympathy by trying to undermine
the Community (the creation of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1960)
Institutional imperatives of system change 155
and by signing agreements with the US on military (including nuclear weapons)
and intelligence issues. Germany was geographically divided, politically
impaired at the international level (Basic Law and later WEU restrictions on
arms production and possession), and with a foreign presence on its soil (with
both divided Berlin and divided Germany as symbols of limited sovereignty).
All this meant a stalemate as far as European foreign and security policy was
concerned. Only bilateral intergovernmental efforts succeeded – most notably,
the Franco-German Treaty of 1963 – and NATO’s predominance remained
unchallenged, despite increasing problems with US foreign policy in South-East
Asia. However, the economic successes of the Community in general, and those
of the Customs Union and the Common Market in particular, meant that there
was an impact that extended well beyond the Community’s internal borders.
Accordingly, efforts to find a way of integrating and co-operating on the politi-
cal side of economic affairs did not go away, both internally (political union)
and externally (foreign affairs). Hence the setting up of EPC in 1970, following
the December 1969 Hague Summit.
From EPC to the CFSP and . . . the ESDP
The main foundations of European foreign policy co-operation were laid down
by the EPC framework following the 1970 Luxembourg Report, and were devel-
oped throughout its history with the 1973 Copenhagen Report, the 1981
London Report, and more recently with Title III of the SEA. We contrast here
EPC with the failed attempts of the 1950s and 1960s, and identify the reasons for
a different outcome and its implications for integration theory.
The main reason for the successful development of EPC was ironically that
the previous failures had shown the limits of supranationalism in ‘high politics’
areas central to national prerogatives and, ultimately, sovereign statehood. But
even successive Gaullist attempts at a more confederal, big-powers, Concert of
Europe-type arrangement had their own limitations. Those same failures, how-
ever, had also shown the existing resolve of smaller states to push ahead with
integration in all domains of policy action.2 The international environment had
also changed, with the consolidation of détente and the emergence of new lead-
ers in all key members of the Community and in Britain (Brandt, Pompidou,
Heath). All these changes at the domestic, European and international levels led
to the setting up of EPC in 1970 and the first enlargement of the Community in
1973. In fact, the new members actively participated in foreign policy discus-
sions even before they formally joined the EC/EPC framework.3
The principal reasons for EPC’s success can be attributed to its intergov-
ernmentalism, flexibility, pragmatism and its built-in room for adaptation. The
EPC arrangements also coincided with a stagnation phase in other areas (espe-
cially the economy following the oil crises of 1973 and 1979), and it can be
argued that, to paraphrase Taylor, such arrangements ‘saved’ the overall process
of integration by allowing intergovernmentalists to be seen as possible integra-
tionists for the first time.4 A similar case has been made more recently by
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Øhrgaard, arguing that there is clear ‘affirmative’ evidence that ‘integration can
occur in an intergovernmental setting’.5 But where this book parts company
from Øhrgaard is on his conclusion that Haas’ neofunctionalism must be
reassessed in that new light. Instead, we argue that confederal consociation
offers a better alternative (see below). Despite its limitations from a classical fed-
eralist prism,6 it was thanks to EPC that foreign policy co-operation was occur-
ring for the first time within an institutionalised framework, albeit distinct from
the Community’s and more flexible than it (no formal role for the Commission
and no jurisdiction for the ECJ). Moreover, one needs to link progress in foreign
policy with the enlargement process at the time, which was to include a leading
international country, Britain. Finally, while EPC showed that political leader-
ship had been reinstated as a key element in any integrative move (thus pre-
senting a setback for the automatic spillover thesis), it also confirmed that some
momentum does take place on its own and that the success of economic inte-
gration in the 1950s and 1960s meant that the Community had to develop new
ways of co-operation in foreign policy if it did not want to be only ‘an economic
giant but a political pygmy’.
The other important element of EPC was its impact on national foreign
ministries and diplomats. This is known in the literature as the ‘co-ordination
reflex’, in that any national foreign policy position has to cater for any impact it
would have on the foreign policies of other members and, by implication, on the
overall view of the Community. Whether an arrangement among all members
could be found in EPC made all the difference between a clear European line
(usually reinforcing the view of one – or more – state) and a diplomatic failure for
the Community as a whole. Of course, failure to get EPC support did not mean
the end of a national initiative, especially when it was made by a big state, but it
did have a negative effect overall and a less than constructive impact on the
emerging acquis politique, namely, EPC declarations, communiqués, and
démarches. All this was of particular importance to the credibility of EPC in the
latter part of its life, when more instruments were added to it, especially the use
of economic sanctions to back the rhetoric. Indeed, the lack of a common stance
meant a weakening of Europe’s position on a given international issue and a
return to more nationalistic positions. All this had a detrimental effect on inte-
gration, whether implicitly (the so-called ‘footnote states’ of the 1980s – Greece
and Denmark – were not seen as convinced integrationists in other fields either)
or explicitly (as was the case in the spring of 1982 when solidarity was seen as
greatly damaged by Britain’s insistence on obtaining political support in its efforts
to regain the Falkland Islands, whereas it did not reciprocate in the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) with its obstruction over agricultural prices).7
The overall impact of years of intergovernmental foreign policy-making
and the careful avoidance of defence matters (although the economic and polit-
ical aspects of security had been included in EPC as early as 1981) meant that
some progress on a European voice in the world was made (especially in the
CSCE, the Middle East and Central America), and an institutional structure had
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gradually developed, including European correspondents, COREU, emergency
procedure and working groups. But somewhat paradoxically, the limits of such
an exercise were also exposed: a distinctive structure with parallel foreign min-
isterial meetings, a limited role for the Commission and the EP, and no defence
dimension (see below). All this meant that in the run-up to the TEU, the new
arrangements had to go one step beyond the existing mechanism if they were
not to be seen as a total failure. But the lessons of the past had also been learned
and no supranational/federal jump was seriously envisaged either (as the col-
lapse of such an isolated effort by the Dutch Presidency as late as September
1991 had shown). This is clearly visible not only in the rather limited federalist
aspects of the CFSP (the Commission’s theoretical right to initiate debate and
policies, the possible use of QMV in the Council over the implementation of
Joint Actions, the possibility of using the Community budget for operational
and administrative expenditure), but also in the limited changes that Amster-
dam brought about in 1997 (see below).
In its most ambitious interpretation, the transition from EPC to the CFSP8
had four main objectives in mind,9 with the TEU itself largely approximating in
the end a ‘compromised structure’:
● to ‘integrate’ the various external policies of the Union by weakening con-
siderably, if not totally eliminating, the previously existing legal and de facto
dichotomy between Community affairs (trade and aid policies) and EPC
affairs (foreign policy);
● to facilitate the above by giving more powers to the Commission in what
remains, even with Maastricht, mainly an intergovernmental pillar;
● to facilitate the emergence of common EU actions in foreign and security
policy, by limiting the use of unanimity and of the national veto in the deci-
sion-making process;
● to move towards overcoming at long last the distinction between, on the
one hand, the economic and political aspects of European security, and on
the other, its military component (defence).
With regard to the dichotomy between Community and EPC affairs, some
progress can be found in the ‘temple structure’ of the TEU, although the
dichotomy persists between its supranational (EC) and intergovernmental
(CFSP and JHA) pillars. As for the Commission’s role in the CFSP, some
progress was made by the incorporation for the first time of a Commission right
of co-initiative in second-pillar issues, although no exclusive competence was
envisaged as is the case in the first pillar. The TEU deals with the third problem,
by distinguishing between principles and Common Positions (Art. J2) on the
one hand, and Joint Actions (Art. J3) on the other.10 In the former case, decisions
will still be taken by unanimity, but, once such decisions have been reached,
their implementation would, if all states agree, come under QMV. Also, Maas-
tricht adds a security–defence dimension to the Union, by allowing military
issues to be discussed for the first time, albeit within the second pillar and its
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newly declared ‘defence arm’, namely the WEU. As for the Amsterdam CFSP
revisions, there were rather limited overall, as the most important ones have
been postponed. There is little change, as the Commission remains a junior
partner. The so-called ‘Mr CFSP’ has now been named, and will be the Secretary
General of the Council. To what extent this will help the identification of a visi-
ble and clear centre for the CFSP remains unclear, as this development affects
the future structure of the Council Presidency, henceforth to consist of the cur-
rent and next Presidencies, plus the Commission (new troika), with the assis-
tance of ‘Mr CFSP’. Early signs since Solana was appointed to the post in
November 1999 pointed to increased tension with Patten, the (new) Commis-
sioner for External Relations. Since then, there have been many efforts by all
parties involved to try and play down this clash of prerogatives.
Some modifications have also been made regarding CFSP decision-making:
● ‘Common Strategies’ (a new concept) are to be defined by the European
Council.
● Decisions are to be implemented by the Foreign Ministers’ Council using
QMV if needed (for both Common Positions and Joint Actions which have
already been adopted). An ‘emergency brake’ is provided, allowing any
member to oppose the adoption of a decision for important and stated rea-
sons of national policy. In such cases, those members that wish the Union
to act could, if they represented a QMV, refer the matter to the European
Council for a decision by unanimity.
● ‘Constructive abstention’ is permitted and institutionalised. This could
reduce the risk of deadlock.
● A policy planning and early warning unit led by the High Representative for
the CFSP (with personnel drawn from the Council’s General Secretariat,
the member states, the Commission, and the WEU) is to be established in
order to provide policy assessments and more focused input into policy for-
mulation. The tasks of the unit include: monitoring and analysing develop-
ments in areas relevant to the CFSP; providing assessments of the Union’s
foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas on which the
CFSP could focus in the future; providing timely assessments and early
warning of events or situations which may have significant repercussions
for the Union’s foreign and security policy, including potential political
crises; and producing at the request of either the Council or the Presidency,
or its own initiative, argued policy options papers to be presented under the
responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation.
There is, however, no real progress on the CFSP budget, which has dogged rela-
tions with the EP over recent years.11 Some observers have argued that, as no
‘contamination’ has occurred, in the sense of an intergovernmentalisation of
existing communitarian practices, this is a success for integration.12 Such an
approach fails to take into account that the acquis politique, as is the case with
the acquis communautaire, is rarely reversed.
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In terms of defence matters, the Petersberg tasks of the WEU have been
inserted in the AMT and the word ‘progressive’ has replaced that of ‘eventual’ in
the framing of a common defence policy and common defence. Where there is,
however, great progress is after the December 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo
Declaration, which basically lays the foundations for a defence and military
dimension within the Union. In practice, it puts an end to the WEU versus
NATO debate on European defence, as the debate now is between the Union and
NATO. It is important to analyse how the Union managed to move thus far. A
number of WEU ‘rebirths’ in the early 1980s (over the ‘euromissiles’ and the
‘space war’ debates), and again in the early 1990s with Maastricht, but also over
the 1991 Gulf War and in the mid-1990s in the Adriatic Sea over a naval
embargo in the Balkans, had led many to believe that the future looked bright
for this organisation. But the WEU became obsolete in November 2000 when it
disbanded itself. After Saint-Malo, the Union had made major strides towards a
ESDP. The WEU could no longer serve its main purpose as the Union itself had
now become an alternative – in the long run – to NATO and national defence
policies. However, a number of WEU arrangements remained in force, such as
its Art. 5 provision, a shadow secretariat, and its Parliamentary Assembly (which
has taken the name of an interim assembly). Other institutions or agencies have
become, since 1 January 2002, EU agencies (the satellite centre in Torrejon, or
the Institute for Security Studies in Paris). The EU has also created three new
bodies to coordinate and develop the ESDP:
● a Political and Security Committee known as COPS (after its French
acronym) which consists of senior officials from the fifteen member states
based in their respective Permanent Representations. It deals with all
aspects of the CFSP including the ESDP;
● a Military Committee which consists of the national Chiefs of Staff or their
representatives;
● a Military Staff which provides military expertise and support to the ESDP.
These new structures came into action in an interim force in March 2000 and
were confirmed as permanent organs after the December 2000 Nice European
Council meeting. In addition, following the June 2000 Santa Maria de Feira
European Council meeting and the November 2000 Capabilities Commitment
Conference in Brussels, the foundation of the ERRF have been laid as follows:
Germany: 13,500 troops; 20 ships; 93 planes
Britain: 12,500 troops; 18 ships; 72 planes
France: 12,000 troops; 15 ships; 75 planes; Helios spy-planes
Spain: 6,000 troops; one ship unit including aircraft carrier; 40 planes
Italy: 6,000 troops
The Netherlands: 5,000 troops
Greece: 3,500 troops
Austria: 2,000 troops
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Finland: 2,000 troops





Denmark: no contribution owing to the Amsterdam opt-out.
There are many problems one must mention at this stage: the national defence
budgets have been falling dramatically in the past few years and it is only since
the 11 September 2001 events that there has been some reversal of this trend,
especially in the bigger countries. Several weaknesses have been identified with
regards to lift capacities and satellite guidance systems. It is, therefore, unclear
what impact the ERRF will have in the future. Moreover, the participation of
non-EU NATO members has created friction (especially with Turkey) and the
key issue will remain what relationship the ERRF will have with NATO (see also
below). It is unclear if recent developments will lead to an ‘autonomous’ EU
defence entity as the ‘Europeanists’ want (France, Belgium, Italy), or will instead
reinforce NATO as the ‘Atlanticists’ (Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal) would
prefer. But what is clear is that there are military officers working for the Union
in Brussels now, and not only for NATO.
As for any ‘lessons’ for theory, one should stress the fact that European inte-
gration is a multifaceted, multiform process, which marries intergovernmental
and federal arguments and processes. This is all the more so in the field of ‘high
politics’. A more ‘sophisticated’ approach, that of confederal consociation,
might be more relevant here, not least because it is better equipped to offer a
better explanation of why so much and no more integration has occurred in
Western Europe in general, and in EPC/CFSP matters in particular. It also offers
prescriptive views on the future development of an effective decision-making
system in EU foreign policy.
Confederal consociation and European foreign policy
The approach in question, as argued in Chapter 2, has been developed since the
early 1990s as an alternative to the rather sterile debate between intergovernmen-
talism and federalism (and all the variations in between). It has the double advan-
tage of describing the process of integration in the past and of suggesting its limits
in the future. As Church has summarised the confederal consociation thesis:
Through the segmentation of the European populations, governance is left in the
hands of a cartel of state elites in the Council of Ministers, with states securing their
interests via proportionality and mutual veto in bargaining . . . Chryssochoou has
built on this idea of Taylor (1993) to suggest that the fact that the EU is a Confed-
eral Consociation is a direct cause of its lack of democracy.13
In our view, confederal consociation offers a better explanation of the ‘hybrid-
ity’ of the Union, in that its ‘political constitution’ comprises federal, confederal
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and consociational principles and procedures (see Chapter 2), while bringing in
the additional question of democracy and foreign policy. The most important
dimension of this approach for the decision-making process in the CFSP is to
argue that the continued existence of the national veto and, hence, the need for
consensus, reinforces not only the democratic element in the CFSP/ESDP (by
respecting the wishes of the component national demoi as expressed through
their elected representatives) but is also the best guarantee for the emergence of
a truly common European foreign, security and, eventually, defence policy.14
Such a normative statement differs starkly from the traditional federal view on
foreign policy: instead of perceiving QMV as a panacea, confederal consociation
takes it as a side-show that can be useful only in lesser issues such as the practi-
cal implementation of policies agreed on the basis of unanimity or consensus.
The distinction between ‘unanimity’ and ‘consensus’ is important because it
shows that the use of the national veto can only be a weapon of last resort.
Within reasonable limits, the emergence of a true European identity should and
must include all views and not exclude any particular position, especially on
matters of vital national interest (which is by definition changing as it is largely
decided by the government of the day). This will be especially relevant after the
next enlargements.
Democracy and accountability in foreign and security policies are not seen
as mutually exclusive but rather as prerequisites for the emergence of a Euro-
pean identity in the world. But all this is in the future and will take time. For the
time being, the veto will remain for important matters of national sovereignty.
EU institutions such as the Commission and the EP will try to accelerate the
process towards a European demos, but there is no guarantee of success nor a
clear timetable. What it means in terms of practical arrangements in CFSP deci-
sion-making is that there will be some advances on federalist means such as
QMV in the implementation of Common Positions and Joint Actions, together
with vetoes where necessary. ‘Constructive abstention’ is further evidence of
progress in that direction, but the mere fact that abstention by one-third of EU
members is acknowledged as a restriction on its use reflects the continued
importance of intergovernmental practices. These restrictions fit quite well in
the confederal consociation model, and could not therefore be described as evi-
dence of obstinate and obsolete nationalism. It is hoped that the COPS and
CFSP planning cells will also be used as the ‘oil’ necessary for the wheels to work
more efficiently, but without undermining the importance of consensus.
In both theoretical and practical terms, there will be more of this multifac-
eted form of integration which, with or without the new fashionable name of
‘flexibility’, will produce progress in some areas and problems in others. In the
latter category one could mention the eventual merging/absorbing of the WEU
into the Union, especially now that ‘old’ neutrals and neutralists (Ireland and
Denmark) have found new allies in the 1995 members (Sweden, Finland and
Austria) and are bound to find even more diverging immediate security inter-
ests in the next newcomers as defined by the December 2001 Laeken European
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Council meeting (all twelve states currently engaged in accession negotiations,
except Bulgaria and Romania which have not been listed as joining by 2004,
mainly on economic grounds).
To a large extent, the initial debate of ‘small versus big states’ has now been
re-ignited. But as the international context (both world-wide and in Europe)
has been dramatically and fundamentally altered, solutions that have been
excluded in the past might now become more acceptable such as a European UN
Security Council (de facto or de jure, with or without Russia, with or without
the OSCE’s blessing) and the Contact Group (which includes France, the UK,
Germany and Russia) since the Bosnian phase of the Yugoslav crisis. Thus, good
examples of the possible future ‘turf wars’ already occurred in the immediate
aftermath of the 11 September events (see also Chapter 5), first on 19 October
2001 when a tripartite meeting between the French (Chirac/Jospin), the British
(Blair) and the Germans (Schröder) took place just prior to the Ghent European
Council meeting, and second on 5 November in London when another such
meeting (in the form of an informal dinner this time) was ‘gate-crashed’ as a
commentator put it, ‘by Berlusconi, Aznar, Solana, Verhofstadt and Kok’. All
these issues will be considered first during the European Convention (March
2002–March 2003) and second by the 2004 IGC, which had been announced in
Nice in December 2000 to soothe German criticisms and which was confirmed
by Laeken a year later. But let us now expand on the OSCE and NATO, whose
development has impacted heavily on the construction of the institutional map
of the European security and defence area. Discussion of the OSCE is brief and
reflects its relatively limited role.
The Conference/Organisation on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (C/OSCE)
The evolution of the C/OSCE did not progress as a kind of ‘grand design’ and
was not implemented according to plans for a new security architecture. The
transformation of the Helsinki Process was a response to acute needs and
requirements, representing a continuous process of institutionalisation and
adapting through manageable forms of creative development to the new politi-
cal and security environment. It is the one forum that brings together all of
Europe with the US and Canada, and its potential role is to provide a pan-Euro-
pean security framework. Recognised as a regional organisation under UN
Chapter VIII, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
function during the Cold War was ostensibly to bridge the European divide.
Although in practice it mirrored the divide instead of overcoming it, the CSCE
process did make important contributions to European security-building. The
CSCE came into being in 1975, with thirty-five states signing the Helsinki Final
Act, which comprised four sections or ‘baskets’. The first section concerned
security issues; the second, co-operation in economics; the third, humanitarian
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co-operation; and the final section included follow-up mechanisms. Although
not formally institutionalised, it established a process of diplomatic engage-
ments, conferences and reviews – the objective of the dialogue being to imple-
ment the Final Act.15 The proceedings of the second ‘follow-up’ Conference that
began in Madrid in 1980 were critically affected by the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981. The Madrid
sessions ended in 1983 with an agreement to convene specific working groups,
including one in Stockholm on CSBMs and Disarmament in Europe, known as
the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and another in Ottawa on human
rights. The latter failed to reach agreement, but Stockholm committed members
to accepting specified notification, observation and verification procedures for
military manoeuvres.16 The third ‘follow-up’ meeting in Vienna lasted from
November 1986 to January 1989. The Vienna talks secured agreement that
NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries would commence Conventional Stability
Talks (that led to the CFE) within the CSCE framework. The CSCE agreed to
take further the Stockholm Document on CSBMs, human rights (the Human
Dimension) and procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Negotia-
tions proceeded against the background of a changing European order that was
in turn to change the CSCE.17
The CSCE Summit in Paris in November 1990 adopted the Charter of Paris
for a New Europe. The Charter began the institutionalisation of the CSCE and
established five bodies. The CSCE Council was founded, consisting of foreign
ministers meeting (at least once) annually, supported by the Committee of
Senior Officials (CSO). A CSCE Secretariat was established in Prague, an Office
for Free Elections in Warsaw and a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna. The
Charter also called for CSCE summits of heads of state and government every
two years. The Charter, together with the conclusion of the CFE Treaty, marked
a new stage in European security. The CSCE was developed further in meetings
in Valletta, Moscow and Prague before the fourth ‘follow-up’ meeting in
Helsinki in July 1992. At Valletta in February 1991 a ‘mechanism’ was adopted
to settle disputes when the parties concerned were unable to resolve them by
negotiation. The mechanism is obligatory, in that it can be requested by a party
to a dispute, but its recommendations are not binding and even the initiating
phase can be overridden. The 1991 Moscow meeting completed the work of the
Conference on the Human Dimension, which commenced in Paris in 1989 and
was taken forward at Copenhagen in 1990. The Copenhagen Conference con-
cluded with a declaration guaranteeing the rights of citizens, committing gov-
ernments to ‘pluralistic democracy’, the rule of law and the protection of
national minorities. Minorities were to have the right to use their own language,
observe their own religion and follow an appropriate education. The Moscow
Conference went further and agreed that fact-finding teams could be sent to
investigate alleged human rights abuses, whether or not the state in question
agreed. The Prague Council in 1992 further developed CSCE institutions and
procedures. The Warsaw Office for Free Elections was renamed the Office for
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Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and was assigned the task
of overseeing the Human Dimension. The Prague Council confirmed the
Moscow concept of ‘consensus minus one’. Prague looked to enhance human
rights, democracy and law, and decided that the CSCE could take political and
peaceful action without the consent of the state concerned.18
The 1992 Helsinki Summit further institutionalised the CSCE, confirming
the Prague decisions and widening the role of the CSO. Within the latter, an Eco-
nomic Forum was created to review commitments under Basket II and with
regard to market details. The ODIHR was also enhanced to monitor the Human
Dimension and support the newly created High Commissioner on National
Minorities (HCNM), which was seen as an institution to act at the earliest possi-
ble stage to resolve tensions involving national minority issues that had not devel-
oped into conflicts. The Helsinki Summit further created another institution, the
Forum for Security Co-operation based in Vienna. It was entrusted with the
negotiation of conventional disarmament measures; the promotion of CSBMs;
and reducing the risk of conflict. The final innovation of the Summit was its
adoption of peacekeeping, defined in accord with the classical UN understand-
ing: a non-enforcement role, strict impartiality, and requiring the consent of all
parties involved. CSCE peacekeeping operations would not proceed without an
effective cease-fire in place and guarantees for the safety of personnel. Resources
and expertise were to be drawn from NATO, the EC, WEU or the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS). A more direct linkage to NATO was opposed by
France, and the CSCE was to turn to NATO on a case-by-case basis. The Helsinki
Document marked the transition of the CSCE from a forum for dialogue to an
operational structure. Since 1995, the new OSCE has defined its role in the Euro-
pean security architecture by concentrating on conflict prevention in a broad
sense: not only the immediate prevention of violent conflict but also long-term
peace-building. Early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management have
been identified as the institution’s main activities.19 Its involvement in conflict
prevention was closely linked to the Human Dimension and the protection of
minority rights. The HCNM has been involved in a number of cases, including
the plight of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia; the Hungarian minority in
Slovakia; the Slovak minority in Hungary; the Hungarian minority in Romania;
the Albanian minority in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the Greek
minority in Albania; and Ukraine–Crimean relations. Fact-finding missions were
dispatched and augmented with CSCE ‘good offices’ on the ground, which
sought, inter alia, to facilitate settlements in Moldova and Nagorno Karabakh.
At their Istanbul summit in November 1999, the leaders of the fifty-four
OSCE member states signed the Charter for European Security. The Charter
originated in the debate on developing a ‘Common and Comprehensive Security
Model for Europe for the 21st Century’ – launched in March 1995, largely to calm
Russian concerns about NATO’s eastward enlargement. The OSCE Charter for
European Security may not be revolutionary in nature but it should not be
regarded as a mere empty shell either. It reviews the new risks and challenges to
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European security in the post-Cold war strategic environment, reaffirms some
basic general principles and provides for the strengthening of the OSCE’s opera-
tional capacities in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict
rehabilitation. Finally, in the appended Platform for Co-operative Security, the
Chapter proposes a set of arrangements for closer ties and co-operation between
the OSCE and other international institutions, which, together with the opera-
tional guidelines for a more effective OSCE, are directly relevant to NATO’s new
role in Europe.20 The Charter also considers the operational capacities of the
OSCE from four different angles: field operations, peacekeeping operations,
police operations and the Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams
(REACT) concept. The latter is of importance. Originally forged by the US, the
REACT concept commits governments to develop at both national and OSCE
levels the capacity to set up teams with a wide range of civilian expertise that the
OSCE would be able to deploy in conflict prevention, crisis management and
post-conflict rehabilitation. The general assessment to be made here is that we
are witnessing an expansion of the operational role and capabilities of the OSCE.
There is no doubt that the OSCE did not, and does not, represent the often-
called-for ‘grand design’ for the European security architecture; nor is it, or will it
be in the foreseeable future, the central pillar of the European institutional struc-
ture. Perhaps its most important contribution in the new European security envi-
ronment is the political legitimacy it can bestow on instruments or policies of its
own, or of institutions like NATO.21 By virtue of its membership and decision-
making procedures, it can legitimise intervention aimed at ordering the European
region. It has also been important in establishing a comprehensive approach to
security, which includes human rights, economic and military dimensions at the
point when European security has become more complex and multifaceted. Also,
the OSCE can be conducive to the management of interregional and transre-
gional relations by providing links to the emerging macro-regions of the world,
and thus helping to shape an open regionalism, which may be of utmost impor-
tance for the future stability of the international system. However, the OSCE is a
long way from becoming a security framework within which other organisations
perform subfunctions delegated from above. Its weaknesses are its decision-
making procedure and the mobilisation of consensus as well as the absence of an
enforcement capability. In the field of the normative consensus, the OSCE has to
be regarded, to a very large extent, as a forum of symbolic politics. Indeed, one
can rightfully argue that the OSCE is basically not so much a community of
values, but a quasi-legal community based on the principles of recognition of the
given status quo and the commitment to peaceful change.22
NATO’s rationale in the new European security environment
The evolution of NATO throughout the 1990s is a remarkable tale of survival
and development in adverse conditions.23 This section considers the institutional
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and strategic response of the Alliance to the geopolitical and security challenges
of system change. Both NATO’s origins and Cold War history are well known.
What catalysed NATO was a strong desire to link Europe and the US (and
Canada) in response to the Soviet threat. NATO mollified European concerns
about a German threat; contributed to a greater sense of West European unity
and security; and provided a mechanism for the US to participate in European
economic and military reconstruction.
Following the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO, the
pattern of West European security and co-operation was clarified. With the
exception of the crisis surrounding French membership in 1966, the basic ratio-
nale of the Alliance was set. The 1967 Harmel Report recommended that NATO
co-ordinate a multilateral approach to bridging gaps between East and West,
commit the major powers to full consultation with NATO allies on German
reunification, overcome the division of Germany and foster European security,
and co-ordinate and consult on arms control and mutual and balanced force
reductions between East and West. The Report found that the Alliance had two
main functions: ‘Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and
political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend
the territory of member countries from aggression should it occur.’ The second
function is ‘to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship
in which the underlying political issues can be solved.’24 In May 1989, the
Alliance’s Comprehensive Concept confirmed the continuing validity of the
Harmel Report’s objectives.
From 1954 the Alliance looked to nuclear deterrence as the basis of its
defence to offset conventional inferiority in Europe. The Soviet acquisition of
nuclear forces introduced problems concerning the credibility of American
extended deterrence that were to plague NATO throughout the Cold War. By the
late 1950s, the ultimate deterrent – i.e., the principle of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD), which threatened massive retaliation by US nuclear forces
in the event of a Soviet attack – was undermined by a fundamental challenge to
collective defence. Would the US risk its own security now that the Soviet Union
could threaten American soil? With nuclear parity emerging between the two
superpowers, the concept of MAD actually increased the potential for a lower-
level conventional attack in Europe, were the Soviet Union to test the US resolve
to defend Western Europe. Indeed, the turbulent strategic environment tested
the credibility of NATO’s collective defence function and contributed to France’s
withdrawal from the integrated military command in 1966. Nevertheless, in the
years that followed, the basic rationale of collective defence prevailed in the
Atlantic Pact.25
The impact of détente did not change NATO’s original rationale, not least
because the emergence of strategic parity between the superpowers did not alter
the European order. NATO did commit itself to the pursuit of European détente,
albeit in addition to its military defence role. Ironically NATO strategy was crit-
icised more as East–West relations deteriorated in the late 1970s. Public protest,
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parliamentary attention and the rebirth of the peace movement followed the
(abortive) neutron bomb decision and the 1979 decision to deploy Cruise and
Pershing II missiles. NATO came under a new public scrutiny in Western
Europe. The Alliance had to defend its role and convince public opinion of its
rationale. As European doubts and criticisms mounted, Congressional concerns
regarding burden sharing were underlined. The INF Treaty of 1987 resolved the
immediate issues in dispute but not the wider problems of the European balance
of power.26 The North Atlantic Council (NAC) continued to place its belief in the
central importance of nuclear weapons. In its Brussels Declaration of 1988,
NAC saw no alternative to a strategy of ‘deterrence based upon an appropriate
mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces’.27 To that end,
NAC further reasserted the importance of the American commitment to
Europe. The Declaration asserted that ‘the presence in Europe of the conven-
tional and nuclear forces of the United States provides the essential linkage with
the United States strategic deterrent . . . this presence must and will be main-
tained’. The Council identified the major imbalance of conventional forces in
Europe as its central security concern. The Soviet Union and its allies enjoyed a
clear advantage in numbers of key offensive systems, including main battle
tanks, artillery and armoured troop carriers. NATO welcomed the signs of
change in the policies of the Soviet Union following Gorbachev’s leadership but
‘witnessed no relaxation of the military effort pursued for years by the Soviet
Union’. Indeed, in 1989, while NAC recognised the dramatic political changes in
Eastern and Central Europe, it continued to stress its strategy of deterrence.
Throughout the postwar years, as NATO’s membership, organisational struc-
ture and list of responsibilities grew, two essential facts remained constant:
NATO focused on the Soviet threat, and it performed both military and non-
military functions for its members. Athough the degree of threat varied over
time, for the Alliance the threat always was present.
The end of the Cold War and pace of change in the European order was,
however, spectacular and it fundamentally challenged NATO’s rationale and
raison d’être. The Alliance responded by attempting to adapt to the new security
environment, stressing its political role and reorienting its approach to issues of
military doctrine, sufficiency and readiness. The process of change in the Alliance
began in 1990. It was a process that would eventually result in significant reduc-
tions in funding and force levels for NATO’s conventional and nuclear forces.
Joint weapons programmes, annual military exercises, readiness, nuclear alert
status and training have all been sharply reduced. In May 1990, NATO’s Military
Committee announced that it no longer considered the Warsaw Pact a threat to
the alliance, which instead looked to ‘seize the historic opportunities resulting
from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in
Europe’. The member states declared NATO as one of the principal architects of
change in the new Europe and identified the need for adaptation. To that end,
intra-Alliance co-operation, political consultation and co-ordination were
underlined. The conclusion was that ‘although the prevention of war will always
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remain (NATO’s) fundamental task, the changing European environment now
requires . . . a broader approach to security based as much on constructive peace
building as on peace-keeping’.28
The London Declaration of the NATO Heads of State and Government in
July 1990 confirmed that the Alliance ‘must and will adapt’.29 The Declaration
stressed the continued institutional task of collective defence, acknowledging,
however, that challenges to that mission had been radically transformed: ‘secu-
rity and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to
enhance the political component of our Alliance.’ Member states sought a new
relationship with their former adversaries in Eastern Europe, thus inviting the
Warsaw Pact powers to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. The
Declaration also envisaged changes in NATO’s force structure as the CFE Treaty
was implemented and Soviet troops left Eastern Europe. Strategy would change
with the creation of true multinational units, moving away from the geograph-
ically based area defences of the past.30
A new Allied military strategy was to be prepared, which would move away
from forward defence and modify ‘flexible response’ to reflect a reduced reliance
on nuclear weapons. In June 1991, NATO began to define its ‘Partnership with
the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe’. NATO declared that it did ‘not
wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the Continent’, but to
seek ‘an architecture for the new Europe that is firmly based on the principles
and promises of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris’. The Alliance
supported the adoption of democratic reforms and market economies in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. It further identified a set of initiatives to develop its
security partnership with its former enemies, including exchange of informa-
tion and ideas on security policy; military doctrine and arms control; contact
between senior military authorities and widening participation in Alliance
activities, including scientific and environmental programmes.31 NATO also
began to recognise the emergence of a new European security architecture. NAC
accepted that security in the new Europe had various dimensions – economic,
political, ecological and defence – and found that the ‘Alliance, the EC, the
WEU, the CSCE and the Council of Europe are key institutions in this endeav-
our’. The Council believed that a transformed Alliance was an essential element
in the new architecture, for an ‘important basis for this transformation is the
agreement of all Allies to enhance the role and responsibility of the European
members’. The Council welcomed ‘efforts further to strengthen the security
dimension in the process of European integration and recognise the significance
of the progress made by countries of the European Community towards the goal
of political union, including the development of a common foreign and security
policy’.32 At the same time, it looked to the development of a European security
identity to strengthen the European pillar within the Alliance. For the Council,
such a process would ‘underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a
greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce
transatlantic solidarity’. While the Council accepted that institutions such as the
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EC, WEU and CSCE have ‘roles to play in accordance with their respective
responsibilities and purposes’, the ‘extent of its membership and of its capabili-
ties gives NATO a particular position’. Thus, the Alliance asserted its ‘particular’
role, by identifying four core security functions it would perform in the new
Europe:33
● to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security envi-
ronment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and
commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country
would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose
hegemony through the threat or use of force;
● to serve, as provided for in Art. 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transat-
lantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital
interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ secu-
rity, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common
concern;
● to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of
any NATO member state;
● to preserve the strategic balance within Europe.
Although the above represents classic communiqué language with nothing
but platitudes, it meant that NATO was now seeking to anchor its position in
the new European order and establish the complementary nature of other secu-
rity institutions. In the words of Wörner, ‘our future European architecture will
rest on a system of different organisations, sometimes overlapping, but inter-
locking and, albeit with a different focus, complementary’. Accordingly, the chal-
lenge for NATO was to secure this relationship when, as Wörner recognised, ‘all
European institutions – the European Community, CSCE, Council of Europe
and Western European Union – are equally in a phase of renewal and redefini-
tion’.34 Decisions taken (especially) in the second half of the 1990s advanced
further the pace of change in the European security landscape. In June 1996,
NATO’s foreign ministers decided to adopt a European Security and Defence
Identity (ESDI) ‘within the Alliance’ and to develop the Combined Joint Task
Force (CJTF) concept. In May 1997, NATO and Russia agreed to establish a Joint
Permanent Council. In June 1997, the EU completed the IGC and concluded the
AMT. In July 1997 in Madrid, NATO agreed on the admission of three new
members, and in April 1999, the Alliance adopted its Strategic Concept, while
engaging in military action (Kosovo) for the first time in its fifty-year history.
Almost at the same time, EU member states embarked upon their most serious
attempt to ‘Europeanise’ security and defence, with a process starting at Saint-
Malo and culminating in the decisions at the Nice Summit in December 2000.
The new strategic concept
Against this background, NATO’s new Strategic Concept announced in Rome in
November 1991 marked another turning point, as did the adoption of its first
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new military policy document in almost twenty years, the MC400 document. It
was a major step towards the redefinition of the Alliance’s role in the new
Europe. The Council accepted that the end of the East–West confrontation had
greatly reduced the risk of major conflict and that the notion of a ‘predominant
threat’ had given way to ‘risks’. The Strategic Concept found that risks to Allied
security were less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory
of NATO members than from ‘the adverse consequences of instabilities that may
arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties including ethnic
rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central
and eastern Europe’. The Concept reaffirmed the four core functions of the
Alliance declared in June 1991 and went further in a new broad approach to
security. Security was seen to have political, economic, social, environmental,
and defence dimensions. Allied security was now to adopt three mutually rein-
forcing elements: dialogue, co-operation and the maintenance of a collective
defence capability.
In that context, the Concept stressed the new political approach and under-
standing of security in Europe. The Alliance recognised that the prevention of
war in the post-Cold War European setting ‘depends even more than in the past
on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and the successful management of
crises’. Under the new strategic circumstances, the Alliance planned to resolve
crises at an early stage. It was recognised that this required a coherent strategy,
which would co-ordinate a variety of conflict management measures. At the
same time, it was anticipated that such a strategy would in turn require close
control from the Alliance’s political authorities. In June 1992, NATO announced
it was willing to support, on a case-by-case basis, peacekeeping under the aus-
pices of the CSCE, while in December 1992, it pledged to support peacekeeping
under UNSC authorisation.
The Strategic Concept finally underlined the importance of collective
defence. The Alliance will maintain an adequate military capability and a clear
preparedness to act collectively in the common defence. A commitment was
made to retain a mixture of nuclear and conventional forces, though at a much
reduced level than in the past. NATO forces are, however, to be adapted to their
new strategic roles. The overall size and readiness of forces was to be reduced.
The maintenance of a linear defence in the Central European region was to be
ended. The Strategic Concept stressed flexibility, mobility and an assured capa-
bility for augmentation. NATO forces are to be capable of responding to a wide
variety of challenges and are to consist of rapid reaction and main defence com-
ponents. The key element was that NATO forces should be able to ‘respond flex-
ibly to a wide range of possible contingencies’. The new strategic environment
was seen to facilitate a significant reduction in substrategic nuclear forces, which
were seen, however, as an important link with strategic nuclear forces, in par-
ticular American ones, which serve as the ‘supreme guarantee’ of Allied security.
The adoption of the Strategic Concept marked NATO’s transition to the
new European security environment, by reaffirming its security role and
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implementing the new broad approach to strategy. In the immediate post-Cold
War era, NATO retained its position as the primary forum for security in the
new architecture. The revived WEU complemented NATO’s institutional devel-
opment in this period. As p. 00 shows, WEU served to bridge NATO–EU rela-
tions and to resolve for the foreseeable future the tension between a European
defence and security identity based upon the EU/WEU and the transatlantic
basis that NATO provides. A second feature of the new security architecture was
the overlap of security in terms of its broader political interpretation. The broad
approach to security adopted by NATO in its New Strategic Concept was
reflected in the response of other institutions to the changing European order.
Preventive diplomacy, crisis management and peacekeeping are themes shared
by NATO, the WEU, the Union and the OSCE. The latter had some recognition
as the overarching organisation but was, and still is, a considerable distance
from being Europe’s security institution par excellence. Aspects of the OSCE role
can also be seen in the EU’s promotion of a European Stability Pact and the work
of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC). While the lack of institu-
tional definition within the new architecture was understandable, co-ordination
remained imperative, and so was the need for a coherent and cohesive manage-
ment of responses to crises, by implementing the broader political aspects of
strategy in the new Europe. That was a challenge not just for the Alliance itself,
but for the role and relationship of the ‘interlocking institutions’.
Consolidating adaptation
With a mandate from the Alliance’s Heads of State and Government, and in
accordance with the terms of reference endorsed by NATO Foreign and Defence
Ministers in December 1997, NATO’s Policy Co-ordination Group (PCG) started
examining the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept with a view to updating it ‘as
necessary’. This process ended on 23–24 April 1999, with the approval by the
Washington Summit of the new and by now forward-looking Strategic Concept.
The latter was clearly the result of the consolidation of the strategic environment
of the 1990s, the decisions taken at both national and international levels and the
challenges that NATO had to face, mainly in Southeastern Europe throughout
the decade. This new Strategic Concept was to guide the Alliance as it pursued
this agenda. With this document, NATO stressed its role in consolidating and
preserving the changes of the 1990s, and in meeting current and future security
challenges. It clearly indicated a demanding agenda, in which NATO had to ‘safe-
guard common security interests in an environment of further, often unpre-
dictable change. It must maintain collective defence and reinforce the
transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume
greater responsibility. It must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare
for the accession of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will
and the military means required by the entire range of its missions.’35
In terms of threat perception, para. 24 represents an expansive list, which is
directly linked with the new evolving security paradigm, by taking account of
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the post-Cold War global context, and by emphasising that Alliance security
interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including uncontrolled
population mass movement, international terrorism, sabotage, international
organised crime and the disruption of the flow of vital resources. Moreover,
para. 20 indicates that NATO security remains subject to a wide variety of both
military as well as non-military risks, which are multidirectional in nature and
often difficult to predict. Such risks include uncertainty and instability in an
around the Euro-Atlantic area, and the possibility of regional crises at its periph-
ery, which could, para. 20 stresses, evolve rapidly. In short, both the definition
of the risks and their geographic scope have been considerably expanded, while
there is a growing recognition that most challenges are not likely to involve a
direct military threat to NATO territory. Rather, they will involve non-Art. 5
‘crisis response’ operations.36 The new Strategic Concept reflected this changed
balance between collective defence and crisis response. NATO forces must be
able to carry out a full range of missions as well as to contribute to conflict pre-
vention and non-Art. 5 contigencies (para. 41). Thus, it laid the conceptual
groundwork for the restructuring of NATO forces with the view to enhancing
their power-projection capabilities. Particular emphasis was placed on deploya-
bility, mobility, and survivability of forces, together with their ability to operate
‘out of area’ (paras 53b and 53d). Improvements in these areas have been the
main focus of the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), also approved at the
Washington Summit, which aims, in addition to enhancing the Alliance’s
power-projection capability, to increase interoperability.37
Another key issue that attracted attention before the Washington Summit
was ‘the mandate question’ – i.e., whether NATO can take military action in
non-self-defence situations, without the authorisation of the UN Security
Council, as it did over Kosovo. The issue of the appropriate mandate did not
arise until October 1998, when NATO threatened to use air power in Kosovo. In
Bosnia, NATO entered by invitation. An Art. 5 mission would be covered by Art.
51 of the UN Charter, which provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain inter-
national peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of these
rights of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
The European views, strongly supported by Russia, were that non-Art. 5
missions must always be authorised by the UN Security Council. The US and the
British rejected this view, basing their argument on the evolving principles of
humanitarian law and the danger of large-scale humanitarian catastrophe
in the case of Kosovo,38 and more generally on the legal principles in the UN
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Charter regarding the maintenance of international peace and security.39 The
practical issue in the minds of US policy-makers has been the risk that a non-Art.
5 action could be vetoed in the UNSC by Russia or China. The view in Washing-
ton is that NATO members cannot allow their chosen course of action in a peace-
support crisis to be blocked by a non-member. Many of the allies nevertheless
do believe that it is necessary for future non-Art. 5 crisis management and peace-
support operations to be based on a sound international legal framework.
The solution found at the Washington Summit was more indirect than
expected,40 and confirmed the trend – a result of the Kosovo war – towards seeing
certain humanitarian and legal norms inescapably bound up with conceptions
of national interest.41 The Concept very briefly stressed that the UNSC ‘has the
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security
and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the
Euro-Atlantic area’ (para. 15). The absence of a direct reference to a mandate has
been interpreted as a rejection of legally generated or self-imposed political
limits. The criteria, thus, are whether there is a ‘threat’ – though defined very
widely – to the Euro-Atlantic area. For many, it was highly problematic that there
was no attempt towards formulating more general rules in a possible emerging
legality of humanitarian intervention, thus sending a signal to China and Russia
that NATO has not given itself the right to attack sovereign nations at whim, even
when there is strong moral justification.42 Apart from the norms and thresholds
of intervention, all the above, as well as several other issues addressed in the new
Strategic Concept, clearly reveal the dominant trend in NATO: from defence of
territory to defence of interests and values. In this context, the issue of roles and
distribution of responsibilities within the Alliance acquired greater salience,
especially after the renewed effort on the part of the Union to proceed to a more
defence- and security-oriented institutional structure.
WEU and ESDI
NATO’s evolving role in security management has not only emerged from the
necessity of utilising its integrated military command structure, but also as a
result of the policy adjustment of its members to the new security paradigm.
Since 1991, the Alliance has been adjusting its force structures to acquire higher
levels of flexibility and mobility with multinational formations. The product of
this process has been the development of ESDI within the Alliance. The aim was
to respond to the old/new debate on ‘burden-sharing’ and distribution of
labour, by increasing the capabilities of the European Allies in crisis manage-
ment operations, where the US may allow the use of NATO assets, but might not
wish to be the leader.43 The ESDI concept means a greater European capacity for
autonomous military action, in part thanks to deeper political cohesion.44 But
the ESDI concept is not linked to a single institutional framework. Multiple
organisations and efforts are involved, including bilateral initiatives (notably
Franco-German and Franco-British co-operative frameworks) and trilateral
endeavours (for instance, those involving French, Italian and Spanish forces in
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joint exercises and training). EU members engaged in a limited foreign and
security policy co-operation from the early 1970s (with the EPC format), and by
the late 1980s they were actively considering a more explicit engagement in
defence matters, by utilising the WEU framework.45 Actually, it was the French
that launched the idea of an – autonomous from NATO – ESDI back in 1991, by
attempting to establish an organic link between the Union and the WEU in the
Maastricht Treaty.
The WEU, like NATO, did undergo a major transformation during the
1990s, until the decision by the Union to absorb it at the Cologne European
Council in June 1999. During the Cold War, WEU military functions were
largely eclipsed by NATO. The development of EPC in the early 1970s also over-
took the WEU’s political functions. The WEU lost a further role when Britain
joined the Community and no longer needed a ‘bridge’ to the Six. It was not
until the mid-1980s that the WEU was reborn, when France and West Germany
looked to it to provide a forum for strategic discussion. The context was the
launch of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and the Intermediate-range
Nuclear Force (INF) crisis in Europe. France sought a ‘Europeanisation’ of secu-
rity policy without the price of reintegration into the military command struc-
ture of NATO and Bonn aimed to increase public support for Europe’s role in
Western security policy.46 Arguably, the major cause underlying these develop-
ments was Europe’s need to have a more unified voice in defence matters in
order to overcome the inertia of not being able to contribute to security and
defence decisions reached in Washington.47
In October 1984 the foreign and defence ministers of the WEU convened
an extraordinary session in Rome, underlying their determination to make
better use of the WEU framework in order to increase co-operation between
the member states in the field of security policy. The belief was that a ‘better
utilisation of the WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western
Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the coun-
tries of the Atlantic Alliance’.48 Furthermore, the Rome Declaration led to
institutional reform, with the WEU Council henceforth meeting twice a year
and the work of the Permanent Council being intensified. Institutional change
continued in 1985 with the WEU Bonn agreement to establish three new agen-
cies to study arms control and disarmament, security and defence questions
and co-operation in the field of armaments.49 The potential role of the WEU
in European integration was also identified in the 1987 Luxembourg and
Hague Council meetings. In The Hague, the commitment ‘to build a Euro-
pean Union in accordance with the Single European Act’ was recalled, and it
was declared that ‘the construction of an integrated Europe will remain
incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence’.50 But the WEU
remained committed to NATO, recognising that, under the (then) military
balance in Europe, ‘the security of the Western European countries can only
be ensured in close association with our North American allies’. WEU mem-
bers looked to a more integrated Europe to further their role in the Atlantic
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Alliance and the European pillar, so that a more balanced partnership would
emerge with the US.51
A further impetus to the development of the WEU was provided by crises
in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1987 and 1988 during
the Iran–Iraq war, the WEU co-ordinated the member states’ responses to the
threat posed by mines in the Gulf. While co-operation in the naval clearance
operation was not perfect, the WEU established a three-tier co-ordination
framework comprising high-level consultation, involving political and military
experts from foreign and defence ministries; meetings of officers serving as
contact points within admiralties; and regular contacts between task force
commanders on the spot.52 A similar framework was established in 1990 to co-
ordinate the WEU member states’ implementation of UN Security Council
resolutions. The WEU Ministerial Meeting on 21 August 1990 sought the most
effective co-ordination in capitals and in the region, including areas of opera-
tion, sharing of tasks, logistical support and exchange of intelligence.53 While
NATO proved to be an important forum, its foreign ministers decided on 10
August 1990 not to proceed with military co-ordination under the integrated
command structure. Each member of the Alliance was to contribute in its own
way to the Gulf operation, although an attack on Turkey would invoke Art. 5.
Thus the WEU had a clear field to provide ‘out-of-area’ co-ordination. Its role
pertained largely to the naval embargo, and the US took effective command of
fighting the land war.54
The Union, in contrast to the WEU, did not prove to be an effective body
for the co-ordination of policy towards Iraq. Although it supported UN sanc-
tions, froze Iraqi assets and suspended co-operation with Iraq, divergences in
the Union emerged as the likelihood of military action increased. It was against
this background and in the context of the emergent new European order that the
role of the WEU in general, and particularly its relationship with the Union,
emerged as important policy issues in the context of the IGC 1990/91. A number
of different national positions regarding security policy were also presented at
the IGC. More specifically, France and Germany envisaged a decisive move
towards common defence and proposed the integration of the WEU into the
Union. The US responded to the Franco-German initiative by insisting that all
decisions to commit an ESDI to out-of-area activity involve consultation with
Washington. Moreover, the US signalled its strong opposition to the prospect of
a WEU integrated command structure duplicating that of NATO, as well as to
any ‘backdoor’ security commitment to Central and Eastern Europe via WEU
enlargement that implicitly extended the US commitment to NATO.55
In an attempt to reach a compromise, a joint British–Italian declaration pro-
posed that the WEU should act as both the defence component of the Union and
the European pillar of NATO. In contrast, the final Franco-German declaration
envisaged the WEU as an integral part of the Union and identified a joint mili-
tary force, which could form the basis of a Euro-Corps. The latter was a clear
rebuttal of Anglo-Italian plans for a WEU force to act ‘outside of area’ and the
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NATO Rapid Reaction Corps for Allied Command Europe under British com-
mand.56 The final settlement left defence as a possible area of future development
for the Union. Contrary to the desires of France and Germany, the WEU was not
brought within the Union but was made an organisation that could be called
upon by EU members to act on their behalf. The European Council was accorded
ill-defined powers to ‘request the Western European Union . . . to elaborate and
implement discussions and actions of the Union which have defence implica-
tions’ (Art. J4.2 TEU). Therefore, the WEU was not subordinated to the Union,
but rather saw itself as ‘the defence component of the European Union and as a
means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance’. At Maastricht,
the nine-strong WEU (Spain and Portugal joined in 1990; Greece in 1992; Den-
mark and Ireland became observers in 1992; and Iceland, Norway and Turkey
associate members) identified measures to develop closer relationships with both
the Union and NATO. The WEU envisaged harmonisation of meetings and
venues with the Union and close co-operation between the decision-making
bodies and secretariats of both organisations. With reference to NATO, the WEU
pledged to strengthen working links and the role, responsibilities and contribu-
tions of its member states within the Atlantic Alliance. This was to be undertaken
‘on the basis of the necessary transparency and complementarily between the
emerging European Security and Defence Identity and the Alliance’.57 The WEU
moreover committed itself to act in conformity with positions adopted by NATO,
while it adopted a series of commitments to enhance its operational identity. A
call was made for a planning cell, closer military co-operation, meetings of
Chiefs of Staff and military units answerable to the WEU. The WEU Council and
Secretariat were transferred from London to Brussels, and other EU members
were invited to join.
The outcome of the Maastricht Treaty was an effective compromise giving
the WEU a pivotal role in the new European security architecture. At the same
time, it reflected the limit to which the British were prepared to go. Europe’s
newly instituted CFSP declared that the development of a defence policy was to
be a clear objective of the Union, yet the wording of the Treaty was left deliber-
ately vague and only stated, courtesy of Art. J4.1 TEU, that this ‘might in time
lead to a common defence’. The Maastricht outcome was thus an attempt to rec-
oncile the contending perspectives of the major European powers. The WEU
was declared to be both the defence arm of the Union and the European pillar
of NATO, thus being left equidistant between the two organisations.58 The WEU
Petersberg Declaration in 1992 confirmed its dual role and the important NATO
seal of approval was given by its Heads of State and Government in January
1994. The NATO Summit welcomed the Maastricht Treaty and the launch of the
European Union. Full support was given to the development of a European
Security and Defence Identity. The latter, according to NATO – in language
complementary to the WEU’s – will ‘strengthen the European pillar of the
Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies
to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence’. But the
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NATO declaration went further to proclaim that the ‘Alliance and the European
Union share common strategic interests’, while it welcomed both co-operation
and consultation with the WEU. Significantly, the Summit agreed to ‘make [the]
collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the
North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies
in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy’. With American sup-
port, the Alliance envisaged the development of ‘separable but not separate
capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to
Alliance Security’.59 As part of the process, the Summit endorsed the CJTF con-
cept as a means of facilitating contingency operations.
The January 1994 Brussels Summit directly facilitated the development of
the WEU’s role. During the same year, the latter’s preliminary conclusions on a
ESDP reflected the new relationship between NATO and the WEU.60 By then, a
common perception had emerged that, both institutionally and substantively,
the development of a common European defence policy had to be seen in the
wider context of broader European and transatlantic relationships. The envis-
aged policy was further to lead to ‘an increased European contribution to the
objectives of collective defence and a new sharing of responsibilities, which
should not only be compatible with NATO’s defence policy but should also be a
means of strengthening and renewing the transatlantic partnership’. Five levels
of European interest and responsibility were identified in the field of defence,
where it was agreed that WEU governments:
● have a direct responsibility for security and defence of their own peoples
and territories;
● have a responsibility to project the security and stability presently enjoyed
in the West throughout the whole of Europe;
● have a strong interest, in order to reinforce European security, in fostering
stability in the southern Mediterranean countries;
● are ready to take on their share of the responsibility for the promotion of
security, stability and the values of democracy in the wider world, including
the execution of peacekeeping and other crisis management measures
under the authority of the UN Security Council or the CSCE, acting either
independently or through the WEU or NATO;
● are ready to address new security challenges such as humanitarian emer-
gencies; proliferation; terrorism; international crime and environmental
risks, including those related to disarmament and the destruction of
nuclear and chemical weapons.61
The WEU Council of Ministers recognised the need for the WEU to
strengthen its operational capabilities in order to fulfil its defence roles. Ministers
identified several needs: access to more information on emerging and ongoing
crises; a more systematic approach to identifying and meeting contingencies for
European military deployments; and appropriate mechanisms for political
decision-making, as well as military command and control. They also recorded
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the need for ‘appropriate information and consultation mechanisms and proce-
dures and more support, in particular to enable prompt reactions to crises, inter
alia through a politico-military working group in Brussels which can be rein-
forced as necessary according to the specific nature of the contingency’. Finally,
the importance of a European armaments policy to the development of a
common defence policy was identified. In 1996, the WEU was to contribute to
the EU’s review conference, but its Council of Ministers had already decided that
‘whatever the outcome of the IGC will be, the intrinsic link between a common
European defence policy and NATO will remain’. Given the gradual realisation of
the limits of an ESDI, largely forged by the experience of the Bosnian crisis and
the consistent pressure to achieve reductions in defence expenditure,62 it was only
natural that the WEU should develop ‘in harmony with, not in competition to,
the wider framework of transatlantic defence cooperation in NATO’.63
Atlantic dominance: ESDI within the Alliance
Pivotal to most, if not all, of the policy developments in the latter half of the
1990s was the NAC Ministerial Meeting in June 1996 in Berlin. The meeting
marked a watershed in the development of US policy towards a more coherent
European role in the Alliance. It was then that the ESDI was clarified and the
European security architecture seemed to be coming together. ‘The [US] Admin-
istration had clearly gone on the record as supporting a stronger European
pillar.’64 By 1996, NATO had exemplified a transition from the Cold War struc-
tures, and from contained confrontation between the two superpowers to a new
configuration better adapted to the new geostrategic situation in Europe and the
world at large. The crisis in former Yugoslavia gave the Alliance an opportunity
to demonstrate that it can exercise its military prowess provided that it has the
firm political resolve of governments behind it, and that their objectives are
clearly stated. Involvement in former Yugoslavia had a dramatic impact on
NATO. As already mentioned, the new Strategic Concept acknowledged the need
to adapt the Alliance to the new security demands including risks emerging
beyond NATO borders, among other other challenges short of major war fight-
ing contigencies. But it was operations in former Yugoslavia that gave the imme-
diate impetus for NATO’s increased emphasis on peacekeeping and ‘out-of-area’
operations.65 The success of missions assigned to the Implementation Force
(IFOR), together with work undertaken within the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
framework, were evidence of the Alliance’s ability to deal with present-day
challenges and thus contribute to the political stability of the continent.66
In Berlin, the idea was finally accepted of establishing ESDI within NATO,
and the latter’s most radical plan, the CJTF concept – first introduced at the Jan-
uary 1994 Brussels Summit – was refined and its development was authorised.67
The Berlin outcome was a major turning point in the post-Cold War European
security, for it settled the fundamental issues affecting the transatlantic bargain-
ing: the primacy of NATO; US leadership in security and defence matters; the
contribution of the Europeans, and as a result – the short- and medium-term –
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prospects of a self-contained ESDI. The communiqué endorsed the continuing
‘internal adaptation’ of NATO and defined the CJTF concept as ‘central to our
approach for assembling forces for (NATO) contigency operations’ and ‘opera-
tions led by the WEU’. Moreover, it stated that the whole adaptation process
would be ‘consistent with the goal of building [ESDI] within NATO’, enabling
‘all European Allies to play a larger role in NATO’s military and command struc-
tures and, as appropriate, in contigency operations undertaken by the Alliance’,
while it also referred to ‘a continued involvement of the North American Allies
across the command and force structure’, with the clear aim of preserving and
reinforcing the transatlantic link.
What happened in Berlin was that NATO acquired even more credibility, in
matters of security and defence, than any conceivable rival. With an ESDI within
NATO, it became possible for the US to reconcile the strategic desire for primacy
in Europe and the domestic political pressures for operational and financial
burden-sharing. Strong US leadership expressed not only in the Alliance’s post-
Cold War adaptation drive, but also in the forceful US commitment to the
Dayton process and in the subsequent performance of IFOR, made NATO
increasingly attractive to almost every participant in the European security
debate, including the French,68 thus repositioning it firmly as the dominant actor
in the new European security setting. Indeed, the Bosnian campaign made evi-
dent that the Europeans were incapable of any meaningful stabilising military
intervention without the US leadership. The fundamental objective was, as
always, the development of ESDI within NATO. CJTF would be a vital tool, lead-
ing to the ‘creation of military coherent and effective forces capable of operating
under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU’. A CJTF is a multi-
national, multiservice, task-tailored force consisting of NATO and possibly non-
NATO forces; being capable of rapid deployment to conduct limited-duration
‘out-of-area’ peace operations, it would be under the control of either NATO’s
integrated command structure or under WEU. The aim is to open up multina-
tional command and control outside the traditional NATO framework. The pri-
mary intent of the CJTF concept was to give NATO military forces the mobility
and flexibility needed to execute the new security management tasks of the
Alliance. Once fully in place, the new capabilities will at last fulfil the 1991 Strate-
gic Concept’s call for military authorities to design smaller, more mobile and
more flexible forces. CJTF is a purely military concept, a technique long being
used by many forces in the conduct of contigency warfare. NATO has been insti-
tutionalising the task force concept in order to make it more effective in the con-
duct of multilateral operations.69 It is obvious that CJTF has been instrumental
in combining ESDI with NATO’s capabilities. The purpose was to give the WEU
the necessary military capability to conduct Petersberg-type operations. In fact,
deploying CJTF was intended to become the primary military doctrine of NATO
in peacetime,70 for it would provide flexibility to respond to new missions in or
around Europe, facilitate the dual use of allied command structures for NATO
and/or WEU operations and permit PfP countries to integrate into NATO-led
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operations.71 In terms of the utilisation of NATO’s integrated command structure
for non-Art. 5 operations, it should be noted that within the three NATO Com-
mands of Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), Allied Forces Southern
Europe (AFSOUTH) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), there are also
three CJTF nuclei Headquarters (HQs), in place since the late 1990s.72
For the US, the realisation of the CJTF concept was always going to be
instrumental in ensuring that NATO remains the core security and defence
transatlantic, and for that matter European, institution, while refashioning the
‘burden-sharing’ debate by allowing Europeans to assume greater responsibil-
ity. Cornish, in an attempt to ‘deconstruct’ the CJTF concept, successfully iden-
tifies the constituent elements of its nature and political significance.73 First,
Berlin shows clearly that NATO has firm ambitions to be a crisis manager and
peacekeeper in its own right, with the appropriate UN or OSCE mandate. CJTF
is a means to achieve this goal. To that end, the idea of a division of labour
between NATO and the WEU, with the former responsible for collective defence
operations (Art. 5) and the latter for lower-scale missions (non-Art. 5). If there
is to be such a division of labour it could only be within the non-Art. 5 category,
with NATO taking ‘hard’ missions with fighting potential and the WEU dealing
with ‘soft’ humanitarian and rescue tasks. In other words, non-Art. 5 operations
were not the exclusive preserve of WEU. Second, CJTF is not simply ‘a Euro-
friendly afterthought in NATO’s restructuring process, but lies at the heart of
that process’.74 It aims at providing an appropriate response capability across the
spectrum of possible military tasks, ranging from the admittedly unlikely col-
lective defence to non-Art. 5 needs for action. Third, via the NATO–WEU
diplomatic relationship, CJTF is the practical means by which the ESDI within
the Alliance was to be given operational expression. In political terms, it meant
that CJTF, as a US-approved and NATO-sponsored idea, enabled a US-
controlled development and implementation of ESDI. The key arrangement
was the decisions for ESDI ‘separable but not separate capabilities’. This meant
that NATO had full control over the development of WEU-led operations. In
the words of Cornish, ‘it is most unlikely that a serious rival to NATO could now
develop’.75 This was confirmed in Amsterdam, where the WEU was recognised
as ‘an integral part of the development of the Union’, and shall support the EU
‘in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign security policy . . . with
a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should
the European Council so decide’ (Art. J7.1 TEU). It is obvious, though, that
integrationist expectations have been reduced to hollow political rhetoric. The
main significance of the WEU has been that it enabled a working compromise
to be struck between integration and intergovernmentalism, Atlanticism and
Europeanism.76 What followed with the development of ESDP was made possi-
ble only after NATO’s dominance seemed assured (especially by the British) and
confirmed this compromise by further institutionalising a US-led, transatlantic
division of labour.
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European security and defence policy and US response
Two things emerged from the Franco-British Saint-Malo initiative. First, the
WEU would be absorbed into the Union and placed under the CFSP. Second,
the collective defence provision of Article V of the Brussels Treaty would be
retained.77 NATO’s Washington Summit acknowledged the continuation of the
Berlin decisions, including the implementation of CJTF, the creation of CJTF
nuclei HQs, and the role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe
(SACEUR) in overseeing the use of NATO assets by WEU-led operations. The
Summit also acknowledged that the Union might at some point take over the
role of the WEU in the existing NATO–WEU framework planning capabilities.
The Union’s inability to tackle the build-up of the crisis in Kosovo and the
ambivalence and delays in US policy were vital factors in creating a European
demand for a new security and defence initiative. In Kosovo it was American
plans that came into action, rather than those of NATO. It would not be far from
the truth to note that the Kosovo war was a US operation under a NATO flag.
That reality has been very uncomfortable both for the US and for NATO’s Euro-
pean members.78 The experience was instrumental in putting enough pressure on
the EU members to move the debate radically forward.79 Operation Allied Force
consisted mainly of air operations. While non-US aircraft carried out over 15,000
sorties, about 39 per cent of the total, US aircraft delivered over 80 per cent of the
weapons. The June 1999 Cologne European Council indicated the Union’s will-
ingness to provide the institutional framework for a future ‘autonomous’ Euro-
pean military contribution to international security and emphasised the two
ways in which the Union could conduct Petersberg-type operations. One, by
using NATO means and capabilities, including European command and control.
In this case, the decisions taken in Berlin (1996) and Washington (1999) by the
NAC are to be carried out. The other, EU-led operations without reliance on
NATO assets and force structures could be conducted by European national or
multinational means, which are pre-identified (or pre-designated in NATO
terms) by the member states. In such cases either the national command struc-
tures, which provide for a multinational representation in the HQs or in the
existing command structures within the multinational forces would have to be
used for an effective conduct of EU-led operations.80
The US has welcomed the Union’s ESDP initiative, but obviously this pro-
ject holds implications for Washington. Hardly surprisingly, it requires a close
relationship between the Union and NATO. American policy-makers and com-
mentators have viewed the project in an ambivalent fashion. Officials within the
Clinton administration were often at pains to offer their support, publicly wel-
coming the potential of ESDP to take on conflict management tasks the US
would prefer to avoid. Yet, as the momentum of ESDP has gathered pace, anxi-
eties in Washington were increasingly aired. Initially, during the Clinton admin-
istration, Secretary of State Albright, phrased these in December 1998 as the
‘three Ds’: the triple dangers of a decoupling (of European and Alliance deci-
sion-making), duplication (of defence resources) and discrimination (against
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non-EU NATO members). In a sincere attempt to ameliorate the anxieties, the
1999 Washington NAC Summit agreed on the so-called ‘Berlin-Plus’ compro-
mise. For NAC, ‘a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of
our Alliance’. In this regard, ‘we are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin
in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets
and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed’.81 Amer-
ican concerns, however, persisted. During the week of the Nice European Coun-
cil, the outgoing US Secretary of Defense, Cohen, warned that NATO could
become ‘a relic’ if the Union were to develop a military planning capability that
duplicated NATO, and if resource commitments to ESDP detracted from force
improvements slated under NATO’s own DCI. To its credit, the G. W. Bush
administration has tried to dispel most of these apprehensions, and it has nearly
stopped making disparaging remarks about the credibility of European security
and defence efforts, without, however, stopping voicing concern. Rumsfeld, the
new Secretary of Defense, noted in February 2001 that he was ‘worried’ by a
ESDP that might undermine NATO owing to a ‘confusing duplication’ of efforts,
although Powell’s first comments as Secretary of State were less alarmist. These
broadsides against ESDP have galvanised the Union, by adding urgency to the
creation of an efficient institutional interface with NATO and to the definition
of mechanisms by which European operations will enjoy access to NATO assets.
The capabilities and responsibilities gap
It is clear that the US and the Union have been trying to define the new transat-
lantic bargain that would balance the latter’s desire for a broader and more
independent political role with its continued reliance on American and NATO
military capabilities. There are quite a few practical steps to be taken in that
direction. A crucial one concerns the way in which the Union enhances its mil-
itary capabilities for projecting and sustaining power that is addressing the
defence capabilities gap that divides its members from the US. The defence
capabilities gap means that there is a danger of ending up with a two-tier alliance
– one in which the US and perhaps a few European allies are able to conduct
high-intensity operations, while the rest of the allies focus on the low end of the
military spectrum. This would not strengthen NATO, but weaken it. Accord-
ingly, the defence capabilities gap could result in a quite harmful division of
labour for the cohesion of the transatlantic community, whereby the Union
would take primary responsibility for conflict management and low-intensity
peacekeeping, while the US would take the lead in high-intensity warfare.
In the near term, such a development could contribute to overall NATO
capabilities if it were accompanied by an increase in European defence capabil-
ities. Moreover, such a division of labour is consistent with the political desire
on the part of the Union to take the lead on lower-end peacekeeping and con-
flict prevention tasks and also accords with US reluctance to get involved in
every such contigency. Over the longer term, however, this kind of division of
labour and ‘mission specialisation’ could undermine the cohesion of the
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Alliance, for it would result in allies incapable of contributing to the Art. 5 col-
lective defence commitments, or of conducting high-intensity joint operations
‘out of area’, thus raising questions about the ability of US and European forces
to operate together in more demanding environments.
The debate after the Kosovo war as well as during the Afghanistan and the
global anti-terrorism US campaign is revealing. The growing capabilities gap
and the emerging division of labour inspires acrimonious debates about
burden-sharing, and provides a constant source of friction in the transatlantic
relationship. Because Europe is such a dwarf in security and defence issues, the
US does not treat the European allies as genuine partners in the development
and implementation of security and defence policies. As a result Americans and
Europeans are growing resentful of each other in ways and at a pace that soon
will become difficult to reverse.
Closing the capabilities gap, without undercutting the Alliance, is among
the most urgent and difficult challenges NATO faces in the coming years. EU
members should invest more on their defence capacity if they want to be able to
exercise some control over American unilateralist tendencies especially after 11
September 2001. The interests of both the US and the Union would be served by
developing a strong and effective ESDP. A Europe that remains allied to the US
because of its own weakness is of limited value in the current turbulent strate-
gic environment, and probably unsustainable politically. To preserve and
advance transatlantic co-operation, NATO needs a bargain that shares more
equitably the responsibilities of common interests. A stronger and more
assertive Union is by far the more attractive partner for the US. In such a situa-
tion, the US would be more attentive to European concerns and more multilat-
eralist than at present. American respect for ESDP would increase, making it
easier for Washington to compromise for common transatlantic endeavours.82
Why NATO endures
The discussion above has been mainly about NATO’s response and adaptation
to the new European security environment, the development of its strategies
towards the new challenges and its success in formulating effective policies. The
issues were and still remain particularly salient, given the new strategic land-
scape. At the heart of the problem lies the pressing need for the Alliance to rede-
fine its rationale, no longer in terms of identifying a unifying threat, but in terms
of combining the capabilities of its members in a way that furthers their post-
Cold War interests, while consolidating NATO as a device to the making of
substantive agreements in world politics by providing rules, norms, principles
and procedures that help state actors to realise those interests collectively. The
challenge was enormous as the possibility of deterioration and dissolution
became real. Alliances deteriorate and dissolve for several reasons, of which the
most obvious and important is a change in the identity or nature of the threat
that produced the original association. But NATO endured. Its durability and
persistence has many sources.
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First, there is a leader, the US, strongly committed to preserving the rela-
tionship and willing to expend the effort needed to keep its allies from straying.
As Chapter 5 suggested, American leadership is not on the wane but has been
exercised effectively through credible institutional structures. Second, NATO
has become a symbol of credibility and resolve. The US decision to intervene in
Bosnia, as well as its more recent resolute military response to the Kosovo crisis,
appears to have been motivated by the fear that failure to act would cast doubt
on its reliability and, hence, on NATO’s future itself. Third, the high level of
institutionalisation of NATO has created capabilities that are certainly worth
preserving, despite the extensive change in the array of external threats, espe-
cially since it costs less to maintain them than it did to establish them in the first
place. As Walt has indicated, ‘the 1991 Gulf War could not have been fought
without NATO assets, and the 1995 intervention in Bosnia relied on a similar
base of infrastructure, military assets and joint decision-making procedures’.83
Third, the high level of institutionalisation within NATO worked most power-
fully because it had created capacities that are highly adaptable. As the forego-
ing discussion shows, NATO’s durability increased since its institutional profile
was instrumental in amending doctrines and organisational forms in response
to external developments, making it easier to adapt to the new post-bipolar con-
ditions. Fourth, ideological solidarity and a commitment to similar basic goals
significantly helped to reduce intra-Alliance conflicts and to sustain it long after
its original rationale had gone. Also, the fact that NATO has resulted in its mem-
bers seeing themselves as integral parts of a larger (Atlantic) political commu-
nity, reflecting or even creating a sense of common identity, means that the
Alliance is undeniably appealing and, therefore, extremely robust.
Although neither the history of the past fifty years nor the public statements
of contemporary national leaders offer an absolutely reliable guide for the
future, the geostrategic developments and institutional dynamics of the 1990s
resulted in NATO remaining the landmark of post-Cold War European security.
NATO is still preparing to deal with threats in true realist fashion, even though
their identities are increasingly in dispute or uncertain. What NATO has done in
response – to realist and neo-realist surprise – is to expand its relationship to
other international institutions, such as the WEU and the Union, ‘as part of an
effort to embed itself further into the framework of European, and to a lesser
extent trans-Atlantic, relations. In so doing, NATO has demonstrated the flexi-
bility expected of both organisations and international institutions.’84 One can
easily imagine that these factors, which safeguarded NATO’s efficient political
and institutional adjustment, led to the decisions that were (or were not) taken
in Amsterdam. These decisions cast serious doubts as to whether ‘the project of
a true common European defence is still a real political objective being pursued
by all governments of the relevant European countries’,85 and once again fuelled
debate about the Union’s role in world affairs and its nature as a global actor.
The final section below offers a theoretical understanding of this debate.
Institutional imperatives of system change 185
Instead of a conclusion: the Union in world affairs
This section tries to identify what the Union is in terms of its international
behaviour: an ‘international actor’, a ‘global power’, an ‘economic power/bloc’,
a ‘civilian power’ or a ‘superpower in the making’? These terms entail different
descriptive and normative implications for European foreign policy. The same
applies to what kind of European security superstructure should exist. There is
little doubt from the existing literature that the Union (and before it the Com-
munity) has now acquired an international role, even if its legal status remains
unclear.86 There is in fact general agreement that all EU institutions have
acquired such a role. This is particularly true of the Commission and the
EP, but generally speaking this is due to the emergence of the Union as an
international actor.87
A study undertaken in 1977 by Sjostedt, posing the question ‘to what degree
the EC is an international actor at a given time’,88 concluded that the Commu-
nity was ‘some sort of half developed international actor’.89 As for the future,
Sjostedt presented a series of possible developments without committing him-
self to any particular option. He also warned, quite correctly, of the difficulties
inherent in any prediction in the social sciences.90 In his view, an international
actor is an acting unit in the international system, which possesses the quality of
‘actor capability’. The latter was in turn defined as having a double characteris-
tic: first, that unit ‘is discernible from the external environment’, in that ‘it has a
minimum degree of separateness’; second, that ‘it has a minimal degree of inter-
nal cohesion’.91 The Union has come some way from the time when Sjostedt
could rightly claim that in the mid-1970s the Commission’s role in ‘high poli-
tics’ was non-existent and that there was hardly ever ‘[a] common behaviour in
the “high policy” field areas, to which foreign policy belongs par excellence’.92
There is no doubt that the Commission played an important role in EPC, if
only by being represented at all EPC meetings.93 This is all the more so since
the coming into force of the TEU, which gave the Commission a right of co-
initiative, at least theoretically. Hence the general assessment that the Commu-
nity/Union has emerged as a distinct entity on the international scene.
According to Kirchner, ‘[w]hereas in the 1970’s there was a belief that the
EC was mostly reactive or more affected by international events than vice versa,
the Community can now be described as becoming more active in the interna-
tional field and attractive to other international actors’.94 Ginsberg has gone even
further by arguing that the number of foreign policy ‘actions’ has increased over
the years, claiming that the new logic behind such actions is what he calls ‘self-
styled’ actions as opposed to the previous logics of integration or interdepen-
dence.95 In certain areas, there seems to be a common European stance. De
Schoutheete identified nine issue-areas where ‘quelques résultats’ could be iden-
tified in the EPC framework: the CSCE, East–West relations, Cyprus, the Middle
East, Africa, Latin America, the US, the Council of Europe and human rights.
Januzzi identifies at least seven areas where there has been a common stance:
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Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Latin America, South Africa, ter-
rorism and human rights.96 Similarly, the Union possesses observer status in
many international organisations, starting with the UN, and many non-
member states have diplomatic relations and representation with it. From the
perspective of third countries, they ‘so often perceive the Twelve [now Fifteen]
in EPC as being more united and stronger than the member states themselves
are ready to admit’.97 The additional requirement of Art. 30.5 SEA that EPC and
the Community’s external policy must coincide has added to this trend because
the external economic relations of the Community, as well as its development
and aid policy, have proved extremely important. Such a requirement is
repeated both in the TEU and the AMT.98
A high degree of ‘co-ordination reflex’ has also developed among the
foreign ministries of all the member states. Regelsberger has pointed out that a
flexible frame of mind is more rewarding in understanding the nature of EPC
than is any traditional foreign policy theory.99 Rummel concurs: if ‘[t]he aggre-
gation of (EPC) positions and activities . . . does not yet constitute the foreign
policy of the European Community and its member states, it at least represents
a foreign policy for them.’100 Thus both of Sjostedt’s criteria (minimum degree of
separateness and of internal cohesion) seemed to have been satisfied since he
first used these terms. Although the CFSP (and EPC before it) has not amounted
to a truly common European foreign policy, it would be incorrect to ignore
its role in international relations. Even if one takes a minimalist approach, it is
possible to identify a ‘European’ line on most international relations issues.
Moreover, the Union’s own perception of being an international actor is evi-
dent in the many official statements on its international role. Europe as a distinct
entity was also one of the original underpinnings of the integration process after
the Second World War, based on a sense of common identity. The setting up of
EPC was agreed upon at a time when the Community had ‘arrived at a turning
point in its history’, when there was a need for Europe ‘to establish its position
in the world as a distinct entity’.101 Such a position culminated in the Document
on European Identity published by the (then) Nine as early as December 1973.102
A good way of defining Europe’s sense of distinctiveness can be summed up as
follows: it is not based on the use of force; it both involves the peoples of Europe
and implies their backing; it purports to set up a Europe which is not dominated
by any one of its constituent parts (no empire-building). In short, the interna-
tional actions of the Union can be described as those of a ‘Civilian Power
Europe’. This term was first coined in the 1970s at a time when economic power
seemed to be more important in international affairs than traditional military
power. In Duchêne’s words, a civilian power is ‘a civilian group of countries long
on economic power and relatively short on armed force’. It is also ‘a force for the
international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards’.103 Twitchett defines
it as ‘an international polity as yet possessing no military dimension, but able
to exercise influence on states, global and regional organisations, international
corporations and other transnational bodies through diplomatic, economic and
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legal factors’. This definition must be contrasted with that of a ‘superpower’
which possesses power and influence, and the means to implement them in the
following fields: ideology, politics, economics, finance and the military, espe-
cially in nuclear technology. There also exists a sphere of influence where the
superpower has almost unlimited control or dominance.
In the existing literature, two kinds of early criticisms have been made:
the realists who deny the very existence of the concept itself, in that it amounts
to nothing but a ‘contradiction in terms’.104 Ifestos adds that ‘the turbulences
of the 1970’s and first half of the 1980’s . . . [have] tended to discredit [the
civilian power Europe approach]’.105 Pijpers went further in the late 1980s: ‘EPC
has some striking deficiencies in the field of security’, stressing the lack of crisis
management arrangements and the lack of co-ordination in the field of arms
trade policy.106 A second, more limited, attack came from a left-wing inspired
critique of capitalism. Galtung claimed that a civilian power Europe represented
only an alternative to American hegemony in his The European Community: A
Superpower in the Making.107
Another relevant approach covers institutional arrangements, with the view
to explaining what the Union is or is not in world affairs. There is no point in
repeating the CFSP decision-making process at this stage; suffice it to say that
whether or not the Union achieves a common stance on international affairs
also has an impact on how close this entity is to a federal, confederal or sui
generis model. This picture is further complicated by ‘domestic sources’ of for-
eign policy which tend to affect foreign policy in variable ways according to the
issue at hand, the country concerned, and in relation to EU foreign policy devel-
opments. This is not the place to develop this point further but simply to say that
a clear federalist–intergovernmentalist divide reminiscent of the formative
debates can be found.
Despite the above, a more liberal view has tried to use the concept of a
civilian power Europe in order to understand what the Union is in world affairs
and, by implication, what its internal structure is. Rummel states: ‘When com-
pared to the superpowers, Western Europe stresses moral persuasion, the
“good example”, and unconditional help and de-emphasises ideological
warfare, the selections of proxies, and the “projection of power.”’108 Hill identi-
fies several reasons for applying the phrase ‘Civilian Power’ to Europe: first,
because international politics is not exclusively about military power; second,
because the use of military force to intervene in third countries ‘has
a dubious record’; third, because it is true to say that ‘the record of civilian
power in action is not insubstantial’; fourth, because Duchêne’s original pre-
occupation was with the process of European integration, and particularly the
Franco-German reconciliation, which has been ‘gloriously’ successful; and
fifth, because a Civilian Power Europe is more desirable than a superpower
Europe.109 In that respect, Hill agrees with Duchêne’s original view that the
Community should not become a superpower because that would go against
its intrinsic nature.
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More recently, Buchan, in a journalistic effort, argued that the Union was a
‘strange superpower’.110 Thus, he views the Union not as a conventional super-
power because of its mainly economic power, and he concludes that in the post-
Cold War era this is an advantage as ‘economic problems [are] back at the top
of the international agenda’.111 But he also stresses the current shortcomings of
European integration and contrasts the advances on monetary union with the
lack of a coherent foreign and security policy. As for Piening, he concluded that
the Union was a ‘global power’.112 He takes a more practical and less normative
view to argue that Europe is now a ‘global’ power of ‘a class of its own’.113 He sees
this development as a direct result of internal integration and argues that the
major changes have occurred ‘at almost breakneck speed’.114 Buchan and Pien-
ing concentrate on the size of the market, the population, and the economy of
the Union, rather than on any ‘domestic peace’. Whereas the latter falls into the
category of intra-democratic peace,115 these most recent studies focus on eco-
nomic power within an ever-interdependent and globalising world. They also
both show some scepticism about future developments, especially on the impact
of enlargements to come and of waning popular support, but neither offers a
prescription to that effect, nor considers at length the implications for the future
of European integration theory and practice.
Even more recently, and mainly owing to the de facto militarisation of the
Union, two more opposing views have emerged about the continued usefulness
of the concept of a civilian power.116 Zielonka, Whitman and Smith have called
for its demise. They all consider that a civilian power cannot become militarised
and use military means without losing its raison d’être.117 A minority view, first
applied to Germany after its participation in NATO’s bombing of Kosovo and
Serbia,118 considers on the contrary that military power will at long last offer the
Union the means to act like a civilian power in the world, that is to say as a force
for the projection of democratic and other human rights principles.119 So, in
short, the jury is still out about what kind of an international actor the Union is.
Future deepening and widening will make its role in world affairs all the more
relevant and important for further analyses.
The debate on the Union’s identity and role in international affairs, while
focusing on failings and dilemmas and on persistent limitations, does not ignore
the progress European unity has made thus far. Bouts of expansion in both geo-
graphical and functional scope have marked its history, and periods of pessimism
and showdowns have almost never led to regressions. Hoffmann uses the image
of Sisyphus only to suggest that the present shape of the Union ‘is quite different
from the supranational dream of its founders and that each leap forward brings
with it problems as well as reminders of constant handicaps’.120 However, prophe-
cies of lethal break-ups have not been fulfilled. Instead, it seems that Europeans,
following Haas’ suggestions,121 try to ‘learn’ and to ‘revalue’ themselves by at least
safeguarding their laboriously evolving acquis. And this process of ‘learning’ and
‘re-evaluation’ does lead to – painful and slow – institutional adaptation and
policy innovation. As for now, the Union is a necessary and, in some respects, a
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leading part of the European political and security landscape, as well as a subtle,
if often shaky, actor in international geopolitics.
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Introduction
The principal purpose of this study has been to provide an overview of the
important political and institutional developments in the Union and to link such
developments with relevant theory discourses; the most prominent of which
being the relationship between theory and reform in the evolving political con-
stitution of the Union. As the discussion in Chapter 2 suggested from a norma-
tive standpoint, it is possible to accept that the coming into being of the TEU in
1993, assisted by further treaty reforms, paved the way for a new integrative
stage, best captured by the term ‘nascent Gemeinschaft’. This is not to negate the
usage of the term ‘integration’ in capturing the dynamics of the regional process,
as it is still useful in the vocabulary of EU studies, insofar as it attempts to explain
the joining together of previously independent entities under a new centre,
whether or not federally organised. Yet, the point has been clearly made that
‘polity-formation’ is better equipped – both conceptually and operationally – to
capturing the constitutive nature of European governance. Indeed, the
dynamism of EU polity-building over the 1990s has provided some of the nec-
essary infrastructure for the emergence of a ‘constitutive’ European polity that
derives its legitimacy both from the component polities and the member demoi,
emphasising the need for greater civic deliberation and participation.
It is not so much the actual provisions stemming from successive treaty
reforms or for that matter the way in which they will be carried out that warrant
our closer attention, as are the new European polity dynamics, in that questions
of democracy, citizenship, rights (and duties) are now an integral part of the
Union’s agenda. Although a managerial-type reform has largely prevailed since
the prolonged course of the IGC 1996/97 and the even more arduous IGC 2000,
there is still hope that a more ‘democentric’ process of union will come about
and, with it, a European public sphere founded upon a deliberative politics. This
7
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is the task of a newly-instituted ‘Convention on the Future of Europe’,1 following
the December 2001 Laeken Declaration and, before that, the initiative taken by
the Swedish Presidency on 7 March 2001 to launch a European-wide consulta-
tion process to canvass opinion from political, business, academic and civil
society circles. This quasi-formal, pre-reform process is intended to lead to yet
another review conference in 2004. Its justification lies in the long-standing need
to transform the Union into a more participatory system of deliberative gover-
nance based on the institutions and practices of civic inclusion, as opposed to the
existing forms of executive elite dominance. Arguably, the latter emerges as a
chronic malaise of the general system, which recent treaty reforms have failed
to address properly. The rationale underpinning this critical assertion is that suc-
cessive waves of formal constitutional review have fallen short of transforming a
shadowy political space into a purposeful res publica: a composite polity able to
navigate the normative orientations of European civic society, by means of har-
nessing its deliberative potential, and by elevating its members into a governing
and politically self-conscious transnational demos. As for now, however, it could
be safely argued that European integration is not about the subordination of
states to a federally constituted centre, but rather about the preservation of
those qualities that allow the segments – as distinct historically constituted
nation-states – to survive as separate collectivities, while engaging themselves in
a polity-formation process that transforms their traditional patterns of interac-
tion. Whatever the end result of this elaborate exercise might be, this study has
tried to illustrate that the new challenges confronting the Union are not without
profound implications for both its present and future theorising.
Amsterdam and Nice in perspective
To start with the moderate treaty reforms embedded in the AMT, it is fair to
suggest that the European construction has been ‘stirred’ rather than ‘shaken’.
Hailed by some as a ‘reasonable step’, and criticised by others as lacking ambition
and vision, the AMT preserves the Union’s three-pillar structure with its two
separate legal methods. Some areas previously falling under the third pillar (and
thus the intergovernmental method) will be gradually transferred to the first
pillar, while the Schengen Agreement is now fully incorporated into the Union
(with Britain and Ireland having secured an opt-out).
At the institutional level, it is agreed that at the first enlargement the big
countries will lose their second Commissioner, provided that they are compen-
sated through a reweighting of votes in the Council (see below). A final decision
has been deferred until a new IGC is convened at least one year before EU
membership exceeds twenty. Majority voting has been extended in the fields
of research, customs co-operation and fraud, and so has the (now simplified)
‘co-decision procedure’ in the areas of employment (incentive measures), social
policy (equal opportunities and treatment), public health, transparency
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(general principles), statistics and data protection (independent advisory
authority). The legislative procedures involving the EP are reduced to three: co-
decision, consultation and assent.
Moreover, a Chapter on Fundamental Rights and Nondiscrimination has
been inserted in the AMT to strengthen the Union’s ‘human face’, safeguard the
protection of human rights and, in short, redress the fast-growing ‘credibility
gap’ between EU ‘decision-makers’ and ‘decision-receivers’. Still though, as Shaw
rightly argues, the AMT ‘is more about “managing” reactions to the Commu-
nity/Union than it is about seeking to engage in citizen participation’.2 Further,
a new protocol is enshrined in the Treaty in an attempt to define more precisely
the criteria for applying the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
According to the Treaty: ‘In exercising the powers conferred on it, each institu-
tion shall ensure that the principle of subsidiarity is complied with’; ‘any action
of the Community shall not go beyond any action necessary for the attainment
of the objectives of the Treaty.’ It is also stated that these principles should
respect the acquis communautaire and the institutional balance, also taking into
account that ‘the Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its
objectives and carry through its policies’. Yet, there is a presumption of compe-
tence to the states (but not to subnational units), in that the Community has to
justify compliance of proposed legislation to these principles (see below).
As suggested in Chapter 3, flexibility was finally included in the AMT
though in a way that precludes the creation of a Europe à la carte by introduc-
ing stringent conditions for its application. More specifically, such ‘reinforced
co-operation’ should further the objectives of the Union and protect its inter-
ests; respect the principles of the Treaties and the single institutional framework;
be used only as a last resort; concern at least a majority of EU members; respect
the acquis communautaire; not affect the competences, rights, obligations and
interests of those members that do not wish to participate therein; remain open
to all member states; and be authorised by the Council. However, the Treaty pre-
cludes member states from initiating flexible arrangements in areas which fall
within the exclusive competences of the Community; affect the Community
policies, actions or programmes; concern Union citizenship or discriminate
between member state nationals; fall outside the limits of the powers conferred
upon the Community by the Treaty; and constitute discrimination or restrict
trade and/or distort competition between member states. Authorisation for
such ‘flexible’ schemes ‘shall be granted by the Council, acting by a qualified
majority on a proposal by the Commission and after consulting the EP’. Any
objection by a member state on grounds of ‘important and stated reasons’
results in the whole matter being referred to the European Council for a deci-
sion by unanimity. This points to yet another accommodationist-type arrange-
ment that arguably strengthens the Union’s consociational properties.
But the question that still remains to be addressed concerns the appropriate
institutional structure to sustain successive waves of enlargement in the twenty-
first century. On the basis of the (largely incomplete) outcome of the IGC
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1996/97, there has clearly been a preference for a managerial type of reform to
improve the effectiveness in policy output. Flexibility has been partially elevated
to a modus operandi of the system, whereas the deepening of integration has
been referred ad calendas Graecas. In any case, there is evidence to suggest that
these moderate trends in treaty reform reinforce the point made earlier in this
study about the reversal of the Mitranian logic to international integration, in
that function follows form, rather than being followed by it. Interestingly, this
is the opposite of what neofunctionalists had hoped to achieve: instead of politi-
cisation (the process of linking the management of integration with the daily
lives of EU citizens) becoming an additional weapon in the strategic arsenal of
pro-integrationist forces, it is increasingly used by the more sceptical actors,
often by means of resorting to nationalistic sentiments, thus making it difficult
to mobilise the constituent publics in favour of higher levels of integration and,
eventually, towards a ‘complete equilibrium’ among different levels of authority.
Such a development, by contesting the idea that European polity-formation is a
linear process towards a clearly discernible federal end, may lead to Schmitter’s
imaginative depiction of a condominium-type organisation (see Chapter 2),
characterised by ‘multiple flexible equilibria’.
In the CFSP, as mentioned earlier in this study, the Treaty provides for a lim-
ited extension of majority voting for detailed policy implementation; the
appointment of a ‘High Representative’; the creation of an ‘early warning and
planning unit’; and the possibility of ‘constructive abstention’ in Joint Actions.
But the outcome of the Amsterdam process shows that Europe did not manage
to develop an independent capability within the Union. Yet this is not to say that
European states confronted with a choice between national action and integra-
tion have chosen the former.3 In the first place, in opting against an exclusively
EU security and defence component, they are opting for strengthening institu-
tionalised co-operation within NATO. Moreover, regional security and defence
co-operation shows no immediate signs of lessening in intensity outside the
Union’s formal institutional structures. Many co-operative ventures have been
launched: the European Arms Agency; Eurofor and Euromarfor; the Franco-
British Joint Air Command; the Eurocorps, and so on. That this co-operation
took place outside the framework of integration is explicable by two factors, as
the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6 has shown. First, the very existence of an
alternative and highly successful framework tends to divert attention and
resources away from the idea of linking defence with the Union. The fact that
NATO exists and works cannot be underestimated. Second, states tend jealously
to guard their autonomy over public policy unless compelling reasons exist
for them to turn to integration as a solution. Even in areas where the Union
nominally enjoys a great deal of influence over policy, the member states have
been anxious to preserve their freedom of manoeuvre. This is all the more true
for defence and security. Moreover, the absence of a direct threat weakens any
rationale for agreeing to a higher level of integration in defence matters. In this
context, it was not the debate on the Union but that on NATO and its role that
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was conceived as the most crucial issue affecting the physiognomy of any
prospective security restructuring in Europe, for it related to multiple and inter-
connected international relations issues: change in the world security polarity;
core–periphery relations; definition of threat as a precondition of security
configuration; fragmentation and integration; redefinition of power and its
effectiveness; redefinition of national visions, preferences and interests; re-eval-
uation of US leadership and EU strategy; and re-assessment of institutions and
demands for international regimes.4 Finally, as discussed in Chapter 6, the
December 2000 Nice European Council formalised developments in EU secu-
rity and defence by setting up an ESDP within the CFSP as well as a planned
ERRF, which is to become ‘operational’ in 2003.
Turning in greater detail to the Nice treaty-amending process, after four-
day marathon talks, an agreement was finally reached that the larger states will
retain their second Commissioner until 2005, while each member state may
nominate one Commissioner until the time when the Union expands to twenty-
seven members (initially, IGC discussions included Turkey, but it was felt that
its sheer size, among other issues, might complicate the negotiations). It was
also agreed that the four largest states will each have 29 instead of 10 votes in the
Council (which means that three large states and a small one could form a
blocking minority, whose threshold was raised to circa 73 per cent), while the
small- and medium-sized members will each have between 3 and 13 votes
(which means that while the larger states’ votes have increased threefold, those
of the smaller states have only doubled). Also, the threshold of seats in the EP
has been raised to 732 in an enlarged EU of twenty-seven members – Turkey was
originally included in the logistics but was then dropped owing to its sheer size
and controversy surrounding its eventual accession – thus exceeding the 700-
seat threshold agreed in Amsterdam. QMV, as in earlier revisions, has been
extended to largely non-controversial areas (save for the appointment of the
Commission President), including international trade agreements (services,
investment and intellectual rights), external border controls and certain visa
rules, freedom of movement for non-EU nationals, treatment of illegal immi-
grants, judicial co-operation in civil cases, emergency supplies in times of crisis
and natural disasters, social exclusion and social welfare modernisation, state
aid for industry, regional subsidies, financial and technical co-operation with
non-EU members, etc.
Other changes included the possibility of applying flexible integration
schemes within the Community pillar, but with the Commission’s involvement,
and under new decision rules in the European Council – i.e., by revising the
‘emergency brake’ procedure – provided, however, that at least eight states,
instead of a majority, were willing to participate. Moreover, the work of the
Court of First Instance was linked to the activities of the newly-instituted Judi-
cial Panels, which, courtesy of Art. 225a EC, were authorised to deal with rele-
vant cases. Finally, a fresh round of institutional reforms was agreed to take
place in 2004, a time when Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (among
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others like Slovenia, Slovakia and Cyprus) are expected to join, covering, inter
alia, the division of competences between the Union, the states and possibly
subnational authorities; the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; the
simplification of the Treaties; and the role of national parliaments in the inte-
gration process (see below).
In a high-stakes endgame, which undoubtedly brought on a flash of déjà vu,
the NIT clearly lacked a departure of substance for the creation of ‘norms of
polity’ centred on the specific constructions of legitimate governance. As the
Guardian succinctly put it: ‘At every stage of the prolonged negotiation, raw
national interest has overshadowed the broader vision.’5 Or, as The Times
remarked: ‘It is, at best, a ramshackle palace that has been cobbled together.’6 As
a result, Nice failed to discover ‘a sense of process’ (and purpose) over the trans-
formation of a plurality of demoi into a pluralistic demos and, hence, the emer-
gence of a new pouvoir constituant as ‘the ultimate legitimising referent of the
[Euro-] polity’.7 This is linked to yet another crucial transformation the Union
ought to undertake, ‘from an ethics of integration to an ethics of participation’:
‘a deliberative process whereby citizens reach mutually acceptable agreements
that balance their various communitarian commitments in ways that reflect a
cosmopolitan regard for fairness.’8 In Mény’s words: ‘There is a need for a new
civic culture . . . which allows for multiple allegiances, which combines the
“right to roots” with the “right to options”.’9
Following Dehousse’s analysis of the Union’s ‘unstable equilibrium’,
‘although the parliamentary system remains by far the dominant paradigm in
the discourse on the reform of European institutions, the last decade has wit-
nessed a gradual emergence of issues and instruments which do not correspond
to the parliamentary tradition’.10 As Kohler-Koch put it, ‘the EU is not just insti-
tutionally retired, but lives in a social environment that does not fulfil the pre-
requisites for representative democracy’.11 Arguably, recent reforms have placed
the EP closer to the locus decidendi of the system by extending the scope of co-
decision and by simplifying the procedures therein (by changing the ‘default
condition’ in the conciliation procedure). Although these reforms sought to
address the Union’s ‘parliamentary deficit’ by facilitating the emergence of a de
facto European bicameral system, increased co-decision was not always linked
with greater QMV,12 nor has the EP’s right of assent been extended to legislation
in third-pillar issues, to decisions over the Community’s ‘own resources’,13 and
to formal treaty reform.
Moving on to the issue of transparency, a principle inspired by notions of
‘open government’, Amsterdam succeeded in providing European citizens with
a (conditional) right of information, by covering, in Dehousse’s words, ‘the
practical modalities of [public] access’ to official EU documents.14 But it failed
to contribute to a more comprehensible Treaty, as the simplification of some
legislative procedures like co-decision was coupled with the institutionalisation
(or even instrumentalisation) of other practices like flexibility, exceptions, reser-
vations, safeguards, protocols, declarations and the rest which, taken together,
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arguably represent an exercise in ‘cognitive difficulty’.15 On balance, however, a
formalisation of transparency procedures has taken place: their de jure incorpo-
ration into the Treaty. Whereas previously such procedures were determined by
interinstitutional arrangements and rules of procedure, the ECJ can now mon-
itor the implementation of a ‘norm’ of legislative openness as an operational
principle of European governance. For all their shortcomings, the new trans-
parency rules are now part of the EU’s ‘primary law’.16 Yet, as Cram et al. cate-
gorically asserted, ‘the post-Amsterdam EU is even more arcane and complex
than its already impenetrable predecessor’.17
Regardless of one’s pro/contra integrationist convictions, there is evidence
to suggest that the phasing-in of questions of democracy and legitimacy in the
Union’s public agenda has not yet transcended the anxiety of states, both indi-
vidually and collectively, to safeguard their own prerogatives, even when these
questions became crucial to the political viability of the general system. Instead
of focusing on issues that constitute the essence of any well-thought-out process
of democratic reform, the largely unimaginative quality of proposals submitted
to the review conferences, both of which were assigned the task of preparing the
central institutions of governance for further waves of enlargement, highlighted
in a most clear and tenacious way the absence of a clear democratic vision to
take the European construction dynamically into the new millennium. As
Weiler rightly suggests, ‘[w]hereas in its founding period Europe was positioned
as a response to a crisis of confidence, fifty years later it has shifted to become one
of the causes of that crisis’.18 Both the Amsterdam and Nice reforms failed on the
above accounts, not least because they lacked a kind of ‘innovative reflection’ on
the possibilities of constructing a European civic space out of the segments’
varied traditions. Instead, both processes focused on ‘distributive compro-
mises’,19 with a view to embodying the particularistic attitudes and claims of self-
interested actors in negotiated package deals. This outcome is in line with the
EU’s modus consociandi, resulting in a sacrifice in democratic input for greater
efficiency in output.
Indeed, the largest deficiency of both Amsterdam and Nice was their
emphasis on policy rather than polity, efficiency rather than democracy,
distributive compromise rather than integrative accommodation, functionalist
structures rather than shared normative commitments and, above all, the ratio-
nalist exercise of competences rather than symbiotic legitimation. In particular,
the areas upon which these reforms focused concerned the rationalisation and
simplification of decision-making procedures (co-decision), voting adjust-
ments (re-weighting of votes) and voting mechanisms (extension of QMV) and,
in general, measures concerning the effectiveness of EU decision-making as a
precondition for the future functioning, but not legitimation, of the general
system. Ironically, this elaborate exercise in rationalised institutionalism origi-
nally aimed at rectifying a long-standing criticism of the Community as a ‘joint
decision-system’, in that it tends to produce suboptimal policy outputs and,
at the level of negotiated package deals, an inequitable status quo. For these
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reasons, both revision processes emerge as managerial types of reform, where
affective/identitive politics still remains without reach. Their core principles rest
not on the need for cementing the constitutive (even dialectical) norms of a
polycentric civic space as a precondition for deliberative equity and substantive
public engagement, but rather on a politics of consensus elite government deter-
mined by suboptimal exchanges within an overly complex negotiation system.
Not surprisingly, then, the general assessment is that a European civic space
based on the co-constitution of normative structures has yet to emerge.
Reflections on the future of Europe
The intense debate during the period leading to the AMT continued with the
occasion of a publication by the Commission under the title ‘Agenda 2000’.20 It
is worth looking at the content of this initiative as it constituted the prelude to a
more engaging debate that was to follow a few years later on the future of
Europe. The Commission put forward in the report its views on the future
development of the Union ahead of the enlargement negotiations with each of
the applicant countries. In particular, it ‘outlines in a single framework the
broad perspectives for the development of the EU and its policies beyond the
turn of the century, the horizontal issues related to enlargement, and the future
financial framework beyond 2000 . . . in an enlarged EU’. The report is divided
into two parts, dealing with internal and enlargement issues, respectively. Inter-
nally, it sets four priority areas for action. The first concerned the setting of the
conditions for sustainable employment and intensive growth, prescribing all
those initiatives where priority is given either de facto or by choice of policy.
Thus EMU and the introduction of the Euro on 1 January 1999 within the Euro-
pean banking system (for public use since January 2002), together with accom-
panying and/or supportive measures such as the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP), and the Action Plan endorsed in Amsterdam (emphasising rule simpli-
fication and the consolidation of the single market programme).21 Competition
rules were to be simplified and surveillance and enforcement structures mod-
ernised in partnership between national and central levels of governance. Prior-
ity was also given to the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and
measures were proposed to facilitate their performance.22 Sustainable develop-
ment, which became part of the Union’s objectives with the AMT, was expected
to enhance the competitiveness of the European industry and services if
reflected in environmentally sustainable production and consumption patterns
and if the newest technologies were incorporated into the Union’s environmen-
tal policy. Trans-European networks were given priority ‘to enhance both the
sustainable development and the internal cohesion of the Union’,23 with the new
rounds of enlargement also in mind. The second area was the placement of
knowledge and technology at the forefront. Here, the Commission proclaims
that research, innovation, education and training are of ‘decisive importance for
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the development of the Union’.24 Priority was given to research and technologi-
cal development, focusing on ways of enhancing European competitiveness and
creating jobs. Education and training received priority status, too, with empha-
sis on the exchange of personnel. The third area related to the modernisation of
employment systems. Labour market and employment policies were to achieve
maximum flexibility for the enterprises and maximum security for individuals
in conjunction with the new Title on Employment in the AMT. Issues such as
investment in the skills of the existing workforce, increase in participation rates,
encouragement of mobility and dialogues between the workforce and manage-
ment in anticipation of restructuring of the enterprises receive added currency.
Reform of pensions and healthcare systems in view of adverse demographic
developments represented another major challenge in the Commission’s report.
These were to be reconciled with budgetary rectitude, with the Union acting in
a co-ordinating capacity, serving as a forum for promoting better mutual under-
standing of long-term perspectives and for identifying common challenges.25
The fourth area finally related to the improvement of living conditions.
Expected growth was linked with the promotion of a more cohesive and inclu-
sive European society, with the Union intensifying its efforts to combat all forms
of social exclusion and discrimination. Public health, the environment, the free
movement of people, adequate levels of security and justice, the fight against
fraud, crime, corruption and so on – all add up to a quality of life problem for
post-materialist European societies, and have to be addressed as a priority, in
light of increased public awareness.
With reference to the Union’s external relations, the Commission’s slogans
were ‘a stable Europe that is open to the world’ and ‘a strong and coherent
Europe’. Relations with Russia, mainly owing to the eastward enlargement of
NATO and of the Union itself with the possible inclusion of populations of
ethnic Russian origin, mainly in Latvia and Estonia, were singled out for
improvement, as were those with the Balkan countries that have signed associ-
ation agreements with the Union. The latter, provided that it does not repeat the
CFSP fiasco of the Yugoslav civil war, can become a stabilising force in the wider
area, as these countries are actively seeking to become its members. The demo-
cratic reform process in these countries, currently in severe financial difficulties
(especially Romania, Albania and Bulgaria), should be kept alive with the active
support of the Union. The report also stresses the importance for the Union of
the south Mediterranean area in relation to the Barcelona Process: a partnership
agreement between the Union and the twelve non-EU Mediterranean countries
(including the Palestinian Authority) covering political (security), economic
(free trade area and financial projects) and sociocultural (civil society and inter-
cultural dialogue) issues.26 Development co-operation constituted the third
major item in the Commission’s agenda, and a new but unspecified form of
partnership between the Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries was put forward, although, surprisingly, relations with Latin Ameri-
can countries, but also with the US, were somewhat downgraded in the report.
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For the more effective intervention of the Union in international affairs, the
report suggested that a more integrated approach should be built, meaning, and
rightly so, that the artificial distinction between external economic and external
political affairs be gradually phased out with more use of QMV. But all the above
are more easily said than done, as successive treaty reforms have time and again
reminded us. Thus, if the Union is going to move where the Agenda 2000 report
wishes, it will need all the stamina and courage it can mobilise to persuade both
its member states and demoi that this course of action is the best way forward.
But what might the best way forward be for the fledging European polity?
A positive attempt at defining the new challenges confronting integration
post-Nice can be attributed to the Commission’s White Paper on European
Governance, published in July 2001.27 In it, the Commission identified the
reasons for reforming existing modes of European governance and ascertained
those principles of good governance that should guide the formulation and
delivery of common policies and regulations. Among these principles, openess,
transparency, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence – all
of which are also linked to proportionality, subsidiarity and flexibility – figured
prominently in the Commission’s reformist menu, which represented a
comprehensive approach to the challenges of complex institutional restruc-
turing and positive European awareness-formation at the grassroots (with
renewed emphasis on the future role of civil society representatives in EU policy-
initiation). The White Paper formed part of a long-awaited European public
debate, effectively launched with the address of German Foreign Minister
Fischer to Humbold University in Berlin on 12 May 2000.
In particular, Fischer’s Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation,28 by embody-
ing a strong normative orientation towards some prototype European Bun-
desrepublik – i.e., to the extent that the end product will also be democratically
structured – was instrumental in reviving European public debate and in some
instances re-activating dormant national reflexes about the finalité of the
Union. Likewise, it ignited the interest of both academic and policy communi-
ties about the future political – and, this time in more explicit terms than hith-
erto – constitutional evolution of the European polity. The timing of Fischer’s
federalist blueprint was rather strategically calculated, as it was launched three
months after the IGC 2000 had been formally inaugurated and only three days
after the fiftieth anniversary of the Schuman Plan. Although the then ongoing
review conference was generally regarded as dealing with the ‘Amsterdam left-
overs’, as opposed to being a self-conscious attempt at polity transformation
through a substantive constitutional re-ordering or even re-design, the ‘Fis-
cher debate’ – taken as a debate on good European governance – received a
warm welcome, least of all by integration scholarship, as it signalled ‘a truly
bright and refreshing breath of fresh air in today’s politics’.29 Whether ‘an
unconventional type of political act’, Fischer’s address inspired, if not nur-
tured, a shift in emphasis from the unimaginative language often articulated
by high-ranking technocrats to a more accessible terminology, mirroring
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some fundamental – and conceptual – challenges and dilemmas confronting
European political society.
More specifically, in his capacity as a European and German parliament-
arian, rather than as the official foreign representative of the German federal
government, Fischer posed the question Quo vadis Europa? In the interests of
economy, we offer a summative account of the normative underpinnings of his
answer, which are to be found in his deontological call for a European constitu-
tional treaty or Verfassungsvertrag centred around basic human rights; shared
sovereignty; a division of competences between the Union and the states via a
Kompetenzkatalog; a clear division of powers among the central institutions,
including full parliamentarisation through the institutionalisation of a Euro-
pean bicameral structure – leaving, however, the option for the nature and com-
position of the upper house open between a US-inspired Senate model of
directly elected members and a German-type chamber of state representatives
with different numbers of votes; and a European Government formed either by
the unit governments (thus developing the European Council into a govern-
ment proper) or by a directly elected Commission President with extensive exec-
utive and administrative powers (thus transforming the existing Commission
into a hierarchical structure of government). Far from encouraging the aboli-
tion of the member states, not least owing to the richness and diversity of their
historically constituted cultures and traditions, his vision encompasses the
notion of a lean but fully fledged European federation.
In response to Fischer’s proposals, a clear, albeit qualified, federalist orien-
tation was also recorded from many high-ranking figures like Rau, Schröder,
Verhofstadt, Barnier, Bayrou, Prodi and Simitis; Chirac and Blair, opting for
rather less federalist polity ideas and assorted policy menus that strengthen
national statehood (envisioning an enhanced Council Secretariat, greater
agenda powers for the Council and a Senate composed of national parliamen-
tarians); and Jospin, influenced by Delors’ preference for a ‘mixed’ system of
governance (favouring greater central powers and even a directly elected Presi-
dent, but rejecting both the ideas for a second chamber and a federal core). But
there has also been some justified criticism by EU scholarship regarding the
emphasis placed in Fischer’s federalist blueprint on the division, rather than the
sharing, of sovereignty rights between the Union and the states. Börzel and Risse
make the point well: ‘Fischer still thinks in categories of the hierarchically struc-
tured nation-state with its exclusive authority over power and territory, includ-
ing the legitimate monopoly over the use of (internal and external) force.’30
Instead, they conceptualise a European federal order from the perspective of
multilevel governance, stressing the importance of distinguishing between
‘formal’ and ‘material’ sovereignty: the former, they claim, is already divided,
but also shared, between EU and nation-state authorities, whilst the latter is
defined in degrees of the capacity for autonomous action.31 Material sovereignty
is central to understanding the Union as a multilevel system of governance, in
that it ‘does not easily translate into a constitutional language, which should
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delineate who is in charge of what and when, and thus, should define structures
of formal sovereignty’.32
Thus depicted, the present-day European polity encompasses subnational,
national, supranational and transnational institutions and processes, public,
semi-public and private interests, as well as a plethora of ‘governance arenas’,
‘negotiating networks’, ‘functional regimes’ and the like, within which material
sovereignty is shared across and between levels by a multiplicity of actors that
interact regularly in the determination of policy outcomes. A further line of crit-
icism was directed against Fischer’s conceptual typology, in that his envisaged
finalité amounted to a European federation but not a federal state, thus on the
one hand attempting to escape the confines of classical constitutional theory
without, on the other, formulating a conceptual alternative. Even the term he
uses to describe the Union, Staatenverbund – a term inspired by the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht in its oft-quoted ‘Maastricht ruling’ – is, according to von
Boyme,33 practically untranslatable in all but the Swedish language, courtesy of
the term Statsförbundet. If, then, such is the confusion over the Union’s present
stance, and for that matter Fischer’s conceptual departure, and if no alternative
term is offered for the imagined end state, how can one conceptualise Fischer’s
‘third-way’ construct of ‘federation without a state’? A plausible answer is offered
by Leben, who notes that federation à la Fischer might have been influenced by
Schmitt’s ideas on a ‘federative pact’, aiming to reconcile seemingly irreconcil-
able elements, by advancing a public law conception of the federation, whereby
the member states, both as the authors of the pact as well as constitutive units,
retain their sovereignty.34 Yet, whichever direction the constitutional develop-
ment of the Union takes, Fischer’s blueprint requires, in his own words, ‘a delib-
erative political act to re-establish Europe’. This observation has fundamental
implications for the emergence of a genuine European public sphere in the sense
of becoming something more than the Europeanisation of the component
political spaces. The institutionalisation of the envisaged composite public sphere
lies, in our view, at the heart of any substantive move towards a qualitatively
new European polity characterised by symbiotic legitimation, accountability, and
communicative structures. In Olsen’s words:
A public discourse about the adequacy, or inadequacy, of existing institutional
arrangements can be a process of civic education through which European citizens
develop an understanding of what constitutes a good society and system of gover-
nance, ie, the legitimate constitutional principles of authority, power and account-
ability, and the normative-ethical basis, and value commitments and beliefs, of
the polity.35
In this civic conception of the European polity, the constituent publics, in the
form of a transnational civic demos, are capable of directing their democratic
claims to, and via, the central institutions, through free public deliberation. In
this context, democratic deliberation takes precedence over interest aggregation,
as does civic over state/Union competence, and social over empirical legitimacy.
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Finally, and whether or not further integration is to be pursued through ‘a
Hayekian discovery procedure’ or through a ‘pre-thought-out blueprint’,36 the
search for legitimate forms of collective governance in Europe is central to the
construction of a political community founded on more active and inclusionary
virtues of belonging such as civic self-reliance and institutionalised participa-
tion: a European res publica, that is, composed of constitutive but equally sover-
eign citizens. The task at hand requires also a fundamental change in the current
philosophy of European governance, in the sense of moving away from output-
oriented, utilitarian, task-driven and cost-effective/reducing problem-solving
modes of collective action, embracing instead the long-standing need to call
greater attention to the relationship between the Union and ‘the civic’, with the
view to transforming the governing capacity of its nascent demos into a system-
steering agency. For ultimately, it is within this embracing civic space that a
feature central to the democratic process – national or transnational – becomes
crucial, that of ‘civic competence’: the institutional capacity of citizens qua social
equals to enter the realm of political influence and sustain a vital public sphere –
‘a network that gives citizens . . . an equal opportunity to take part in an encom-
passing process of focused political communication’.37 Here, the pairing of ‘civic’
and ‘competence’ does not embody a category mistake, but rather acts in the
interests of engaging the demos in the management of public affairs, institu-
tionalising, through the granting of substantive civic entitlements, a normative
commitment to core democratic values, while giving an institutional face to a
central task of legitimate public life: active civic participation in the governance
of the polity.
The above discussion brings to the fore the question of strengthening
common citizenship rights and duties: a debate, however, which needs to be
linked with the prospects for constitutionalisating the Charter of Fundamental
rights. Indeed, the IGC 2004 offers an excellent opportunity for adding to the
existing corpus of EU citizenship rights with a view to elevating this novel status
civitatis to an independent sphere of civic entitlements. The need for positive
action in that regard is urgent, especially in view of the importance of providing
a sense of civic attachment to the collectivity and a shared sense of the public
good that transcends the nationally determined fix between norms of citizen-
ship and the (territorial) state. But this requires in turn a certain dosage of deter-
mination by the Union to redress effectively its constitutional shortcomings and
to strengthen the range and depth of civic participation (deliberative or other)
in the exercise of political authority. Out of a voluminous set of measures to
build on the development of a transnational civic demos, the following merit
our attention: institutionalising at Union level the notion of civic competence,
thus adding it to the more conventional way of thinking about competences as
statutory guarantees or the capacity for authoritative action; extending the right
to vote and to stand as a candidate at national elections for citizens residing in a
member state other than their own; introducing the right of European citizens
to hold public office anywhere within the Union; enshrining the citizens’ right
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to information on all EU issues, while making all the official documents of the
Union available to the public; introducing the right of European citizens, indi-
vidually or collectively, to be informed when a decision of the Union impinges
on specific interests; recognising full political rights to legally resident third-
country nationals (denizens), thus transcending any liberal–statist norms of
civic inclusion and rejecting a ‘dissociational-type democracy’ at Union level;
and codifying the principles of additionality and non-regression so that Union
citizenship rights are established in addition to national ones, while ensuring
that existing rights are not reduced.
At a more general level, the distinction between an extra-treaty arrangement
– i.e., an EU Charter that provides only for a standard for fundamental rights –
and a legally binding instrument that provides for a set of basic rights guarantees
is vital, for in the latter case, a Charter incorporated into the Treaty would also be
made subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ. It would also grant the latter a crucial
interpretative function with regard to human rights respect and protection
throughout the Union. Also, with an internally justiciable Charter, the Union
would make a positive as well as credible move towards what has been described
as ‘a more human rights-based constitutionalism’. Yet, a potential problem
remains, as many legal experts were quick to point out: were the ECJ to be
become the last instance of appeal in the Union for human rights issues, this
might deprive its citizens of a final external appeal against violations of their fun-
damental rights. The only sensible way to avoid this predicament, as well as the
possibility of two competing jurisdictions, is for the Union to accede to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In that way, it is claimed that ECJ
rulings related to the ECHR would be made subject to the supervision of the
ECHR, thus enhancing the accountability of the ECJ itself. This brings us to
another complex legal issue, but with crucial political implications, not only for
the quality of human rights protection and enforcement standards within the
Union, but also for transnational demos-formation. Would a legally binding
Charter have general application throughout the member states, or would it be
restricted to fundamental rights protection only in the context of EU action? Put
differently, would the Charter apply in cases of member state action (taken by
central, regional or local authorities, or public organisations) that is not directly
linked to the implementation of EU law, as Art. 51(1) of the Charter currently
provides for? Assuming that the prevalent interpretation is that the Charter is
indeed confined to EU action alone, and despite the drafters’ prima facie inten-
tion to consolidate the current method of the ECJ to deal with questions of basic
rights as ‘general principles of Community law’, given the nature and scope of
the rights enshrined in the Charter, far more positive action is needed. Such
action could take the form of amending Art. 51(1) with a view to extending the
Charter’s applicability to state action that is not linked directly to EU activities.
Bold as this step may be, its case becomes even stronger if one links fundamental
rights protection with the free movement of people within an integrated eco-
nomic space operating under a single currency system. Taking rights (more)
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seriously, ascribes to the concept and process of ‘Chartering Europe’
their proper meaning, while endowing the Union with a political constitution
proper. In line, finally, with a neo-republican approach to EU polity-building
(see Chapter 2), the Charter attempts to bridge the long-standing rights/duties
divide, by explicitly stating in the preamble that ‘[e]njoyment of these rights
entail responsibilities and duties [especially the provisions on solidarity] with
regard to other persons, the human community and to future generations’.
Arguably, all the above proposals are easier said than done. But if properly
institutionalized, they would bring about an EU citizenship policy proper, as
they ultimately depend on the political will of the member state executives,
rather than on an overarching European volonté générale at the grassroots. In this
way also, the Union would be equipped to allocate authoritatively, and not
merely derivatively, rights (and values) within European civic society. The out-
come would be not to create a ‘community of fate’ or Schicksalsgemeinschaft
shaped by common descent, language, history and the like, but rather to ‘democ-
ratise’ the constitution of European citizenship and facilitate the horizontal
integration of citizens in conformity to the norms and practices of EU-wide civic
inclusion. It would also elevate its civic status to a distinctive form of ‘meta-
citizenship’ and endow the Union with a distinctive political subject, whose
collective civic identity exists independent of national public spheres, but whose
‘politics’ extends to both European and national civic arenas. Moreover, such a
move would signal a shift in the basis of legitimation from a functionalist-driven,
segmentary-type of (mainly) economic European civic body to a political com-
munity of free and equal citizens – i.e., a populus liber driven by a charitas
civicum. Although such profound changes in the political constitution of Europe
would almost certainly spark a series of substantive, and for some even unpleas-
ant, amendments to national constitutions, basic laws or parliamentary statutes,
for any well-thought-out and at the same time consequential debate on Euro-
pean democracy to come full circle – assuming of course that such a democracy
will not go through all the developmental stages of Western liberal democracy –
such proposals should be part of the discursive agenda on the constitutional (or
other) future(s) of Europe, the member states and, crucially, the candidate coun-
tries. Such normative commitments at instituting a multilevel civic space within
which the constituent publics are recognised as bearers of rights, freedoms and
duties in relation, however, to the larger polity can also act as an antidote to the
growing impoverishment of national public life, where an apparent decline in
the quality of public discourse and civic participation is met by a shrinking
(social) legitimacy of ‘the political’.
Turning finally to the Charter’s drafting process, and pace the absence of any
formalised selection criteria, it has opened the way for a more visible, delibera-
tive and inclusive method of EU polity-building – i.e., a European public
process. Indeed, the symbolic importance attributed to the composition of the
drafting Convention, but also of the new Convention in view of the IGC 2004,
is that it marked a ‘break point’ in the politics of institutional representation at
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Union level, particularly with reference to the transparency and social legiti-
macy of collective constitutional engineering (both elements were emphatically
absent in previous treaty reforms, although during the IGC 2000 an abundance
of related material became available in cyberspace). In addition, such a strategy
has exemplified an acute and increasingly alarming ‘democratic disjunction’
between the state-controlled nature of treaty change (through unanimity and
asymmetrically negotiated outcomes) and the impact of civil and civic society
on the debate about the future of Europe. Accordingly, to ensure the pluralistic
and participatory nature of the Charter’s drafting formula, it would be desir-
able, at least from a political–constitutionalist perspective, to use its template for
future treaty-amending processes. Should that prove too much for sovereignty-
conscious states to digest, and there is an abundance of realist state-centric
explanations and reasons why it should, an alternative, more pragmatic scenario
would be for the EP to be granted constitutional competence over treaty reform
through the assent procedure, acting by an absolute majority of its members.
Having looked at the Charter, we can now turn to the remaining items on the
IGC 2004 agenda: competence allocation, Treaty simplification, and the role of
national parliaments.
Prospects for the IGC 2004
Allocating competences
Since this question is linked in both conceptual and operative terms with the
governing structure of multilevel polities, some general observations are in
order. To start with, multilevel polities perform functions that are either shared
in common among different levels of decision-making, or are assigned to par-
ticular governmental settings that are seen as being either more legitimate or
efficient structures for the performance of given tasks. Such polities are com-
pound states based as much on informal and ad hoc arrangements of shared rule
as on internal political pressures for self-governance. Hence, the search for
appropriate forms and means of a division of competences is at the heart of the
viability of composite systems aiming to reconcile what constitutes the corner-
stone of all systems of dispersed authority: ‘unity in diversity’ and, at the level of
joint decision-making, ‘consensus in pluriformity’. A voluminous literature
exists on both formal and informal constitutional and procedural mechanisms
through which polity-builders attempt to transcend real or perceived divisions
over what can be termed as ‘capacity for governance’. Central to this issue is the
distribution of formal legislative and executive authority, the form and range of
such distribution, and the variegated possibilities for exclusive, concurrent or
residual competences. In Western liberal polities, there is a strong predisposi-
tion to safeguard the essential norms of democratic governance, with the ten-
sions between different levels of authority often being exacerbated by reference
to their acclaimed ‘democrativeness’. Such problems are compounded further
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by the extent to which the polity at hand is characterised by centralised or
decentralised tendencies, symmetrical or asymmetrical relationships among the
subunits, centripetal or centrifugal dynamics, and constitutional or less for-
malised guarantees for constituent autonomy. When the founding act of the
polity is not a formal constitution accompanied by a supreme court, a system of
rule based on Montesquieu’s trias politica and a Kompetenzkatalog, but instead
rests on a constituent act, pact, contract, convention or treaty, then the level of
systemic ambiguity increases dramatically.
The Union is an excellent case for studying questions of multilevel compe-
tence allocation – and even of multilevel constitutionalism – owing to its
in-built pluralism and variability. But the way in which subsidiarity operates in
the Union chimes well with a consociationalist understanding of politics, as it
justifies a potential flow of decision-making powers to nation-state authorities,
thus offering a ‘partial offset’ to the quest for legislative autonomy within the
component polities. This line of reasoning confirms the view that the principle
resembles a kind of ‘reserved powers’ to the states: a self-defence mechanism
against the accretion of competences to the centre. From this prism also, it is
difficult to overlook signs of an inverse type of federalism, favouring the diffu-
sion of power down to national tiers of governance, with the ‘burden of proof ’
lying with the Community that has to justify through a public reason argument
the compatibility of proposed legislation with the subsidiarity principle. Like
previous references to the latter (a ‘bottom-up’ approach to fiscal federalism,
or in the context of cross-frontier dimension effects, or as a policy instrument
of economic intervention), there is no provision in the Treaties for the precise
allocation of competences, nor is there any distinction between different types
of competences – i.e., exclusive, concurrent and potential. This amounts to ‘the
problem of competence’: the absence of an explicit formal mechanism for
allocating responsibilities within the Union, outside the areas that, in principle,
are considered to be its exclusive prerogative: the four freedoms of movement
and the policies that are a corollary to them. It follows that the areas falling
within the internal market sphere are not subject to the principle of subsidiar-
ity, but are determined by the pre-emption doctrine, in that once the Commu-
nity legislates in one area, then national action is being precluded. Accordingly,
subsidiarity can be used as a rule for competence allocation only in cases of con-
currence, or when the Community has for the first time passed legislation in a
new field. In matters unaffected by Community law, the argument goes, it is
presumed that the component states retain exclusive competence.
There is a case to be made for the powers specifically entrusted to the centre
to be enlisted in the Treaty, as for instance the Australian Constitution does (Art.
51 stipulates thirty-nine areas which fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal
Parliament); or that a clear mechanism to delegate specific competences to the
centre be provided for, as in the case of the German Grundgesetz (Art. 72 II list-
ing the conditions under which the Bund has the right to legislate); or that there
is an explicit reference to the sovereignty of the parts as in the Swiss Constitution
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(Art. 3 stating that the cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty suffers
no restriction from the federal constitution); or even that a ‘residual clause’ be
included in a manner similar to the US Constitution (the Tenth Amendment of
1791 which created a sense of ‘constitutive autonomy’). These polities, similarly
to the Union, have followed, ceteris paribus, a pattern of competence attribution,
where the emphasis was on specifying a limited set of central competences, with
the residual powers resting with the subunits. Reflecting on their experience, the
case for centralised governance has to be proved. This is justified on the grounds
that the segments, in the form of previously independent polities, have preceded
the creation of the federation. Such an approach falls within the logic of
‘bottom-up’ subsidiarity, derived from the Catholic social doctrine on the rela-
tionship between the individual, the state and society, as well as on a vertical
division of power within federal polities. Although an ensemble sui generis
formula should not be excluded for the Union, central to any constitutional
settlement is the principle of proportionality, already an element of Community
case law: ‘Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary
to achieve the objectives of this Treaty’, a principle which does not alter the attri-
bution of competence, but concerns the way in which central power should be
exercised once the Community level has been authorised to take appropriate
action. The rationale here is that central legislative action should not exceed
what is necessary to meet the end in view. In other words, such action has to
be intra vires.
In attempting to clarify the conditions for applying subsidiarity, the Com-
mission has explicitly asserted the primacy of states, in that ‘[the] conferment of
powers is a matter for the writers of our constitution, that is to say of the treaty.
A consequence of this is that the powers conferred on the Community, in con-
trast to those reserved to the states, cannot be assumed.’ The point here is that
the states, as the conferring agency, could ‘de-confer’ if they wish to. In the end,
the following criteria for central action were set out as guidelines on subsidiar-
ity: whether the issue at hand has transnational effects that cannot be satisfac-
torily regulated by state action; whether state action or lack of Community
action would conflict with Treaty requirements and significantly damage states’
interests; whether the Council must be satisfied that Community action would
produce clear benefits of scale or effects. Although these guidelines found their
way into a detailed protocol agreed in Amsterdam, it is still the Community that
has to justify compliance of proposed action to these principles. Moreover, there
is no mention of substate units. Ceteris paribus, directives should be preferred to
regulations, and so should framework directives (assigned the task of fixing
objectives and guidelines) to detailed measures, thus leaving as much scope for
national decision-making as possible. Although this may be revisited by the
Convention and, eventually, by the 2004 IGC itself, it should be linked both to
the preferred means of implementing and monitoring EU law (when different
formulas are required according to different policy stages) and to the question
of creating a hierarchy of Community Acts.
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What still remains of crucial importance, however, is for a balance to be
struck between state and EU competences on what level of aggregation should
act on which types of issue. In view of the discussion above, and given the exist-
ing difficulties in implementing subsidiarity, a possible outline of action in
relation to the IGC 2004 is to ‘constitutionalise’ the process of competence attri-
bution, instead of delineating expressis verbi spheres of legislative authority and
to set up a new instrument – i.e., a Committee of Competence Attribution – of
a mixed composition (consisting of national representatives as well as members
of the major EU institutions, including the CoR and the ECJ) that would provide
complementary checks and balances to the existing framework by assessing dis-
puted acts, should any of the actors involved in EU legislation call into question
a proposal on the grounds of subsidiarity and proportionality. The proposed
Committee would not have to be permanent (although that would help to
develop its own institutional culture) and its rulings could take the form of rec-
ommendations. Given the immense complexities in the Union’s legal system, the
interconnectedness of national and collective modes of policy action, and the
profound cross-border effects of joint decisions, it is fair to say that the idea of a
Kompetenzkatalog is not the most productive way forward, as it could deprive
integration from its inherent dynamism and flexibility. But equally problematic
is Blair’s view, as expressed in a speech delivered in Warsaw in October 2000, to
contain a general delimitation of powers in a politically binding ‘Statement of
Principles’. Interesting as the idea of a Charter of Competences may be for future
reference – i.e., on the eve of drafting a material European Constitution through
a European Constituent Assembly – a more plausible alternative to those pre-
sented above is to enshrine in the Treaty, under the heading ‘Competence Attri-
bution’, a core set of basic principles governing the attribution of competences
within the Union, including also provisions for the active participation of sub-
national authorities. Such an arrangement, as noted earlier, should be seen
within the wider context of framework directives becoming more widely used by
the central authorities.
Pace the constitutional arrangements currently in place in some of its fed-
eral subsystems, and particularly the insistence of the Länder for a strict division
of competences, one could legitimately argue that both the constitutional archi-
tecture and decision-making culture of the Union qua ‘non-state polity’ are not
(as yet) in a position to resolve questions of competence allocation through an
explicit delineation of legislative powers among the Union’s constitutive levels
of governance. Moreover, whether or not the existing acquis is inherently
incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity, the fact remains that a system of
delimited competences is prone to limit the future ambitions of the Union, not
least of all in terms of extending its grip over new or relatively undeveloped poli-
cies (such as taxation and education); open the way for the re-nationalisaton of
common policies (especially in agricultural matters); and create a complex
world of ‘micro-competences’ that would deprive the Union of the levels of flex-
ibility needed to deal effectively with new challenges (most notably in the social
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field). Thus, the drawing up of a set of governing principles (and mechanisms)
for competence attribution within the Union, as opposed to a legally or politi-
cally binding Charter of Competences à la Fischer or Blair, fits better the current
profile of the larger polity as a constitutional system in statu nascendi.
Simplifying the treaties
The perennial issue of simplifying the Treaties has been the subject of inquiry
for some time. Most prominent among these studies has been the report
commissioned to the EUI by the Commission. It appeared under the title ‘Reor-
ganisation of the Treaties’ on 15 May 2000, that is, a few months after the IGC
2000 began its work and only three days after Fischer’s address. The resulting
draft was entitled ‘Basic Treaty of the European Union’ consisted of eight Titles
and ninety-five Clauses (incorporating the major constitutive features of the
Union), and demonstrated the feasibility of the exercise, as the task required a
great amount of technical work, as well as its desirability, in that an exceedingly
complex set of Treaty provisions would become simpler, more readable and,
hence, more accessible to both European citizens and the candidate publics.
Hardly surprisingly, the work of the drafting group revealed numerous ambigu-
ities, inconsistencies, lacunae and contradictions inherent, to borrow a
metaphor, in the ‘loose and baroque structure’ of the existing Treaties and sub-
sidiary texts. Pace its limited mandate – i.e., it had to avoid any changes to legal
status or substantive provisions – by dividing and re-classifying in a consistent
manner the whole primary law of the Union, the group paved the way for a more
apparent, comprehensible and transparent basic instrument. It also linked the
project of ‘rationalisation through simplification’ with the future of Europe
debate. Modest in ambition, as it was an exercise à droit contant, the Basic Treaty
managed in the end to achieve its near-impossible objective: ‘to restructure
without modifying’ the Union’s acquis constitutionnel. Short of a European
Constitution, at least with reference to statist analogies, the EUI brought to
the fore the tension between legal and political arguments for and against a
substantive reshuffling of the Union’s constitutional basis.
Grosso modo, the restructuring operation aimed at preserving three types of
balances, summarised by Mény thus: the grands équilibres among Community
policies; the balance between substantive and institutional law; and that between
Community action in the first pillar and intergovernmentalism in the remain-
ing two.38 A similar suggestion was made by the EP, in that the Treaties should be
split into two parts: a constitutional part (enshrining fundamental principles
and procedures) and an operational part (incorporating policy issues). Pat-
terned on the TEU model, the Basic Treaty, which effectively replaces the TEU
as amended by the AMT, remains a ‘framework treaty’ and covers all EU activi-
ties. Hence its equally flexible nature, also evident in the tripartite structure of
the TEU. Although he EUI report did not make it to the negotiating table
at Nice, it has both a symbolic and identity-creating impact, as the Convention
can use it as a good starting point for the search of a truly intelligible basic
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instrument – i.e., a constitutional treaty. An important issue that merits our
attention concerns the setting up of different and less cumbersome procedures
for revising the Treaties. The EUI report took notice of this point by suggesting
that present treaty-amending processes should be eased in future Treaty negoti-
ations. Few would disagree that the traditional exclusionary and sovereignty-
cautious method of ‘qualified unanimity’ for reforming the Treaties, as
epitomised in Art. 48 TEU – i.e., unanimity between the member states and
adoption by the latter according to their constitutional requirements – has
clearly reached its limits, especially with the Nice experience, where even rela-
tively small and, logically, less conflict-prone amendments became troublesome
to negotiate and agree upon. But what alternatives are there for a more inclusive
and at the same time efficient process of EU constitutional change?
To start with, the drafting group’s recommendation for changing the rules
guiding treaty reform – produced in a separate report envisaging greater parlia-
mentary input, was for different procedures to apply to different Treaty provi-
sions according to the relative political importance and/or sensitivity of the
issues at hand. Incidentally, a similar proposal is found in the report drafted at
the Commission’s request prior to the IGC 2000 by the three ‘Wise Men’
(Simon, Dehaene and Weizsäcker). Doubtless, one could envisage numerous
scenarios based on a distinction between ‘major’ and ‘minor’, or indeed ‘consti-
tutional’ and ‘non-constitutional’ amendments, with each category guided by
different revision rules: the former dealing only with issues regarding the re-
allocation of competences within the Union (and between the central institu-
tions) through some form of legislative co-determination between the Council
and the EP, and conditional upon the ratification of a majority of, say, at least
three-quarters of the member states, or even without any ratification obliga-
tions; the latter, requiring a more vigorous fourth-fifths majority in the Coun-
cil, the assent of the EP through an absolute majority of its members, and
conditional upon the ratification of, say, at least four-fifths of the member states.
Other amending procedures could involve various combinations, including the
conduct of European-wide referenda, especially if the underlying objective is to
move towards the further politicisation of treaty revisions. The same, of course,
applies to the process of initiating treaty reforms or for that matter the idea of a
European Constitution proper, say, on the joint initiative of certain central insti-
tutions (through some form of majority) – i.e., the Council, the EP (with or
without prior consultation with national parliaments) and/or the Commission
acting as a ‘college’ – or ‘by popular demand’ after a general referendum, or by
a combination of both. These formulas for treaty-amendment are merely to
indicate the wide range of possibility according to different logics (and motives)
of EU constitutional reform.
Yet, functional differentiation in amending the Treaties, especially in areas
where the constituent units strive for higher levels of integration and, hence,
are prepared to make greater use of QMV (and also extend it to all areas of
parliamentary co-decision, which could in turn be applied to cover most EU
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decision-making), may not always act in the interests of a more ‘user-friendly’
Treaty. But it would most likely reduce the sheer volume and inordinate com-
plexity of asymmetrically negotiated outcomes – usually producing an
inequitable status quo among small(er) and large(r) states, as the Nice process
has so dramatically exemplified – through the traditional intergovernmental
practices of horse-trading, log-rolling, side-payments, and the like – all of
which, are part of what essentially constitutes the EU’s acquis conferenciel. Be
that as it may, post-Nice, the European polity is once again in search of new
procedures to inflict upon its still uncrystallised political constitution the
appropriate dosage of democracy and efficiency. In the hope that the end prod-
uct of the IGC 2004 will not result in a deadly mix, we shift our emphasis to the
last substantive item that appears on the Union’s reformist agenda.
Remodelling the legislature
Much like the debate on the reorganisation of the Union’s primary law and the
apparent wealth of constitutional choices between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ methods
for amending the Treaties, the questions of how best to remodel the European
legislature and what input (in terms of powers and functions) there should be
from national legislative bodies have no easy answers. For one thing, there is
an a priori normative choice to be made between a clear-cut European bicam-
eral structure patterned on some federal-type legislature or other (and likely to
involve national parliamentarians) and building on the existing quasi-federal
(the other half being presumably confederal) constitutional architecture of the
Union, by means of developing further the co-legislative (and controlling)
powers of the EP, but without formally incorporating national parliaments
into the EU legislative process. Opting for the first choice implies, inter alia,
either the establishment of a new upper house composed solely of representa-
tives of national parliaments, or the creation of a ‘mixed’ legislative body con-
sisting partly of national parliamentary deputies and partly of Council
members. Opting for the second choice means that new checks and balances
would have to be found in the current (and not so co-equal) process of leg-
islative co-determination between the Council and the EP (with the former
reforming its internal structure).
Little doubt exists that European integration has strengthened the executive
branches of the member polities (especially in terms of national parliaments
holding ministers to account on their EU actions or inaction), even to the extent
that some confidently point to the ‘de-parliamentarisation’ of national political
systems. The combined effects of national parliaments’ inability to exercise
effective control over both their government and the Brussels apparatus, along
with the transfer of national legislative powers to a Council that – to this day –
remains collectively unaccountable, has resulted in a dual, if not multilevel,
‘democratic deficit’ in the Union. But the Nice mandate for further reforms
carefully camouflages the seriousness of the situation by simply referring to the
role of national parliaments in the integration process. Our previous analysis
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has touched upon the different (and often differing) views expressed by various
EU leaders in the context of the ‘Fischer debate’. As Duff put it:
Mr Blair apparently wants to introduce a third chamber into the legislature of
the Union, composed, like the old European Parliament, of national MPs. Mr
Verhofstadt seems to have the US Senate in mind when he looks at the future of the
EU’s Council of Ministers; Mr Schröder, the Bundesrat. Other luminaries, like Mr
Fischer, just seem muddled, and national parliaments themselves differ widely in
their reaction to the perceived problem.39
The problem, however, is compounded further by the failure of past initiatives,
like the ‘Assizes’ (a forum bringing together more than 300 national and Euro-
pean parliamentarians), courtesy of TEU Declaration 14, as it was convened
only once in November 1990 in Rome. Also, although Protocol 13 of the AMT
granted Treaty status to the Conference of European Affairs Committees
(COSAC) – first set up in 1989 following the initiative of the French Presidency
– acknowledging its role in commenting on various pieces of EU legislation,
this mechanism reflected a compromise between those who wanted its formal
institutionalisation along the lines of an upper house (and, hence, its incorpo-
ration into the EU legislative process), and those who hailed its informality as
its crucial property. (During the IGC 1996/97, there were voices arguing the
case for COSAC to become a kind of second EP, rather than EU, chamber rep-
resenting the national parliaments.) This proposal, however, would require the
existing EP structure to be split into two constituent bodies (though not neces-
sarily on an equal basis), whose members would be elected through national
and EP elections. The point to make here is that the original role envisaged for
COSAC was to engage national parliamentarians in dialogue, something that
could be institutionalised more vigorously in the existing institutional setting,
and even linked with the creation of a new Inter-Parliamentary Committee
(composed of an equal number of COSAC and EP members) without, though,
altering the present representative (and legitimising) function of the EP. At a
speech given in Paris in May 2001, Jospin called for a similar body in the form
of a permanent Congress of Parliaments to hold annual debates on the ‘State of
the Union’, to make sure that the principle of subsidiarity is being observed, and
to be involved in the modification of technical or procedural rules in certain
policies. The new institution could be involved in certain fields of EU legisla-
tion, either by means of performing political review functions, or by monitor-
ing policy implementation. The same could easily apply to the Commission’s
annual legislative programme and, as suggested by Jospin, to a multiannual
programme that the European Council could adopt. In this way, the EP would
get involved in the day-to-day negotiations with the Council and the Commis-
sion, and the Committee would thus provide additional democratic oversight.
This depiction also preserves the foundations of the EU’s double democratic
legitimacy, with the EP representing the constituent publics directly and the
Council, the member governments.
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It is important to stress that various other institutional improvements could
be introduced to the existing quasi-bicameral structure, which could prove
more significant to the democratisation of the Union – in both political and
operational terms – as compared with a radical remodelling of its legislature
and, hence, either the restructuring of the EP into a lower house of a mixed com-
position as suggested by Blair, or the transformation of the Council into a Bun-
desrat-like assembly – what Schröder called a European Chamber of States – to
sit beside the EP. In terms of improving the present institutional system, the EP
should be granted full co-legislative powers with the Council, including the area
of compulsory expenditure, as well as the right to co-initiate legislation with the
Commission. Simplifying further the co-decision procedure is crucial in terms
of increasing visibility and public awareness over joint decision-making. In rela-
tion finally to the Council, a new European Affairs Council (EAC) could be set
up composed of Ministers for European Affairs. This body should remain dis-
tinct from the Foreign Affairs Council which, in turn, should be made respon-
sible only for second-pillar issues.40 As the General Affairs Council is presently
overloaded, it experiences grave difficulties in performing effectively both leg-
islative (including preparatory) and co-ordination functions. Furthermore,
there is a missing link between the COREPER and the European Council that
the proposed EAC could fill, while at the same time becoming more involved in
the preparatory work of the European Council, and co-ordinating the activity of
all other Councils to provide additional coherence.
The philosophy underlying the preferred means of associating national
parliaments with the EU political system is neither through the creation of a
new upper house, nor through the reconstitution of the lower chamber, but
rather through the setting up of an Inter-Parliamentary Committee to provide
additional checks and balances in the process of scrutinising EU legislation,
the equalisation of legislative powers between Council and the EP (combined
with a further simplification of co-decision), and the internal restructuring of
the Council through the establishment of the EAC to enable it to cope more
effectively with an ever-more complex interinstitutional apparatus, as well as
with an ever-expanding and increasingly state-like EU agenda. To the above list
one could add measures such as the reduction of Council-formations (by
grouping together some policy areas), the generalisation of QMV, increased
transparency in Council meetings (especially when it meets as a legislature),
greater involvement of the CoR in those areas of EU legislation that affect sub-
national units more closely and importantly (including the observation of
subsidiarity), the active involvement of the Council’s Secretariat in the
preparatory work of the Council Presidency (so as to relieve the latter of a vari-
ety of time-consuming and technical tasks), the assignment of greater imple-
mentation responsibility to the Commission but with enhanced national
parliamentary oversight, and so on.
Having examined several possibilities for further institutional reform, and
before turning to the final section of this study in an attempt to summarise the
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limits of institutionalising democratic norm-orientation in the Union, it is
worth recalling Olsen’s architectural analogy on EU institution-building:
Building European institutions of governance may be compared to building San
Pietro in Vatican – Saint Peter’s Basilica. Some trace its history nearly two thousand
years back, and even the current (new) Basilica took generations to build. There
have been many builders, popes and architects, as well as artists and workers. Plans
have been made, modified and rejected. There have been conflicts over designs
and over the use of resources. There have been shifting economic and political con-
ditions and changing cultural norms, including religious beliefs and fashions of
architecture. Such factors have affected both the motivation and ability to develop
the Basilica. Yet, as parts have been added, modified and even demolished, the pro-
ject has had a dynamic of its own, constraining both the physical development, the
use of, and meaning of, the Basilica.41
Concluding remarks
At a time when the Union remains much of an unspecified entity, and in Delors’
words un objet politique non-identifié, its dynamism is caught between federalist
aspirations of becoming a more congruent polity and a modified type of inter-
governmentalism, currently in the form of confederal consociation (see Chapter
2), confirming the centrality of states in the general system, by retaining ultimate
control over both system-wide constitutional choice and change. In support of
state-centrism also comes the view that even the recently observed dialectic
between sovereignty and integration, carrying with it the implication of an
explicit right to political co-determination, has failed to produce credible com-
mitments towards a common strategy for democratising the collectivity by
means of strengthening European civic competence. Arguably, however, in the
midst of a near-chaotic state of theorising the EU polity-building, the normative
agents of legitimate governance, ‘post-national constitutionalism’,42 and the
gradual but steadfast Europeanisation of civil society have raised the expecta-
tions of successive treaty amendments in endowing the Union with a clearer
constitutional physiognomy and civic identity. Yet, by consolidating national
autonomy, and by acknowledging the innate need of states to retain their formal
sovereignty by continuing to act as Herren der Verträge, the limits of treaty
reform in the late 1990s and early 2000s represent a clear illustration of the limits
of EU polity-building itself.
Another important implication is the perception that because the recent
review conferences carried a mandate for limited reforms, the development of
European citizenship and corollary democratic concerns would be dealt with at
a later stage. Judging, however, from the end product of Amsterdam and Nice
processes, it is not certain that the IGC 2004 will be equipped with the necessary
mandate for establishing conditions of legitimate governance based on an exten-
sive ‘deepening’ of common citizenship rights and the emergence of a new
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balancing act between social norms of legitimacy and actual policy performance.
Particularly with reference to the recent Nice reforms, far from representing a
cause célèbre for a substantive re-ordering of civic spaces and public spheres, they
amount to a cautiously negotiated deal of ‘partial offsets’ to key democratic
problems facing the Union. Hence, a new dynamic tension between the promise
of democratising the collectivity and the actual management of integration
manifested itself not only after Nice but, crucially, because of Nice. What the
latter failed in the end to produce was not only a common democratic vision per
se, but rather a belief that such a vision remains without reach, at least for the
foreseeable future. This critical assertion is justified further by perceiving the
NIT as the product of a predominantly utilitarian, cost–benefit calculus among
divergent and often ambivalent national interests along the lines of an overall
rationalist settlement.
To the above, one could add that it is hardly possible to introduce substantive
democratic reforms without civic participation, now that the once unquestion-
able ‘permissive consensus’ cannot generate the necessary public commitment
to an EU politics where ‘the provision of public welfare is best met through
the process of elite-led, regional integration’.43 If anything, the exclusion of
citizens from European governance, compounded by their lack of effective civic
competence, is at the expense of popular fragmentation itself. But it is also against
the interests of better equipping citizens to become agents of civic change within
a nascent pluralist order composed of increasingly entangled arenas for action.
Like any other polity that aspires to becoming a democracy, the Union has to
engage itself in a constitutive process based on a deliberative rather than aggrega-
tive model of governance, thus instituting a new framework of politics that
embraces the virtues of civic freedom and civic solidarity, by means of inventing
and, whenever necessary, re-inventing a sense of European res publica. After all,
as Bellamy insightfully argues, ‘Europe long ceased to be Holy, but its future may
be Roman’.44
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